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This study looks at the recent rise of the public relations profession and its influence 
on national news production in Britain. Simply put, has public relations undermined 
the notion of the fourth estate media in Britain and has it advantaged certain kinds of 
news source over others? 
The thesis breaks down into three parts. The first part documents the rise of public 
relations in Britain, its profile, and distribution amongst a range of institutions and 
organisations. The developing public relations and media industries are compared 
and the literature, on the relations between 'news sources', PR practitioners and 
journalists, is critically evaluated. The second part focuses on corporate public 
relations generally and, more specifically, on financial and City PR. Industry and 
fieldwork data are contrasted with radical and liberal accounts of media-corporate 
source relations. The findings suggest that corporate PR has had limited success in 
influencing mainstream news but been considerably more adept at managing 
specialist news sections. It is thus argued that PR has benefited the corporate sector, 
less by influencing journalists and the general public, and more by excluding them. 
This pattern is supported with a detailed case study involving Granada's take-over of 
Forte in 1995/96. The third part discusses 'resource-poor' and 'outsider' groups - 
more specifically, British trade unions. Fieldwork data is used to test radical and 
pluralist accounts of the coverage of such groups in the mass media. The findings 
argue that unions have found new ways to increase their media access using PR - and 
with rather more success than earlier studies suggested. The conclusion is borne out 
by a case study of the UCW's (Union of Communication Workers) successful PR 
campaign to halt Post Office privatisation in 1994. Finally, the separate findings of 
the thesis are used to develop a fuller description of how public relations affects 
media production and news source access. 
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PART ONIE: INTRODUCTORY FRAMEWORKS 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
PART ONE: THE RESEARCH TOPIC 
This research documents the expansion of professional public relations in Britain 
over the last two decades - particularly in sectors outside institutional politics. It then 
attempts to evaluate the impact of this on national news production and patterns of 
news-source access. 
As chapter two will illustrate, the public relations profession has expanded 
significantly during this period and expanded well beyond the confines of 
Westminster. A wide range of organisations have joined political parties and 
governments in adopting professional public relations as a means of achieving 
political and economic objectives. There are now over 2,400 separate PR 
consultancies registered in Britain (Hollis 1998). The PRCA (Public Relations 
Consultants Association), which primarily serves the corporate sector, recorded a rise 
in members' fee income of 1400% (inflation not accounted for) between 1983 and 
1998. In the 1990s several other types of organisation, including unions, pressure 
groups, religious organisations, charities, local councils and other state institutions 
have followed suit. Organisations in all these sectors are not simply utilising PR to 
improve their image with the public. They are employing professional 
communicators to achieve a number of more specific objectives, including: 
influencing policy makers, raising share prices, winning industrial disputes, 
increasing income, and generating interest in particular issues and new cultural 
products. Thus, behind the current media interest in a few key 'spin doctors' a 
substantial layer of 'cultural intermediaries' has evolved with a significant impact on 
news production and decision-makers. 
At the start of my PhD (September, 1996), despite much speculation about the 
impact of professional PR on the media, there was little focused research on the 
subject in the UK. What there was was dispersed amongst various sub-disciplines 
and practitioner accounts within public relations, journalism, media sociology, and 
politics and government. 
In the PR industry itself, and in the few university public relations departments that 
have recently emerged, research has generally been anecdotal and in an applied, 
rather than critical, form. The research has thus been aimed at practitioners and has 
had little engagement with the research interests of other social science subject areas 
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(Newman, 1984, and L'Etang, J and Pieczka, M, 1996, being two rare exceptions). 
Journalists' accounts (e. g., Cockerell et al, 1984, Cockerell, 1988, Jones, 1995,1999, 
Rosenbaum, 1997) have been rather more concerned with the influence of public 
relations professionals (PRPs) on news and politics but, once again, tended to offer 
anecdotal snapshots, with little in the way of rigorous empirical research or 
theoretical engagement. 
Within departments of media studies and politics, the subject of public relations has 
generally only been considered as part of other research on, for example, media- 
source relations or party political communications. Political communications has, 
understandably, been focused on the PR involved in institutional politics - most 
especially on general elections (see especially Scammell, 1995, Kavanagh, 1995, 
Negrine, 1996, Crewe and Gosschalk/Harrop, 1986 and 1989,1995). This interest 
has yet to filter through to political sociology, where there appears to be almost no 
recent work on the public relations work of organisations acting in civil society. 
Media studies, having been guilty of the charge of being 'media-centric' for many 
years, has begun to explore this new field under the research topic of 'sources' and 
'media-source' relations (see especially Miller, 1994, Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994, 
Deacon and Golding, 1994). However, much of this research was conducted before 
the recent development of professional public relations within such organisations. 
Hence public relations per se was not the principal object of research. Thus, while 
the list of studies which devote greater attention to the subject of professional public 
relations in civil society is growing (see also Franklin, 1994, Negrine, 1994, McNair, 
1995, Manning, 1998) several questions remain. Indeed there was, and still remains, 
significant scope for a focused research project in this area - the results of which 
would serve to intervene in several evolving debates across media studies and 
political communications. 
PART TWO: FRAMEWORKS AND DEBATES 
There were many potential debates and theoretical frameworks with which to study 
the topic. One obvious route, spelled out by Baudrillard (in Poster, 1988) and applied 
by Wernick (1991) to 'promotional culture' generally, was to take public relations as 
an empirical focus for the advancement of postmodernity. Another approach was to 
research the subject in terms of debates about the public sphere as set out by 
Haben-nas (1989 [1962]) and pursued by several sociologists (see collections in, for 
example, Dahlgren and Sparks, 1991 and in Calhoun, 1992). However, my interests 
10 
were rather too 'modernist' to pursue the first option, and the influence of public 
relations on the public sphere too 'irrational' to pursue the second. In either case, 
rather than follow the frameworks defined by specific theorists, I chose to intervene 
in two broad debates that had developed within media sociology. 
Two debates outlined here are: 1) liberal and radical political economy arguments for 
and against the case for the fourth estate media, and 2) pluralist and radical accounts 
of sources, media-source relations and patterns of source access. Both debates are 
concerned with the democratic role of the mass media in modem states. Simply put, 
in liberal democracies the national news media are expected to fulfil a number of 
'ideal' functions (see Keane, 1991, McNair, 1995, Negrine, 1996, for discussions). 
These include providing: a source of objective information, widely available to all 
citizens and interest groups; a check ('watchdog role') on the activities of powerful 
institutions, organisations and individuals; an arena for rational debate on the issues 
affecting society and the state; and access to a wide range of citizens and interest 
groups to put forward their views. For liberal pluralists, the mass media, while far 
from being perfect, manages to fulfil these functions to a satisfactory level. For 
radical political economists it does not. Instead the media are all to often skewed 
towards reporting patterns which favour particular classes, elites or interest groups. 
These debates have already been played out in a number of research areas. There are 
however two key reasons to return to them in this thesis. First, as pointed out, public 
relations has rarely provided a focal point for these debates. Its sudden expansion has 
obvious implications - both for the notion of an independent fourth estate media and 
discussions about media-source relations and source access. Second, both media and 
political environments have been transformed in the period in question - 1979-1999. 
Technological change has brought multiple new means of communicating news to 
wider audiences. Privatisation and deregulation, coupled with globalisation of the 
communications industries, has permitted the growth of new media conglomerates 
and a complete shake up of the sector (see Tunstall, 1996, Cur-ran and Seaton, 1997). 
Similarly, the political and economic landscape has also shifted substantially. The 
neo-liberal shift in government policy-making during the period of Conservative 
government (see, for example, Kavanagh and Seldon, 1989, Young, 1990, 
Middlemas, 1991, Letwin, 1992, Budge and McKay, 1993, Hutton, 1996) has been 
matched by strong shifts in the power bases and media profiles of various source 
organisations. For example, unions and UK manufacturing industry have declined 
while the financial and service sectors have expanded. Industrial relations coverage 
now occupies much less media space than before and financial news more (see 
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Jones, 1987, Tunstall, 1996, Franklin, 1997). Similarly, certain industry sectors and 
types of pressure group are more frequently reported than they were before and 
events in Parliament less. 
Within this changing political and media environment professional public relations 
has expanded at an unprecedented rate. One is thus led to enquire: are such things 
linked? Has public relations flourished because of the changing media environment? 
Has public relations been instrumental in promoting certain organisations and their 
interests over others in the media? 
The Fourth Estate Media 
Liberal pluralist studies of journalists at work have stressed the independence of 
journalists and journalism. They also emphasise the neutral objectivity of the news 
production process that results from journalists reporting a plurality of competing 
interests and opinions. Professional values guide journalists towards neutral coverage 
of issues that are significant to the mass of consumers and therefore tend to act as a 
check on major concentrations of power (Tunstall, 1971, Gans, 1980, Alexander, 
1981, Heatherington, 1985, Harrison, 1986, Tiffen, 1989, Schudson, 1991). Internal 
news formats, genres and agendas guide news values accordingly. Market-oriented 
pragmatism (Gans, 1980, Koss, 1984) ensures that consumers get what they want - 
news that is balanced and broadly reflective of the concerns of the mass of 
constituents (VeIjanovski, 1989, Sola Pool, 1990). 
In contrast, radical media sociologists have argued that journalists cannot be 
independent because powerful interests - namely state and/or corporate elites - have 
continually managed to influence the news production process. This top-down 
influence has been maintained through conscious control of media organisations 
(e. g., ownership and management) and/or less conscious factors (e. g., economic and 
ideological). Ownership, whether by the state or private corporations, has brought 
with it the power to allocate resources, appoint senior staff and influence editorial 
agendas. Additionally, the state has also controlled news production with its ability 
to regulate the media through legislation on censorship, libel laws, licensing, and 
media ownership. Corporate elites have extended their control through overlapping 
networks of shareholders and directorships, and through advertising -a principal 
source of media funding. As many accounts (Schlesinger et al, 1983, Evans, 1983, 
Glasgow University Media Group, 1985, Hollingsworth, 1986, Schiller, 1989,1992, 
Tunstall and Palmer, 1991 Curran and Seaton, 1997) have documented, both states 
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and private owners have frequently abused their control and sought to influence 
journalist employees and the political process for their own ends. 
Radicals have also argued that independent journalism is affected by wider economic 
conditions; by the fact that news is a business operating in a capitalist system and is 
affected accordingly. Market pressures, to take advantage of economies of scale and 
greater advertising revenues, have encouraged production for mass audiences and a 
steady stream of concentration and conglomeration. The results have been: a 
restriction on entry for alternative and critical news producers, cuts in costly news 
production and investigative journalism, and pressure to increase audiences through 
the creation of populist and apolitical 'newszak'. All such trends have been widely 
documented (e. g., Curran, 1977,1986, Fishman, 1980, Murdock, 1982, Gitlin, 1994, 
Chomsky and Herman, 1988, Gamham, 1990, Williams, 1996, Curran and Seaton, 
1997, Franklin, 1997, Bagdikian, 1997, Herman and McChesney, 1997) and have 
accordingly reduced the capacity of journalists to fulfil the media's fourth estate 
remit. 
However, what was all too often absent in radical accounts, at least until the early 
1990s, was a substantial focus on micro-level influences and individual agency. 
Advertising and ownership may arguably affect the shape of news but, critics ask, 
have radicals adequately demonstrated that such factors really undermine media 
autonomy and objectivity on a day-to-day basis? It is on this micro-level that 
scholars in sociology and cultural studies have inadvertently joined journalists and 
liberal media sociologists in supporting the case for the fourth estate media. Thus 
much cultural studies research (e. g., Morley, 1980,1992, Ang, 1985, Fiske, 1987, 
and Comer, 1991) has argued the line that journalists and media consumers have 
rather more autonomy and agency than radical political economists have hitherto 
assumed. Studies of post-Fordist managerial structures and independent producers 
(e. g, Piore and Sabel, 1984, Hall and Jaques, 1989, Ve1janovski, 1989) have 
emphasised the fact that media production power has been significantly dispersed. 
Many of the other charges of such studies; that radical political economists are 
uniformly too 'functionalist', conspiratorial, over emphasise 'economic 
determinism', and assume consumers are 'cultural dupes'; have become recognised 
for the straw (wo)men that they are (see Golding and Murdock, 1996, Curran, 1996). 
But a critical core objection remains: that radical accounts of a biased mass media 
have been too reliant on work that stresses macro and wider political and economic 
trends and has not adequately tested this thesis with micro-level empirical work that 
observes active agents. 
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in effect, several bodies of work have reinforced the liberal media sociology case for 
the fourth estate media on grounds that radicals have been slow to counter. While 
radicals have produced a number of innovative responses at this level; with, for 
example, work correlating income with communications access (MacKay, 1995, 
Golding and Murdock, 1996), the loss of control through post-Fordist developments 
and media bureaucracies (Robins and Comford, 1992, Franklin, 1997, Gitlin, 1994), 
and wider cultural factors (Curran, 1999, Ma, 1999); there is still some scope for 
micro-level research on news production from a radical media sociology perspective. 
in other words, there appears a need for radicals to supplement their macro-level 
based arguments about the fourth estate media with arguments at the micro-level'. 
Work on sources and media-source relations has been one area of research at such a 
level. However, to date, this work has avoided coming to definitive conclusions on 
the matter of journalists' autonomy in their relations with sources. Up until the early 
1990s, those media sociologists who addressed the question (Tunstall, 1971, Sigal, 
1973, Gans, 1980, Fishman, 1980, Tiffen, 1989) tended to agree that the attempts of 
either side to manage the other were often superseded by the benefits of co- 
operation. Thus the two sides were actually engaged in a 'sea-saw tug of war' in 
which, although sources were slightly stronger, neither side dominated for long. With 
increased interest in the subject (Ericson et al, 1989,1991, Schlesinger, 1990, 
Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994, Deacon and Golding, 1994, Miller, 1994), pluralist 
themes have directed research agendas. As such, the reaction to earlier radical 
functionalist/structuralist accounts of media-source relations, coupled with an 
emphasis on exploring source competition (see below) in the media, has thus meant 
that the debate about journalistic autonomy has been side-stepped. 
The rapid expansion of public relations, coupled with other changes in the UK media 
and political environments, has obvious ramifications for the debate on the autonomy 
of the fourth estate media - and at the micro level. Indeed, if public relations has 
expanded so dramatically and, according to all industry surveys (e. g., PR Week 
surveys, 27.5.93,20.8.99), 'media relations' is the principal activity of its 
practitioners, then it would seem essential that the impact of PR on journalistic 
autonomy is researched. But, as already stated, with all these studies, public relations 
has not been the key focus. Several of the studies mentioned have noted the part 
'Ironically, a major source of support for this work has come from many liberal media sociologists 
(Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995, Tunstall, 1996, Seymour-Ure, 1996, Fallows, 1996) who have also 
begun to acknowledge the patterns observed by radical political economists and to show concern 
about the 'crisis of public communication'. 
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played by public relations and the questions posed by its expansion (see also issue of 
Media, Culture and Society in 1993, Vol. 15, No. 3). But no major study on the 
question has since been published in the UK (Manning, 1998, might be seen as a 
possible exception). 
The study of professional public relations thus offers a potentially productive 
research area in which radical and liberal media sociologists may meet on micro- 
level territory. Of central concern is the question of whether the expansion of PR 
suggests a micro-level undermining of journalistic autonomy, or a boost to 
journalists doing their jobs? Are journalists significantly affected by powerful PR 
practitioners (PRPs) - consciously or unconsciously - or are they strong enough to 
maintain their professional independence? Is news becoming more a tainted product 
constructed out of partial public relations outputs or, as the PR industry itself 
suggests (see, for example, Grunig and Hunt, 1984), does it simply facilitate a clearer 
and wider flow of two-way information between sources and their publics? These 
questions are addressed directly in chapter two and indirectly in each of the 
remaining chapters. 
Pluralism, Sources and Media-Source Relations 
Closely related to the debate over the autonomy of the fourth estate media is the 
question of pluralist access. Liberal pluralists have always worked on the assumption 
that democracy thrives on a range of competing interests which balance each other 
out. Within this framework the news media give voice to a plurality of competing 
voices (McQuail, 1979, Alexander, 1981, Blumler and Gurevitch, 1986, Harrison, 
1986); a plurality that is expanding with new technologies such as the Internet, cheap 
video equipment and new digital broadcasting (Negroponte, 1995, Pavlik, 1996). To 
date, liberal pluralists have rarely looked directly at sources, preferring instead to 
underpin their arguments with the observation of such things as journalists' routines 
and professional values. 
However, pluralist assumptions concerning source access have been continually 
undennined by one repeated finding in media sociology. Studies, both liberal 
(Tunstall, 1971, Gans, 1979, Blumler and Gurevitch, 1986,1995, and Tiffen, 1989, 
Hallin, 1994) and radical (Sigal, 1973, Glasgow University Media Group, 1976, 
1980, Hall, et al, 1978, Gitlin, 1980, Gandy, 1980, Fishman, 1980, Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988), have all confirmed that news has been consistently dominated by 
sources from government and established institutions. As a result, what literature 
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there existed on sources was, for some time, dominated by radical thinking. Such 
work started with the premise of unequal source access and was simply concerned 
with explaining why that occurred. 
For the Glasgow University Media Group (1976,1980,1982), where unequal access 
between interest groups was not sufficiently accounted for by macro-economic 
explanations, it was by the prevalence of 'dominant ideology'. This accounted for the 
dominance of corporate and state elite opinions and agendas in media texts because 
journalists were unconsciously guided by established elite norms and values. Hall et 
al's (1978) 'structural culturalist' alternative skilfully elaborated on these themes. 
They argued that journalists, in their search for 'objective' and 'authoritative' 
accounts, automatically sought out institutionalised sources which were already 
legitimised by their power, representativeness and expertise. The media's 'structured 
preferences' for the opinions of 'primary definers' meant that non-institutional 
sources, and journalists themselves, could only respond to those agendas and 
frameworks already determined. 
However, in the time that elapsed between this early work, in the 1970s, and renewed 
interest in sources, in the early 1990s, the research climate changed considerably. 
New work attempted to distance itself from earlier 'overly structuralist/functionalist' 
accounts. Schlesinger's critique of Hall et al (1990) summed up the case most 
definitively: primary definers, being often in conflict, did not speak with one voice; 
neither did they retain the same levels of access over time, let alone possess equal 
amounts of access. Similarly, journalists and non-official sources were not always 
relegated to subordinate positions of counter-definition, but did on occasion 
challenge official accounts. In effect, the structural culturalist approach, like the 
radical functionalist one, gave an overly deterministic picture that did not account for 
change and the 'dynamic processes of contestation in a given field of discourse'. 
The body of work on sources that followed has been either pluralist or radical- 
pluralist in nature. Much of it has focused on assessing the media strategies of 
pressure groups (Anderson, 1991,1993,1997, Hansen, 1993, Cracknell, 1993, 
Manning, 1998). In line with liberal work on journalism (Tiffen, 1989, Schudsen, 
1996) these studies often explained away the dominance of elite sources as being a 
result of the organisational routines and values of news gatherers; i. e., for variable 
organisational, rather than structured ideological, reasons. At the same time, Hallin 
(1994) noted that although elite sources dominated news texts those same sources 
were often in conflict. Thus it could be argued, in a more pluralist vein, that conflicts 
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amongst primary definers are reflected in the media and act to cancel out other elite 
source advantages. 
In a more radical-pluralist vein has come a series of studies comparing various types 
of source. These have been in the 'criminal justice arena' (Schlesinger and Tumber 
1994), in the Northern Ireland conflict (Miller, 1993,1994), in policy-making in the 
health sector (Miller and Williams, 1993,1998), and during attempts to introduce the 
6poll tax' (Deacon and Golding, 1994). Each of these studies (see also studies on 
pressure groups cited above) has both documented non-official source media 
strategies and demonstrated the potential means by which official sources 
occasionally fail to dominate media discourses. All therefore fleshed out a scenario 
where media access and the accumulation of media status (a form of 'cultural 
capital') are continually contested matters. Overall there seems to have developed 
quite an impressive body of literature on the subject of non-institutional sources - 
much of it resulting in an alternative radical-pluralist synthesis. Some of the work 
has also produced material relevant to the study of public relations in a variety of 
sectors. 
However, many gaps and questions remain. While several studies observed state 
institutions at a time when professional public relations had already been established, 
the same cannot be said of other sectors in civil society. The business sector has been 
virtually ignored in media studies. This is a significant omission given that a) this 
sector is by far the largest employer of public relations, and b) policy-making has had 
a clear free-market pro-business slant over the last two decades. At the same time, all 
studies of 'outsider' and 'resource-poor' sources were based on research at the end of 
the 1980s and early 1990s and, as such, were completed before the recent and 
widespread adoption of professional PR practitioners and methods in those sectors. 
As a result, most (Miller, 1994 and Manning, 1998, being the main exceptions) have 
not been concerned with separating the practice of PR from its source ties. 
Professional PRPs themselves - those working outside formal politics - have largely 
been ignored. PR has simply been seen as an extension of the resources and media 
relations of an interest group or organisation. It is thus generally assumed that there 
exists a fairly accurate correlation between a source's economic, political and 
4cultural' capital, and its media profile; and the fluidity of contestation in the media 
waxes and wanes accordingly. Outsider sources can only make a temporary and 
limited impact, and only if they become institutionalised and/or dominant elites are 
in conflict. 
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With little focused research on public relations itself, these assumptions have not 
been tested. However, a few simple points about professional public relations and 
journalist-PRP relations reveal clear inconsistencies in such premises. First, the 
(newsworthyness' of sources appears to be as much conditioned by a variety of 
internal journalist imperatives as by an external source's level of resources. So, for 
example, corporate sources, despite their high level of resources and expenditure on 
PR, have not gained comparable levels of access or positive coverage (see chapter 
three). Second, PR strategies, in themselves, can considerably affect the levels of 
cultural and political resources of sources and the newsgathering routines of 
journalists (see chapter seven and eight). Third, within the industry, public relations 
is considered to be most effective when acting invisibly. This not only means PRPs 
being invisible, it also means sources feeding information to journalists and setting 
agendas without themselves necessarily appearing in the media (see chapters five and 
eight). Fourth, as most PRPs are aware, general coverage and public opinion are 
often less important than influencing key audiences and decision-making processes 
(see chapter four). 
All of which indicates that there is ample scope for a thorough investigation of how 
public relations has affected the ability of various types of source/interest group in 
civil society to impact upon the British media and public discourse. Clearly, if many 
types of source organisation are adopting public relations and media strategies as a 
means of obtaining their objectives, then it must be asked: are particular interests 
benefiting at the expense of others? Is public relations simply a means by which 
particular elite interests can further dominate access and manage media agendas? Or, 
does it enable 'outsider' and 'resource-poor' (Goldenberg, 1975) groups to gain 
media coverage that was previously denied to them? This is the central question that 
is discussed in different ways in chapters three to eight. 
PART THREE: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND THESIS OUTLINE 
The research objectives of the thesis were as follows: 
1) to accumulate detailed empirical data on the growth and distribution of 
professional public relations in Britain over the last two decades 
2) to theorise how, and to what degree, public relations impacts upon news 
production in the national press 
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3) to investigate how public relations alters the positioning of source 
organisations within national media hierarchies and, in effect, includes or 
excludes them from participation in public discourse 
The ftameworks, debates and objectives outlined helped to narrow down and define 
the research parameters. In addition to collecting general data on the rise of public 
relations in Britain, three organisational sectors were chosen for further study - large 
corporations, 'outsider' pressure groups and state funded institutions. These were 
further narrowed to include FTSE top 150 companies operating in the City, trade 
unions during industrial disputes, and welfare state institutions engaged in funding 
battles with government. The selection of three types of source organisation proved 
over-ambitious and, after completion of the first two sector studies, enough material 
had been gathered to dispense with the study of state-funded institutions. 
The research parameters were also narrowed down in other ways. First, public 
relations in Britain has many sub-specialities and overlapping roles. Lobbying, 
marketing, advertising and internal staff communications are all conducted by PRPs 
as well as other communications specialists. At times this thesis does refer to such 
activities. However, its principal focus when referring to 'public relations' is 'media 
relations' work - the main activity of the industry. Second, all specific research 
referring to the news media was confined to the national press - thus excluding 
regional and trade press and national and regional broadcasting. The third parameter 
was national. Although much of the literature discussed was North American and 
European, the empirical work only engaged with British organisations and media. 
The thesis breaks down into eight chapters grouped into three parts. The first part 
(chapter two) details the rise of public relations in Britain, its profile and distribution. 
It then evaluates ongoing debates about the nature of working relationships between 
news sources, public relations practitioners and journalists. It concludes that what 
was once a 'tug of war' between sources and journalists has been replaced by an 
increased media dependency on the 'information subsidies' provided by PR. Public 
relations has therefore increased its influence, not as a result of powerful spin doctor 
pressure, or media-source conspiracy, but because working news journalists have 
become increasingly stretched as a result of rising competition. PR professionals, 
with their rapidly increasing resources, have thus been ideally placed to make good 
the shortfall in news-producing industries. 
Part two (chapters three, four and five) then focuses on the corporate sector. The 
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corporate sector is not only the principal user of professional PR; it is regarded, along 
with the state, as the source which is most influential in media production. Chapter 
three thus asks: how, and in what ways, has corporate public relations benefited the 
corporate sector in Britain? The chapter concludes that, contrary to the conclusions 
of several critical studies in media sociology, corporate public relations has had 
limited success in promoting corporate agendas and ideals to the general public 
through national mainstream news. Instead, corporate PR has been more involved in 
specialist news sectors - most significantly in the area of City and financial public 
relations and business news. 
Chapter four thus concentrates its investigations on financial PR activity. Although 
PR in this sector is promoted as a means of information dissemination for the perfect 
functioning of the market, and financial and business news is deemed to be a 
response to greater public interest, very different trends are in evidence. Rather, PR 
has developed more as a corporate tool, used to gain competitive advantage, in an era 
of increased conflict and competition between rival financial elites. It concludes that 
the consequences of the use of PR in this sector are that financial and business news 
has been 'captured' by financial elite news sources, and that non-financial elites have 
been excluded. The long-term results of such closed 'elite discourse networks' have 
been a) a steady stream of corporate decision-making driven purely by market 
imperatives, and b) a neo-liberal economic consensus being continually reaffirmed 
and exported to outside constituents. Chapter five documents all these aspects with a 
detailed case study involving Granada's take-over of Forte in 1995/96. 
The question in part three (chapters six, seven and eight) reverses the perspective. It 
asks: can public relations be successfully used by 'outsider' and 'resource-poor' 
groups to secure and widen their media access and, therefore, gain access to such 
'elite discourse networks'? Its empirical focus is the British trade union movement. 
Chapter six begins by reassessing critical media sociology accounts of why such 
groups failed to get positive coverage in the 1970s and 1980s. It finds fault with the 
early explanations for the causes of media bias against such groups during the 1980s 
- suggesting, from a media-source relations perspective, that there is some scope for 
professional communications to improve coverage generally. Chapter seven goes on 
to document the extensive use of PR by unions in the 1990s and observes various 
means by which union communicators have overcome their resource deficits. It is 
thus demonstrated that 'outsider' groups are also capable of 'spinning' elite decision- 
makers and occasionally forcing significant changes. Chapter eight illustrates these 
findings in some detail with a case study of the UCW's (Union of Communication 
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Workers) successful PR campaign to halt Post Office privatisation in 1994 - the first 
privatisation successfully opposed by a union during the Conservative govemment. 
The final chapter (nine) pulls together the conclusions of the previous chapters. 
PART FOUR: METHODS 
This thesis adopts an eclectic range of both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
This was because the initial intention was to relate the micro-activities of individual 
agents to more general macro outcomes. Small-scale actions were to be traced to 
larger political and economic outcomes; as opposed to inferring micro-activities from 
identifiable macro-patterns. It therefore seemed appropriate, on the one hand, to 
gather and generate qualitative data, in the form of interview material and qualitative 
content analyses of specific documents and media texts, in order to identify micro- 
level activity. On the other, this was to be matched with survey material, financial 
data sets, and quantitative content analyses of media texts - to establish macro- 
patterns. The micro-level activity of public relations and media-source relations 
could then be linked to more general outcomes. 
However, as the research progressed the need to use a number of different methods 
became apparent for two other reasons. The first was the subject matter. Public 
relations is, according to those involved, most effective if it retains a high level of 
anonymity. Although PR has now become an essential part of news production, both 
journalists and PRPs are interested in minimising knowledge about their 
interdependency. Additionally, while many practitioners were willing to be 
interviewed and grant access, they were also likely to engage in attempts to 'spin' the 
researcher. In effect, much of the qualitative material collected, especially interview 
material, was often contradictory and, on its own, unreliable. It therefore seemed 
continually necessary to compare qualitative material on particular points from a 
number of sources and, where possible, to support findings with quantitative data. 
The second reason came down to what was most practical, given the existing forms 
of data and the size of the sector being studied. In some cases quantitative data 
already existed, but little else; and in others, the reverse was true. This was often the 
result of public relations being studied in different research environments. Corporate 
PR, for instance, had been researched for commercial purposes by the industry itself. 
Institutional PR had been largely studied in political science departments while non- 
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institutional PR activities had been observed in interdisciplinary media departments. 
In some cases there were clearly identifiable sampling frameworks where sampling 
was simple and manageable with the resources available. In others that was not 
possible. 
The fieldwork, in fact, included 103 interviews with 97 individuals and produced 
over 180,000 words of transcribed material. Less than five per cent of this is 
reproduced in the PhD and transcribed material is, on the whole, simply used to 
illustrate events and general points made elsewhere. Very occasionally, when a large 
group of interviewees each pointed out a similar trend or pattern, a more general 
sociological point is supported simply with interview material. Generally, interviews 
were most useful as a means of gaining access to other material and confirming or 
contradicting events and trends noted elsewhere. The majority of the interviews took 
place 'on-the-record' and most citations are referenced. However, a proportion of 
interviewees, as well as particular parts of on-the-record interviews, were recorded 
'off-the-record'. All interviewees, bar two senior civil servants in the DTI, are listed 
in the bibliography. 
The research took place in three parts - each of which followed a similar procedural 
line. The first part began with a literature review across media studies, political 
communications and public relations. Initial sources of primary research and possible 
research questions were identified. This was followed by what amounted to a pilot 
study involving the accumulation of detailed empirical data on the growth and 
distribution of professional public relations in Britain (the first research objective) 
and a case study of public relations in action. Information on the growth and 
distribution of professional PR was accumulated through secondary literature and by 
secondary analysis of existing data-sets (Hakim, 1982). Initial research on the less or 
non-quantifiable aspects of public relations, such as common PR strategies, 
joumalist-PR interaction and types of resource used, began with a set of semi- 
structured interviews and interpretative content analysis of a series of documents 
accumulated in a structured research review (Ericson et al, 1991). Secondary 
literature, content analysis, semi-structured interviews and secondary analysis all 
combined to produce a focused synthesis (Hakim, 1979) revealing emergent patterns 
of PR forms, distribution and growth. 
Sources for this first section included: government and professional association 
surveys; trade journal surveys and reports; company annual reports and accounts; the 
records, policy documents and publications from a sample of PR departments; 22 
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interviews with a combination of journalists, senior company officials and public 
relations personnel. The study was completed with a case study of a widely covered 
public relations conflict. This compared the PR activities of the Prison Officers 
Association, the Prison Reform Trust, Group 4 Securitas and the Home Office during 
the introduction of the first privatised prison escort system in April 1993. Its primary 
objective was to begin theorising about how, and to what degree, public relations was 
impacting upon news production in the national press (the second research 
objective). 
This initial study clarified the need to explore further the first two research objectives 
and offered up a third. This was to investigate how public relations alters the 
positioning of source organisations within national media hierarchies, and aids or 
hinders such organisations in their attempts to achieve specific political and 
economic objectives. It also revealed a number of sectors where professional PR was 
beginning to make a more significant impact. These sectors included: political 
parties, trade unions, local councils, corporations, charities, central government, the 
police service, welfare state institutions, pressure groups and the cultural industries 
themselves. Three of these organisational sectors were chosen to pursue the research 
objectives at a more focused level - businesses, trade unions and welfare state 
institutions. The findings of this pilot study provide the basis of the general profile of 
professional public relations and its relationship with the national media that make 
up chapter two. This has been synthesised with new material collected throughout the 
rest of the research. The case study has not been reproduced in this thesis. 
In each of the two main sections of the thesis a similar pattern in the use of methods 
and procedure is identifiable. Each was concerned with generating research 
hypotheses out of a collection of existing secondary and primary materials. This was 
followed by a mid-level exploration of those hypotheses through a more focused 
collection of data from an identifiable and representative sample of organisations and 
individuals. The findings were then tested with a detailed case study. 
Thus chapters three and six critically reviewed the existing literature on public 
relations and the media in studies of corporations and 'outsider' groups respectively. 
Each sector study also involved accumulating more secondary data-sets on the 
growth and distribution of PR in the sector, and completing a set of depth interviews 
with experienced practitioners in the field. The findings helped to identify sampling 
frameworks and to break down the research objectives into manageable components. 
In other words, these chapters clarified my hypotheses and were the first steps 
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towards an operationalization of larger-scale fieldwork. 
Chapters four and seven, as well as gathering more information on the general 
adoption and distribution of PR in the sector also focused on more subjective 
questions. How much had PR been incorporated into the sector? What combination 
of resources (economic and other) were being used by these organisations? What 
were the common PR strategies of organisations within the sector? How much had 
the general introduction of PR aided or hindered them in gaining media access and 
therefore achieving specific objectives? 
In the case of the corporate sector chapters (three and four) a certain amount of 
quantitative data was already in evidence. Industry researchers had produced several 
surveys and research reports over the years. PR Week (the industry trade joumal), the 
IPR and PRCA (the industry's professional bodies), and several media distribution 
companies and PR consultancies, had all compiled data on the industry - although 
many of the surveys lacked rigour and used small or skewed samples. Because some 
quantitative data sets were already available, and because the business sampling 
frame was so large, it was decided to a) narrow the study parameters, and b) 
concentrate greater resources on accumulating more qualitative material. Thus, 
chapter four focuses on financial public relations. Financial PR is considered to be 
the top end of the industry and has provided more income for consultancies in the 
last two decades than any other form of corporate PR. 
Sources of qualitative and quantitative textual material for this section included: PR 
Week, the City and Financial Section of the Institute of Public Relations, the Investor 
Relations Society, the Stock Exchange, City Business and Guildhall Libraries, and 
the Advertising Association. Semi-structured interviews, conducted with 38 different 
professionals, active in the field of financial PR and journalism, provided further 
qualitative material. Ten interviews were with the corporate affairs directors of top 
150 companies as listed in the Times 1000 (1997). All PRP interviewees were also 
featured in PR Week in the 18 months prior to interview. 15 interviews were with 
senior representatives (chairmen, partners, directors) of a majority of the top 
financial PR consultancies in the UK. These were selected by cross-referencing 
tables produced by PR Week, Crawfords Directory of City Connections, and the 
Hernmington Scott (Hambro) Company Guide. Nine senior financial journalists and 
editors, working in the national press, chosen according to experience and on other 
interviewees' recommendations, were selected. The last four interviewees included 
the Director General of the Takeover Panel, the Executive Director of the PRCA, the 
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Director of External Affairs of the Investor Relations Society, and an independent 
financial PR consultant. The list of organisations visited and individuals interviewed 
did not strictly adhere to a specific sampling method but, I believe, still provided a 
good representative sample of the sector and from several contrasting viewpoints. 
in the case of the pressure group/trade union chapters (six and seven) there existed 
virtually no quantitative or qualitative material. Barely any studies of trade unions 
and the media had been completed since the mid 1980s (the exception, Paul 
Manning's 1998 book, still used data collected in the late 1980s and early 1990s). 
Thus it was decided that both were needed. One of the reasons for the selection of 
trade unions was, in fact, the existence of a simple and limited sampling frame. 
Research gathered data using two methods. The first was a survey of all trade unions 
affiliated to the TUC (accounting for 80% of union membership in the UK). The 
second was a set of interviews across a range of affiliated unions. 
The survey questionnaire was sent out by post to all 74 affiliates (as listed in the 
1997 TUC Directory) in July 1997.54 usable questionnaires, or 73% of the total, 
were returned. The questionnaires were coded and the information fed into SPSS for 
ftirther analysis. In addition to the survey, a series of semi-structured interviews was 
conducted with representatives of 19 different unions (one in four) selected through a 
stratified sample. Unions were coded and selected for interview according to criteria 
(including size, union density, private or public sector, and professional 
classification) with interviewees selected so as to represent all strata. Additionally, 
interviews were conducted with two union PR consultants, and seven (one ex) 
journalists with long experience of industrial relations reporting. Further qualitative 
source material came from union documents and reports kept at the TUC Library. 
Chapters five and eight tested the hypotheses generated in earlier chapters, at the 
micro-level. Both consisted of strategic case studies in which rival organisations 
employed extensive PR campaigns to compete over issues with set timetables. The 
impact of sources on news production was judged by taking source data and 
comparing it with media outputs. PR materials, policy documents and source 
interviews were correlated with media texts and interviews with journalists (methods 
identified in Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). Quantitative and interpretative content 
analysis of news texts was then used to assess the impacts of PR and the 
effectiveness of both corporate, institutional and union sources. Case studies 
conformed to a multiple-case design (Yin, 1994) to allow for greater comparison 
between sectors and further testing of conclusions. Relevant news texts and 
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campaign documents (public and private) were, in most cases, already compiled by 
the organisations involved; logged articles and organisational profiles were then 
subjected to more sustained quantitative analysis by use of the FT Profile database 
and CD Roms (Hansen, 1993). 
The newspaper content analysis for chapter five recorded a total of 582 articles 
appearing in nine national daily newspapers and three Sunday papers over a two- 
month period. These included all articles for the period that were over six column 
centimetres for broadsheets and over three column centimetres for tabloids. The 
newspaper content analysis for chapter eight looked at all articles appearing in 10 
national daily newspapers over a six-month period -a total of 285 items. All articles 
were initially located in the cuttings collections of the organisations; involved. To 
ensure comprehensive coverage, these were checked and cross-referenced with CD 
Rom collections in the British Library. 
For each article in both case studies a number of elements were recorded: 1) which 
organisational sources were quoted, 2) which organisations contributed and/or had 
their positions/arguments stated, and 3) what were the arguments/positions expressed 
in the headline and first paragraph? Lastly, the main participants were each given a 
favourability rating of minus two to plus two for each article. Zero denoted either no 
mention or a neutral presentation. Minus one represented a negative impression of a 
group and/or policies associated with it; plus one, a positive impression. Minus two 
represented an outright attack on that group; plus two, an outright endorsement. Each 
study also recorded data more specific to the research objectives of the sector study. 
Models for this analysis are to be found in Hansen (1993) and in the methods used by 
many companies involved in evaluating PR campaigns for the industry. 
Further details of the methods involved, including the selection of interviewees and 
articles for analysis, are in footnotes to the chapters concerned. Details of the union 
survey, including the questionnaire and results tables, are in the appendices. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EXPANSION OF PUBLIC RELATIONS IN 
BRITAIN, MEDIA-PR RELATIONS, AND THE RISE IN INFORMATION 
SUBSIDIES 
PART ONE: THE RISE OF PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS IN 
BRITAIN AFTER 1979 
The profession of public relations is not new. As several accounts have recorded 
(Kelley, 1956, Tulloch, 1993, Cutlip et al, 1994, Ewen, 1996, Rosenbaum, 1997, 
L'Etang, 1998) it has been employed by governments and large corporations for 
most of the twentieth century. The work of Edward Bemays and Ivy Lee, the 
'grandfathers' of the industry, began with corporate expansion in the USA in the 
1900s. The Democratic and Republican parties established their PR offices in 1928 
and 1932 respectively. Government information services and propaganda operations 
grew tremendously during the first and second world wars. Indeed, the modem 
foundations of British public relations - the Central Office of Information (1945) and 
the Institute of Public Relations (1948) - were established with personnel from 
largely redundant government departments used to formerly administer the empire 
and promulgate government infonnation in wartime (see Tulloch, 1993, L'Etang, 
1998). 
However two clear trends in the development of the profession in Britain are 
discernible after 1979. The first is its sudden growth. The second is its wide-scale 
adoption by a variety of different types of organisation. To date, most research has 
focused on the first trend within Westminster politics. As several accounts suggest 
(e. g., Ingham, 1991, Franklin, 1994, Kavanagh, 1995, Scammell, 1995, Jones, 1995, 
1999, Rosenbaum, 1997), the Conservative Party initiated a new era in which 
political communications became increasingly prioritised by the main political 
parties. In 1978 the Conservatives opened their first full-time account with a 
professional advertising agency - Saatchi and Saatchi. For most of their time in office 
they were advised by the heads of several top-ten PR companies, including Tim Bell 
of Lowe-Bell and Peter Gummer of Shandwick. As Kavanagh observed (1995, p56) 
'Mrs Thatcher supplied a set of beliefs but used the latest public relations techniques 
to a greater degree than any of her predecessors'. 
The other parties began to adopt similar communications personnel and approaches 
as the 1980s progressed. In 1981 the SDP were launched with massive PR support 
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Table 2.1: Changes in Numbers of Information Officers Employed in 
Government Departments and Public Institutions 1979-99 
MAFF MoD Dept of Dept of Dept of FCO DHSS Home DTI 
Empt Trans Envir Office 
1979 22 58 23 13 65 19 24 27 38 
1981 26 53 22 12 57 17 21 29 93 
1983 23 34 22 18 37 17 18 25 77 
1985 24 37 22 29 38 18 35 28 59 
1987 25 34 29 30 44 13 44 33 67 
1989 34 35 38 33 40 16 55* 37 65 
1991 41 36 78 33 34 20 57 37 62 
1993 44 32 68 44 42 20 88 42 65 
1995 40 36 54 40 44 22 108 43 69 
1997 39 47 44 37 42 30 141 50 67 
79-97 
%+/-+77 -19 +91 +185 -35 +58 +488 +85 +76 
1999 44 56 96** - 97^^ 46 171 54 74 
97-99 
%+/- +13 +19 +118 - +23 +53 +21 +8 +10 
Cabinet PM's Treasry Buck. CBI 
Office Office Palace 
1979 - 6 12 3 8 
1981 - 6 12 3 8 
1983 - 6 12 3 10 
1985 12 6 10 3 13 
1987 11 6 13 4 19 
1989 9 6 10 8 17 
1991 10 6 9 9 16 
1993 14 10 9 9 14 
1995 13 10 13 12 18 
1997 14 12 16 10 18 
Inland Met. BBC CRE 
Reven. Police 
5 6 5 5 
5 8 6 5 
4 8 9 6 
4 8 12 6 
8 12 12 6 
11 12 11 6 
13 53 12 6 
16 58 17 6 
18 61 35 8 
15 42 34 8 
79-97 
% +/- - +100 +25 +233 +125 +200 +600 +580 +60 
1999 23 14 20 13 19 18 51 32 7 
97-99 
%+/- +79 +17 +25 +30 +6 +20 +21 -6 -13 
Source: Figures Compiled from C01 Directories 1970 - 1999' 
'All figures accumulated from 'The IPO Directory - information and Press Officers in Government 
Departments and Public Corporations' (formerly called 'Chief Public Relations, Information and Press 
Officers in Government Departments, Public Corporations, etc. '). * Department of Health and Social 
Security was split into two. Figures from 1989 (inclusive) are the sum of the two departments; A 
Departments of Trade and Industry were separate until this point. Figures before 1985 are the sum of 
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from Dewe-Rogerson - another top ten PR company. The Labour Party had no such 
industry support, but also began revamping their communications operations 
internally shortly after their 1983 defeat. An indication of the increasing emphasis on 
promotional work is the rise in campaign expenditure by the main parties. In 1979 
Labour spent fl. 57 million on their election campaign, the Conservatives E2.33 
million. By 1992 these figures had increased to VA million and E10.1 million 
respectively (Scammell, p290). In the 1997 election Labour spent E13 million in the 
12-month run-up (plus another E13 million during the two previous years), the 
Conservatives E19 million, and the Liberal Democrats E5 million (Observer, 
27.7.97). In effect, communications expenditure has increased by roughly two thirds 
with each general election since 1979. 
Government communications expenditure also increased significantly during the 
period. In 1979, the Central Office of Information (COI) budget was E27 million and 
advertising expenditure was E44 million. By 1988 these figures had risen to E150 
million and E85 million respectively (Scammell, 1995, p204-6). The government 
frequently tops the table of annual advertisers in Britain. Similarly, employment of 
information officers (see table 2.1) has roughly doubled across Whitehall over the 
last two decades. Of the major government departments, maintained over the period 
1979-1997, only the MOD and Department of the Environment were smaller in 1997 
than they were in 1979. The rise in in-house government communications was 
matched by a rise in the employment of PR consultancies to promote government 
policies (see chapter three, part one). The government PR expansion has continued 
apace with the new Labour administration (see table 2.1). Most notably, the Cabinet 
Office has increased impressively - thus indicating a rise in the personal 
communications power of the Prime Minster. 
However, the expansion of public relations has not been restricted to institutional 
politics. Looking at the distribution of IPR members (figure 2.1) it becomes clear that 
central government and political parties currently employ only a few per cent of 
those in the profession. Even accounting for an obvious pro-business bias in the 
profile of IPR membership, it becomes apparent that the business sector employs the 
majority of PRPs. 23% of the IPR's 5,700 members work in-house for businesses 
and 45.2 work for consultancies - 90% of whose clientele is corporate (see PRCA 
annuals). In fact, it is in the corporate sector that the growth of the profession has 
been most impressive. Although the IPR (1948) and Public Relations Consultants 
the two departments; ** Department of Employment becomes the Department of Education and 
Employment ; AA Department of the Environment becomes the Department of Environment and 
Transport 
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Association (1969) had been in existence for some time, the corporate PR industry 
expanded at unprecedented rates in the 1980s. 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of IPR Members in Employment Sectors 1998 
In-House Central Government (0.7%): National Government (0.5%), Government 
Information Services (0.2%) 
Other Government (15.9%): Local (6.7%), Education (3.3%), Health (3%), Armed 
Forces (0.6%), Other Govt Dept/Agency (2.3%) 
External (45.2%): Consultancy (39.1%), Advertising (0.8%), Sole Trader (5.3%) 
In-House Companies - Industries and Services (20.2%): Manufacturing (6.1 %), 
Services (7.7%), Finance (3.7%), HQ/Holding Co. (2.1 %), Nationalised Ind (0.6%) 
In-House Companies - Cultural Industries (2.8%): Tourism/Leisure (1.6%), 
Press/Broadcasting (1.2%), Arts/Culture (0.1%) 
In-House Non Profit/Pressure Group (6.4%): Charities (3.2%), Trade/Prof Bodies 
(3%), Political Organisations (0.1%), Trade Union (0.1%) 
No Response (8.8%) 
Source: IPR Membership Survey 1998 
Table 2.2: The Percentage of Top Companies (in the Times 1000) Using PR 
Consultancies 
1979 1982 1984 
UK Top 50 Co. s 
UK Top 100 Co. s 
UK Top 500 Co. s 
28% 45% 90% 
25% 45% 85% 
20% 36% 69% 
Source: Carl Byoir and Associates, in PRCA 1986 
Surveys by Carl Byoir and Associates (PRCA, 1986), reproduced in table 2.2, show 
that over a five-year period it became the norm rather than the exception for top 
companies to use PR. The numbers of consultancies and total consultancy income 
each rose accordingly (see figure 2.2). The PR consultancy industry grew at annual 
rates of 25-30 per cent during the 1980s and more consultancies were created during 
that period than in all the previous decades put together (BDO, 1994). PR Week, the 
industry's own trade journal, was launched in 1984. By 1990 a British-based 
company, Shandwick, had fought off the US competition (temporarily) to become 
the largest PR company in the world. By 1992, Saatchi and Saatchi, with related 
interests in PR, was similarly claiming to be the world's biggest advertising agency. 
In spite of the recession of the early 1990s the consultancy sector in the UK rose by a 
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factor of 31 (or II -fold in real terms) between 1979 and 1998 (Miller and Dinan, 
2000: 10). 
Figure 2.2: Growth in PRCA Members' Fee Income 1983-1"7 















83 84 86 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 96 96 97 
Source: PRCA Year Book, 1998 
Indications are that, during the 1990s, professional PR has begun to spread into many 
other sectors of British civil society. It has instigated a substantial secondary industry 
of service suppliers, and has prompted the development of a number of DIY guides, 
specialist reference books and educational courses. A range of organisations and 
individuals have accordingly shown interest in the adoption of corporate promotional 
strategies and expertise as a means to achieve their objectives. 15.9% of IPR 
members (see figure 2.1) work for local government and other state institutions 
outside central government, and 6.4% work for pressure groups and charities. A 
survey of NUJ members (NUJ, 1998), with a clearly anti-corporate bias, put the 
figures higher. Out of the 24.4% of members who worked part or full-time in PR, a 
third of these were employed by charities, societies and associations, and a fifth for 
unions and local government - equating to roughly 3,500 people. 
The growth rate for public relations in local councils and other state institutions has 
appeared to match that in central government. By 1994, according to Franklin (1994, 
p7,1997), 90 per cent of metropolitan local authorities had established PR 
departments. Looking at the end of table 2.1, it is clear that institutions such as the 
BBC, Metropolitan Police and Buckingham Palace have also expanded their public 
relations quite significantly. Such institutions, along with schools, universities (see 
Wernick, 1991) and health authorities (see Miller and Williams, 1998) have been 
encouraged to adopt public relations for three obvious reasons: a) the need to 
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communicate with the British public, b) the introduction of 'market reforms' and 
business practices in the running of public institutions, and c) rising competition for 
dwindling government resources as the state attempts to decrease its public spending 
(see Pollard, 1992, Lowe, 1993). 
Media campaigns have always been a mean for pressure groups, charities and trade 
unions to raise interest and support. What has changed in the last decade is the influx 
of PR professionals into these sectors. Deacon's (1996) survey of the voluntary 
sector in fact found that 31 per cent of all organisations had press/publicity officers, 
43 per cent used external PR agencies and 56 per cent monitored the media. These 
figures were increased to 57 per cent, 81 per cent and 78 per cent for organisations 
with annual budgets above E250,000. As chapter seven shows, two thirds of unions 
have at least one part-time press officer, 25 per cent use PR consultancies and 57.4 
per cent use other agencies to monitor the media and provide other services - 
significantly more that observed in earlier studies (Glasgow University Media Group, 
1976,1980, Manning, 1998). That such organisations are increasingly using 
professional PR methods to achieve political and economic objectives is further 
evidenced in research on pressure groups and trade unions, in work on: 
environmental issues (Anderson, 1991,1993,1997, Cracknell, 1993, and Hansen, 
1993), the 'criminal justice arena' (Ericson et al 1989, Schlesinger and Tumber 
1994), gay and lesbian pressure groups (Miller and Williams 1993), industrial 
disputes (Jones, 1997, Manning, 1998), and paramilitary organisations in Northern 
Ireland (Miller, 1993,1994). Amongst charities PR has also become fundamental for 
raising profiles and gaining funding. The National Children's Home QPR, 1992), St 
John's Ambulance (IPR, 1994), the Women's Royal Voluntary Service (IPR, 1995) 
and the Royal British Legion (IPR, 1997) have all won top IPR 'Sword of 
Excellence' awards for their campaigns in the 1990s -a signal that PR in the charity 
sector has become as professional as that employed by businesses. 
In 1971 Tunstall wrote (p 175) that: 'The history of public relations in Whitehall is to 
a large extent the history of public relations in Britain'. This is obviously no longer 
the case. What was once the exclusive domain of government in Britain has moved 
first to business and then into every sector of society which feels a need to compete 
in the public sphere. 
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PART TWO: THE INTERACTION OF JOURNALISTS, SOURCES AND 
PUBLIC RELATIONS PRACTITIONERS 
This expansion of professional public relations offers up a number of potential 
research questions. The one addressed in the rest of this chapter concerns the impact 
of public relations on news production. The PR industry may have expanded 
considerably, but is there any indication that it is actually affecting the way news is 
produced and, if so, how? 
Two common approaches to answering this question appear to have emerged in 
studies of sources/PRPs and journalists. The first of these has involved attempts to 
look at content. It seeks to determine how much news content is primarily PR 
information and how much is the result of proactive journalism? The second 
approach puts the emphasis on 'conscious control'. It asks: who is in charge and who 
is setting the media agenda - journalists or sources and their PRPs? '. This section 
looks at both of these approaches and concludes that they deliver rather inconclusive 
results. This is because the evidence collected tends to be vague and subjective, 
confused by too many variables, and based on ad hoc collections of anecdotal 
evidence. 
Public Relations Content or Journalism? 
Both journalists and PRPs have made attempts to determine what proportions of 
news content are PR instigated and what are simply hard journalism. However the 
polls and estimates produced to date, in addition to being methodologically weak, 
show very little agreement. A Gallup (1991) survey of 100 heads of in-house PR 
departments and 26 editors of national media found that PRPs believed that 40 per 
cent of output was based on PR. Editors, in contrast, estimated it to be an average of 
25 per cent - with national newspapers the lowest at 10 per cent and the trade press 
the highest at 53 per cent. Those in radio and television said it was 30 per cent. A 
Two-Ten survey (1993) of 25 national and 100 regional news and features editors 
found that 10 per cent of national news content and 18 per cent of regional news 
content was considered to be 'derived from PR'. Additionally, 15 per cent of national 
and 23 per cent of 'feature content' was 'derived from PR'. A poll produced by the 
PRCA (1.7.94) estimated that between 10 and 20 per cent of the stories in the 
national press were PR generated. The Financial Times used most PR - estimated at 
26 per cent (62 per cent in the companies and markets section). The FT was followed 
by the Times (16 per cent), Daily Mirror (14 per cent), Star (14 per cent), 
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Independent (I I per cent), Guardian (10 per cent), Sun (9 per cent), and Mail (9 per 
cent). The question continues to be posed periodically within the industry (see, for 
example, Michie, 1998), and was in fact put to over a third of those interviewed for 
the research. For both journalists and PRPs, if the question was not dismissed out of 
hand, estimates continued to vary wildly from between 20 and 80 per cent 2. 
The reason for the variety of responses is that it is almost impossible to break down 
and determine empirically what is PR and what is journalism. The first problem is 
caused by the difficulty of distinguishing PRPs from their source ties. There is no 
compulsory register of professional PRPs - only professional associations with 
voluntary membership. Many practitioners avoid the PR label, preferring titles like 
6communication strategist', 'image consultant, 'information officer', or 'researcher'. 
Additionally, it is now standard practice that figures such as politicians, chief 
executives and pressure group leaders are media-trained and used to present material 
to journalists - in press releases and interviews - regardless of who manufactured the 
statements. More confusingly still, PR messages are considered most effective when 
working through third parties. Indeed, the most telling definition of PR is that relayed 
by Tim Bell (BDO, 1994, p7): 'Whereas advertising is the use of paid-for media 
space to inform and persuade, PR is the use of third-party endorsement to inform and 
persuade'. PRPs thus ftequently get others outside their organisation to present their 
material as a means to gain objective support or a sympathetic hearing (see chapters 
five and eight). Much material is also simply pumped through to news-gatherers and 
wire services such as Reuters or the Press Association; material which itself is 
circulated as news gathered rather than PR supplied '. 
Second, for every story fed to the media, there is one being carefully kept out. For 
many organisations, half or more of the work of PRPs involves restricting reporter 
access and information and/or attempting to quash negative stories. Berkman and 
2 For example, Quentin Bell, former chairman of the PRCA, estimated that up to 80 per cent of news 
output is public relations (in Michie, 1998). The current executive director of the PRCA, Chris 
McDowell, estimated that (interview 26.7.98): 'In the nationals it's [PR] less than 20 per cent, but in 
the financial sections an enormous amount is. It's virtually all connected to PR in some way. The FT 
is at least 50 per cent PR ... ' 3 As several PRPs explained: Jon Elwes (31.7.98), 'For getting blanket coverage do syndicated articles. 
You do a feature wire or a news pack service through someone like Two-Ten. You send an article to 
them and they send it down the feature wire and it's often printed straight in. It might go to 700 
publications - regionals, locals and trade - and be printed, as is, in 70. It's quite an effective way of 
getting wide coverage'; Paul Barber (20.8.98), 'The new area is the wires - Reuters, Bloomberg, the 
Press Association, AFX. If you get it on the wires thenjournalists everywhere will take the story from 
the news wires. As papers reduce their numbers of journalists the news wires become the most cost- 
effective way of getting stories'; Martin Adeney (17.12.9 8), 'Increasingly they just take it off the wire 
services, which is one of the significant developments in the last three or four years. In my time we 
never took the wires too seriously and you wouldn't write many stories based on the wires. Now a lot 
of stories come straight from the wires - the Dow Jones, Bloomberg, Reuters 
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Kitch (1986), Tiffen (1989), and Ericson et al (1989) all noted the prevalence of such 
activities when looking at corporate news sources. Several of those PRPs interviewed 
confirmed such tendencies across businesses, pressure groups and government. For 
example, Tim Blythe, Director of Corporate Affairs at WH Smith explained 
(15.9.98): 
'Currently press relations is 30 per cent of my job ... over a year it's 
fifty- 
fifty. 50 per cent is keeping stuff out of the press. I had ten years in 
Whitehall, and 70 per cent of press relations there was keeping stuff out 
of the papers. " 
Perhaps the most significant obstacle to defining where public relations ends and 
journalism begins is the fact that the two have become inextricably linked in a 
relationship that is largely invisible. Media and PR practices are most successful and 
appear most legitimate when the process of interaction between the two remains 
undeclared. Thus, PRPs and journalists alike are not keen to admit publicly their 
relations for fear of undermining their professional integrity. Even where the 
relationship is simple to document, many PR ploys for getting organisations and 
messages into the media have become so commonplace that neither the public nor 
journalists themselves now seem aware of the differences. Several observers have 
described the range of ploys commonly used by political party and government PRPs 
attempting to gain frequent and favourable coverage (e. g., Nelson, 1989, Tiffen, 
1989, Gaber, 1995, and Rosenbaum, 1997). As Nelson declares (1989, p50): 'The 
press release, the press conference, the photo op, the pre-arranged interview, and 
press tour have all, over the years, become fully integrated into the fabric of what we 
perceive as "the news"'. There are now numerous public relations DIY books which 
explain the methods for producing potential copy that journalists, if not side-tracked 
by 'real' news, will faithfully reproduce as a seemingly 'independent and 
newsworthy' story. 'The survey', 'the debate', 'the human interest story', 'the 
demonstration', the 'new research' or 'report', 'the charity action', 'the record 
breaker', and another story on the 'in-vogue theme', are all PR devices for getting 
information into the press. 'Yes that's all a survey really is', says Michael Bland and 
Associates (Michael Bland Communications, p6), 'the use of statistics to give 
authority and news appeal to a story you want to promote ... Even the serious press is 
4 Paul Barber (20.8.98), 'Keeping something out of the papers might be the most significant thing we 
do all year but it can't be measured ... If you're in an area like banking, half your work might involve keeping stuff out of the media, taking on negative stories and so on. '; Jonathan Russell (14.1.99), 
'There is also a lot of work involved in keeping your profile lower. There are as many instances of 
when you would want to keep your company out of the press as when you would want to put them on 
the front page'; John Richards (20.5.97), 'We get a better press but it does depend on how we handle 
our media relations ... individual members can't talk to the media. Only the General Secretary, Assistant General Secretary, I and the eight regional reps talk to the media now'. 
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happy to publish an interesting survey without questioning the quality of the 
research'. 
For several journalists and PRPs interviewed, the methods for feeding PR output to 
journalists are often recognised as such but they are still considered valid means of 
news-gathering. Much news is instigated by external sources but is still regarded as 
6newsworthy' and in need of being followed up. The real concern is then about how 
PR information is used. If handled appropriately, it becomes journalism rather than 
PR. As David Blackwell of the FT explained (17.5.99): 
'I hope none of it [journalism] is PR. Certainly not here. A lot is initiated 
by PRs ... there's a constant trickle of results, information on share price 
movements, acquisition and merger stuff announced by the Stock 
Exchange and so it goes on. The majority comes to you like that. But 
then you also get a feel for what we call a sector. You get a feel for 
what's going on. You can guess, if you follow the industry closely, you 
can see something is going to happen before it's announced and you 
follow it up. ' 
In the view of Chris Hopson of Granada (13.10.98): 
'It's about fifty-fifty [PR-joumalism]. Most stories are generated by the 
companies themselves. Almost by definition, little or nothing, in some 
cases, is discovered by journalists. But the other fifty is that most good 
journalists don't just take the press release, they ask around a variety of 
sources. They are not just swallowing hook, line and sinker what the 
company is telling them what the story is about. ' 
Evidently the ability to determine what is news and what is PR in any single 
publication is virtually impossible. In which case, determining whether a rise in 
public relations activity has resulted in more PR-produced news or not becomes a 
hopeless task. 
Who is in Charge and Who is Setting the Agenda? 
An alternative approach to separating public relations supply and journalist output is 
to investigate which side is in control and to ask: is the balance of power changing? 
This debate continues to appear periodically in studies of journalism, media 
sociology and political communications. In media sociology, the fourth estate line on 
journalistic autonomy, although not as resolute as before, is still assumed in many 
liberal studies (Tiffen, 1980, Alexander, 1984, Schudson, 1991, and Dayan and Katz, 
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1992). Such things as 'professionalism', 'newsworthiness' and audience demand, 
mean that journalists maintain a fierce independence from sources and continue to 
fend off attempts to influence their output. Other commentators (Sigal, 1973, Gandy, 
1980, Gans, 1980, Fishman, 1980, Ericson et al., 1989, Schlesinger and Turnber, 
1994) have found a greater degree of complexity in the continuing relations between 
sources and journalists. However, the common consensus of much media sociology 
in the 1990s has tended to agree with Gans's earlier assessment. That is that (1980, 
p 117): 'The source-journalist relationship is therefore a tug of war: while sources 
attempt to "manage" the news ... journalists concurrently "manage" the sources 
in 
order to extract the information they want'; but that, more often than not, sources 
'have the edge'. 
The recent expansion of public relations and, in particular, the rise in power of 'spin 
doctors', has managed to re-ignite interest in this debate (see Franklin, 1994, Bhunler 
and Gurevitch 1995, Kavanagh 1995, Jones, 1995,1999). The general assertion of 
these works, one that finds many advocates in the media itself, is that PRPs are 
becoming too powerful and, consequently, journalists are losing their conscious 
autonomy. PR power has manifested itself in several ways. First, with the rise in 
media outlets, more journalists are likely to be competing to get the attention of 
prominent sources. As a result, top PRPs are finding themselves in the position of 
being able to control media access and/or exclude journalists altogether. This power 
to exclude journalists from, for instance, the briefings of the Prime Minister's press 
secretary, has been a frequent cause of complaint for journalists operating in the 
lobby system at Westminster (see Cockerell et al, 1984, Negrine, 1994). It was also 
apparent in interviews with financial journalists who felt that their access to key 
business sources was being increasingly restricted by PRPs. As Richard Northedge, 
deputy editor of Sunday Business declared (25.5.99): 
'They are a very powerful intermediary ... A PR consultant will work for 
a journalist on behalf of 50 different companies so there are 50 different 
reasons for the journalist to know the PR consultant ... They have 
certainly come to hold a much more powerful role in the last 10- 15 years. 
Most journalists now complain about them. While PRs help to make 
contacts with the companies they have also moved to a position where 
they automatically intervene. " 
5Raymond Snoddy (17.5.99), 'Sometimes they act as a block to keep one away from companies in 
trouble. I try to go to principals as much as possible. But they have some control in terms of who you 
get to speak to. It's a certain power over access. Sometimes it can get very heated and shouting 
matches follow... '; Alex Brummer (16.6.99), 'There is also the fear that the PR is a barrier between 
you and the source that you want to get to. And the CEOs who are happy not to go through the filter 
of the PRs are becoming less and less. There are very few now and there is a sense of losing 
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Second, the power of PRPS can be quite significant if their source employers own, 
advertise in, or have other personal connections with, the publications they deal with 
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Curran and Seaton, 1997). Such factors have become 
highly influential in smaller, weaker publications, such as trade magazines and local 
papers where large companies dominate a sector and are an irreplaceable source of 
advertising revenue. As one 'senior magazine editor' explained (Guardian, 13.5.96, 
plo): 
, If a PR wants you to go to an event involving a company that spends 
thousands of pounds on advertising in the magazine then you go. And 
you turn up where they want, when they want and wearing whatever 
cocktail dress they want. ' Few journalist interviewees had experience in 
these sectors but those that did all mentioned it as a strong influencing 
factor'. 
Third, PRPs can harass journalists at all points in the news production process. Such 
badgering has increased according to many popular accounts - and is now taken to 
extreme lengths directly before and during elections. In preparation for the 1997 
election, Tony Hall, head of news and current affairs at the BBC, was forced to 
announce that the Corporation was to set up a log to monitor party pressuring of its 
staff. It was a tactic that had also been adopted by the ITN news-rooms (interview 
with Jon Snow, 22.1.97). Jones (1995,1999), Gaber (1997), and Rosenbaum (1997) 
all offer further accounts of media harassment in all its forrns. Thus, like 'flak' 
producing PRPs in the US (see Berkman and Kitch, 1986, Herman and Chomsky, 
1988, Dreier, 1988) British PRPs have increased pressure on journalists. For all these 
reasons, it is clear to several observers such as Gaber (1995, pl) '... in the debate as to 
who - between the politician, the broadcasters and the press - is in control of the 
national political news agenda, it is the politicians and their advisors who are firmly 
in the driving seat. ' From these descriptions one might thus conclude that PRPs are 
gaining more than an 'edge'. 
However, accounts produced by PRPs and journalists themselves frequently refute 
claims about the extent of PRP power. The question of control in media-source 
relations was put to almost all journalists and a third of PRPs interviewees. Once 
something there. ' 
6 Ellis Kopel (23.7.96), 'Now there is an enormous amount more pressure by proprietors on editors, 
and editors on journalists, to try and influence stories, suppress stories, etc. ... especially on the 
magazine side'; Neville Davis (29.1.97), 'You have to work within the industry. You can't sit in an 
ivory tower and say "I am a journalist" and criticise. Because you will be out of a job. You can 
criticise all sorts of non-advertisers, but you can't have a large proportion of criticism of your own 
industry. ' 
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again the responses of both sets of constituents varied considerably, but very few 
supported the account of powerful 'spin doctors' leaning on or controlling 
journalists. 
First, while the number of media outlets has expanded, so has the number of sources 
attempting to use the media. There is thus a corresponding growth in competition 
among PRPs attempting to get media access and favourable coverage. The general 
impression given by most interviewees was that PRPs, as a rule, had a lower status 
than journalists and that the powerful 'spin doctors' made up only a tiny minority of 
practitioners. According to Michic (1998) only ten per cent of PRPs have any kind of 
status or power - in that journalists know who they are and/or they are able to control 
access to key sources. As Stephen Farish, editor of PR Week, explained (25.7.96): 
'When you're a journalist and you come into a room you are the most 
important person there. When you are a PR, you are the least important 
person there. As journalists, people get to speak to anyone almost 
instantly. As a PR person it could take you months to speak to the same 
person. ' 
Second, even for those in positions of power, the great swell of media outlets makes 
attempts to monitor and control news a difficult task. Ingham (199 1, p 18 7/8, see also 
Ingham, 1996): 
'Of course I tried to manage the news. I tried - God knows, I tried ... But 
news management, in the sense of ensuring that nothing is allowed to get 
in the way of the story the governtrient wants to get over, is impossible in 
the modem world ... The real news managers today are the media 
themselves'. 
Journalists at the end of the day write the stories and have the final say as to what 
goes into the piece. Even if they cannot access a source, suffer intense PR 
harassment, or are pressured by other considerations, they still determine have what 
is covered. As many prominent sources and PRPs are aware, what goes in can bring 
down individual leaders as well as governments and large companies. As Wilson (in 
Crewe and Gosschalk, 1995, p49) declares 'And let there be no doubt; when it comes 
to power to really hurt, we cannot touch the media compared with what they can do 
to us. ' Thus for the vast majority of PRPs interviewed it was journalists who tended 
to be in control'. 
7 John Aarons (5.7.96), '... there are far more PRs with far more media outlets with rapidly changing 
staff. The modem PR is more proactive and skilful and has to work much harder than 20 years ago ... Now today, definitely the journalists have the power and we have to hassle for attention'; John Elwes 
(23.7.96), 'At the end of the day it's the journalist who is in control because he writes the article at the 
end ... We treat the press like gods and they are ... Journalists know they are in charge and act like it'; 
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For almost all journalist interviewees too, although they complained about PRPs, 
they were adamant that they were still in conscious control on a day-to-day level. In 
fact, none of the journalists would go so far as to say that they were losing their 
professional autonomy to PRPs. As Alex Brummer, financial editor of the Guardian, 
declared (16.1.96): 'The idea that financial journalists can be led one way or another 
by the communicators, whatsoever the latter may promise to their paymasters, the 
corporations, is preposterous". 
Ultimately, there exist a colourful range of accounts which may be used to support a 
case for one side or the other. The evidence to date consists merely of irregular 
recordings of anecdotal evidence. The variables and vested interests involved make 
quantitative assessments impossible. Once again one cannot derive clear conclusions 
- only suggest certain patterns. In terms of control one might tentatively argue that 
power relationships are governed by the law of supply and demand, in part related to 
evolving hierarchies of PRPs and journalists. In other words, the more in demand a 
source or media producer, the more power it is likely to have in its relations. 
However, the most obvious pattern is that journalists and PRPs work together in a 
strained relationship - rather similar to Gans's (1980) original 'tug-of-war' 
description. As Jon Snow of Channel Four (22.1.97) typically explained: 
'The thing is that people tend to think the spin doctor is just there 
spinning but he's also a source; so you can't differentiate between a spin 
doctor and a source. Many of the recipients of spin doctors are very 
happy to hear from them ... So it isn't a one-way street. It isn't simply 
nasty spin doctor hassling innocent victim journalist". 
Michael Sandler (19.10.98), 'Inmost situations the journalist has the upper hand. In fact 90 percent of 
the time it's the journalist who is in control and 10 per cent it's PRs'; Martin Adeney 17.12.98), 'Once 
the press gets hold of it it's very difficult to keep it out ... It's very rare to get it pulled although 
occasionally you can. We can only work hard at putting the company's point of view and try to limit 
any misconceptions. But it's very difficult. ' 
8MeIanie Essex (5.2.97), 'There is an element of me that simply sees spin as a self-perpetuating myth 
.... They begin to believe in their own power. But we [the BBC] are very robust in dealing with it. It's 
unnatural to expect everyone to get it right 100 per cent of the time, but 99 per cent of the time... '; 
financial journalist (interview, 1999), 'A lot of PR people, when they're talking to the companies and 
trying to get their contracts, will say that they control the press. They like to feel they often use the 
management to control us. But that's not so - not on the XXX anyway. We try and have an arms- 
length relationship with them and we do it on our terms, not theirs ... With the pressures we are under there's no opportunity to interfere. There is no window for fine-tuning. The article's done and dusted 
in no time so there's no time for them to complain or pressure us. ' 9AJex Brummer (16.6.99), '1 talk to one or two PR men each day ... Basically there are about three or four senior people who have got something useful to say and they work across several firms. I regard 
them as semi-friends -I have known and worked with them for a long time ... I think it's a relationship 
of tension. There is a mutual distrust of PRs by most financial journalists. But there is also a 
recognition that they have to keep in with them and that they work within a very tense relationship'; 
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Whatever the power balance involved, the process of news production could not take 
place without a consistent long-term and daily working relationship between PRPs 
and journalists. News predominantly starts with source supply rather than media 
investigations, and PR is far more a part of news production than journalists have 
hitherto admitted. 
But still the question posed at the start of this chapter remains. Professional public 
relations has grown and, as a consequence, sources are more professional in their 
dealings with the media, but is PR becoming more influential in the news production 
process? Attempts to gauge changing levels of content and/or journalistic autonomy 
have proved to be inconclusive. 
PART THREE: RESOURCES AND THE SHIFT TO SOURCE SUPPLY 
The Decline of British Journalism and the Rise in Information Subsidies 
This part takes an alternative approach to answering the question by putting a greater 
emphasis on changing resources and organisational. practices. As established above, 
sources, their PRPs and journalists work closely together in the production of news. 
Sources and PRPs, whether active or passive, provide most of the raw materials, and 
journalists manufacture the finished products. It therefore stands to reason that if the 
resources and working conditions of the two sides change it is likely that the 
production process itself will be altered. What is argued here is that, in the last two 
decades, national news-gathering resources in Britain have declined, so forcing 
journalists to economise and rely more on external information supplies. 
Simultaneously, public relations resources have increased, therefore enabling them to 
supply a much-needed demand for information. Consequently, journalists still decide 
what goes in an article and have not lost conscious control, but the process of 
information supply has changed. Without trying to separate and identify the sources 
of news content, or ask who is setting the agenda, emergent trends suggest that news 
texts are being composed less by active journalists and more by public relations 
sources. 
Roland Gribben (21.5.99), 'It's like politicians and journalists. It looks adversarial in print but both 
need each other. PR is a selling business. We are in a consuming business. They are undoubtedly 
trying to massage the message. It comes down to our judgements of what we consume in the end . You are trying to get behind the layers of PR sugar'; Barrie Clement (25.5.99), 'It's very good. It can 
break down if you are doing a story about the internal changes of a union. But generally it's a mature 
relationship in which journalists realise that the union people are trying to spin things in their direction 
and they realise that the journalists have their own story to write. And as long as both sides understand 
that that's a working relationship. ' 
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An alternative way of looking at PR output is as a source of information supply for 
journalists who have to fill space. An argument suggested by Sigal (1973), Gandy 
(1980) and Fishman (1980) in the United States, is that PRPs are 'information 
subsidy' (Gandy, 1980) suppliers to journalists, and that the less resourced a media 
outlet is, the more it becomes dependent on such 'information subsidies'. As 
Fishman (1980, p148-50) explains: 
'Thus as story quotas increase while the labour force and the time to fill 
this quota remain constant, workers turn to reporting pre-formulated and 
pre-scheduled events in an anticipation of the speed up of their 
production line ... the overall economic logic of news reporting dictates 
the minimisation of labour costs by under-staffing the news room. ' 
In theory, if investigative (or 'enterprise') reporting is a resource-intensive activity, 
then as resources go down, so does independent investigative journalism. At the 
same time dependence on sources and information subsidies goes up". 
News production in Britain, along with many other industry sectors, has been 
subjected to the effects of intense competition over the last two decades (see Barnett 
and Curry, 1994, Tunstall, 1996, Williams, 1996, Curran and Seaton, 1997, Franklin, 
1997). The application of new technologies with greater communications capacity, 
increasing concentration and conglomeration in the industry, media industry-friendly 
politicians and media legislation driven by free-market imperatives, have all 
intensified competition. As 'the market' has taken over from publicly owned and 
regulated media production, news has become looked upon as a financial millstone 
rather than a service. With far more readers, viewers, sponsors, advertisers and 
finance attracted to entertainment, the will to resource costly news programmes and a 
serious broadsheet press has consequently dwindled. Thus, as Jones concluded 
(1995, p8): 'During the 1980s they [the Conservative Party] had unleashed and 
encouraged unparalleled competition between newspapers, television and radio. 
These commercial pressures had inevitably had an impact on editorial standards"'. 
'OSigal's 1973 study of the Wall Street Journal and New York Times - between 1949 and 1969 - is one 
of the few studies that correlated staffing levels with output. Sigal found that as staff numbers and 
resources on both papers increased in the period, reporters became less reliant on official sources, and, 
the level of investigative/'enterprise' stories rose. 
"The sea-change in the way news is viewed is partly evidenced in the comments of programme 
controllers. As Paul Jackson, Carlton's director of progranimes, declared in May 1992 (in Barnett and 
Curry, p249): 'If World in Action were in 1993 to uncover three more serious miscarriages of justice 
while delivering an audience of three, four or five million, I would cut it'. As John Wilson, former 
controller of editorial policy at BBC, was similarly to comment (in Douglas, 1998) "... news is a way 
of making money just as selling bread is a way of making money. No-one believes that news and 
journalism are simply a service to democracy. ' 
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An overview of the declining national newspaper industry suggests that, in an effort 
to remain profitable, it has simultaneously increased output and cut back on staff. 
National newspapers have consistently struggled as long-term declines have been 
hastened by rising competition. Sunday papers have lost sales steadily since 1977 
and dailies since the mid 1980s (figs. in Annual Report of the Press Council and 
Media Guardian, 20.6.94). A 1980s tabloid war, instigated by Murdoch's Sun, was 
followed by a 1990s broadsheet war, instigated by Murdoch's Times. Since 1993, 
there has been a sustained press price war which has seen significant losses across 
the industry. Despite the cuts and a temporary halt to declining sales, the long-term 
trends looked the same. Between 1994 and 1998 national papers lost a further half a 
million daily sales (3.6 per cent) and a further 1.16 million Sunday sales (7.3 per 
cent; figs. in Press Gazette, 17.7.98,18.7.94). Only the FT and Murdoch's papers 
have managed to buck the long-tenn decline in readership over the period. 
To keep pace all newspapers have raised prices well above inflation and attempted a 
series of sales gimmicks and new layouts. A common ploy has also been to introduce 
multiple new sections to appeal to draw in alternative readers. This in itself has 
produced a high rate of page inflation. During the period 1984 to 1994, increases 
were as follows: The Sun, 32 pages to 52; The Mirror, 32 to 48; The Star, 28 to 36; 
The Mail, 36 to 64; The Express 36 to 64; The Telegraph 36 to 38; The Guardian 28 
to 72; The Times 32 to 72; The FT 48 to 78. (figs. Guardian 20.6.94). At the same 
time, it appears that journalist numbers per publication have been cut or, in the best 
cases, increased slightly. The evidence remains sketchy. However, almost all papers 
have reported minor cuts in staffing levels over the last five years. The Guardian, 
Observer, Mirror and Sunday Mirror have implemented small but regular rounds of 
redundancies in this period. Others, such as the Independent, Daily Express and 
Daily Star, have gone considerably further, cutting the numbers of editorial staff by 
between a third and a half (figs. reported in the Press Gazette and Journalist). 
Tunstall (1971) estimated that in 1969 there were approximately 3550 journalists 
working on national newspapers. Two more recent estimates, by the NUJ and Delano 
and Hennington, are 2666 and 2462 respectively - indicating a drop of between 25 
and 31 per cent over the last thirty years (figs in Franklin 1997, p5l - 53). 
Even those papers which have maintained profits and increased journalist numbers 
have not kept up with page inflation. The table below, records the changes in 
pagination and staffing levels of the three most profitable national dailies of the late 
1990s. It is a clear indication of the growing disparity between resources and output. 
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While technology (new means of information retrieval and transfer, printing costs, 
etc. ) has been responsible for many savings, it is also likely that journalist workloads 
have increased considerably. Indeed, Tunstall recently estimated that (1996, p136) 
'Between the 1960s and the 1990s the amount of words written and space filled by 
each national newspaper journalist certainly doubled and perhaps trebled"'. 
Table 2.3: Increase in Page and Staff Numbers at the FT, Sun and Times 
Financial Times The Sun The Times 
Page Nos. 1984 48 32 32 
Page Nos. 1994 78 52 72 
Percentage Increase 62.5% 62.5% 125% 
Staff Nos. 1986 362 236 253 
Staff Nos. 1996 417 296 309 
Percentage Increase 15.2% 25.4% 22.1 % 
Sources: Media Guardian (20.6.94) and Newspaper Personnel Departments 
For the majority of remaining staff, conditions have clearly worsened. Since the 1986 
Murdoch-led move to Wapping, the power of NUJ has waned. Currently, amongst 
national newspapers, only the FT and Guardian give full union recognition 
(Journalist, Oct/Nov 1998). Consequently the workforce has been increasingly 
casualised and new working conditions imposed. Approximately 40 per cent of 
journalists now work on a freelance basis or are employed on part-time or short-term 
contracts (NUJ, 1998). Other changes include: the introduction of 'multi-skilling', 
'pooling' of journalists, merging of sister papers, discriminatory practices against 
union members, attempts to make journalists take legal responsibility for their 
articles, and the loss of journalists' copyright to publishers. A 1996 survey revealed 
that 62 per cent of journalists claimed to work 59 or more hours in the office each 
week, and that journalism was now the third most stressful occupation - on a par with 
airline pilots and prison officers. One third claimed to have recently suffered from 
stress-related illnesses and 60 per cent said stress levels had increased in recent years 
(Press Gazette, 12.7.96). A similar survey in 1997 (Press Gazette, 12.5.97) reported 
that 87 per cent now thought stress levels were increasing. 
12 Broadcasting companies have fared little differently. The BBC has simultaneously expanded its 
news operations (with 24 hour coverage in particular) and been forced to introduce internal market 
conditions and staffing cuts in an attempt to maintain its charter and licence fee. Franklin (1994, p70) 
estimated that 7,000 jobs were shed from the BBC between 1986 and 1994. Over 90 journalist job 
cuts were reported during 1996 and a further 25 per cent cut (to be phased in over 5 years) was 
announced in 1997. Regional and foreign news services have been particularly hard hit. ITN has 
followed similar cost-cutting paths and moved further downmarket; ultimately removing its flagship 
news programme, News at Ten, altogether. The newest news operations at Sky and Channel Five 
operate on marginal budgets with skeleton staff. Only Channel Four remained relatively unscathed 
during the 1990s, but its future remains far from secure. 
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This impression of increased competition, rising stress levels, and a decline in 
thorough, let alone investigative, journalism is indeed common among journalists 
and is voiced with some regularity in the media trade press. For example, Bill 
Hagerty (Press Gazette, 29.1.99, p14): 
'... but the system is now dictating that journalists stay at their desks. 
They are overworked - multi-skill mania has taken over - and are not 
allowed the time to investigate and certainly not the time to go abroad 
and investigate. That kind of thing is actively discouraged because it 
costs money ... It's all fast-food journalism these days. 
"' 
Quite clearly, the less journalists find news the more they become reliant on 
information coming to them and the less time they have to assess that information 
critically. The obvious conclusions filtering through point towards an increased 
dependency on 'infannation subsidies'. A Gallup Survey (199 1, p 11) found that 60 
per cent of editors agreed that 'The growing role of PR practitioners has made 
journalists more reliant on supplied information'. A 1996 survey (PR Week, 
11.10.96, pl) of 60 broadcasters found '... 62 per cent said that, with budget 
restrictions and increased demand for stories, they expect to use more outside 
generated material in the coming year'. 
The general description offered above was consistently confirmed in interviews with 
both PRIs and journalists. Although journalists tended to deny the strong influence 
of PR on their work (conscious or unconscious) they almost unanimously agreed 
about the above trends and the declining standards of investigative journalism. All 
but two financial journalists interviewed were quite clear that demands on journalists 
had gone up and that stress levels had consequently increased. As one financial 
journalist, who was leaving, said (anonymous, 1999): 
'I got totally pissed off at the starving of resources at the XXX ... If you 
get to the stage, as I did, when you are asked to do too much for too long, 
13 Henry Porter (Media Guardian, 20.6.94, p4), 'Today the reporter who leaves the new hi-tech facility 
to collect facts and exhaustively researches a story is a rare bird and certainly the zealous inquiries of 
investigative reporters are more or less a thing of the past'; Jon Snow (Press Gazette, 20.9.96, p5), 
'We are under siege, there is no question ... Ratings will be the determinant because the money comes from advertisers ... Within a couple of years there could be no serious analytical news programmes on American TV and that is the way we are heading'; Ian Hargreaves (Press Gazette, 18.4.97, p 11), 'The 
biggest threat to the media is the explosion of media firms and new products and the sight of 
companies investing in these firms trying to milk journalists harder and harder... ' See also: Geoffrey 
Goodman (Press Gazette, 18.12.95, p17); Colin Boume (The Journalist Dec 95/Jan96, p18-19); Roy 
Greenslade (Guardian 15.7.96, p25); Alan Rusbridger (Press Gazette 22.3.96, p 15); Anthony Sampson 
(British Journalism Review, Vol. 7, No. 3,1996, p42-51); Hugh O'Shaughnessy (British Journalism 
Review, Vol. 9, No. 4,1998 p56-59). 
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you start looking elsewhere ... The XXX 
is one particular case and we 
didn't keep up. I left, quite frankly, because I was furious. The paper has 
been starved of editorial resources ... I was a 
high-profile journalist, a 
senior journalist. But with all that, I had no say and I had to work under 
more and more pressure. I'm just extremely angry about the whole thing. 
I expected to be in financial journalism for the rest of my life and, if I had 
the choice, I still would be. "' 
Almost all talked about journalists no longer leaving the office, the decline of 
investigative journalism, and the dependency on outside source materials. As Barrie 
Clement of the Independent explained (25.5.99): 
'You're expected to produce more copy because there are fewer people 
to fill the paper. And with less reporters the papers think twice about 
sending people out to get stories. It's much more bums on seats now and 
people don't get out much. So people are increasingly reliant on the wire 
services and Internet and other information coming to you. Some people 
get 80 per cent of their materials from the Internet and wires. So 
journalists sit in the office much more because that's what management 
want them to do - it's like a comfort blanket. They like to look around 
and see lots of bodies at their desks. "' 
The PRP's perceptions of deteriorating conditions in journalism were also 
14 Also: Raymond Snoddy (17.5.99), 'They [demands] have increased. There is a lot more financial 
pressure to deliver ... There is a greater pressure on 
financial budgets and at the same time the amount 
of supplements, and therefore page numbers, have kept going up. As these pressures have increased, 
people have to work longer hours to keep up. It's now a very busy and stressful occupation'; Barrie 
Clement (25.5.99), 'There are fewer people, fewer journalists. There have been mass redundancies in 
journalism - the same as in other areas. They have got rid of older, more experienced journalists and 
brought in younger, cheaper ones ... It's no longer annual pay rises - 
it's much more hit and miss. You 
can only get rises now if you are prepared to sign inferior contracts. I told them to go to hell last time 
and lost my pay rise... '; anonymous financial journalist interview (1999), 'Output has increased at the 
same time as numbers have gone down. That's across writers and subs. The output of the subs has 
increased phenomenally with new technologies. Everyone is working a lot harder. Over a period of 
years, newspaper chapels have become almost defunct. You don't hear about disputes anymore. 
Threats of action don't halt production anymore. That's all gone now, which means that journalists 
work harder'. 
15 See also: Linda Rogers (7.1.97), '1 have no evidence for this but it seems that journalists are a lot 
less assiduous. They have less time to investigate stories. Less time to investigate the story behind the 
story ... The temptation is to get stuff you can 
just get across your desk, not to go out so much'; John 
Carvell (30.1.97), 'We spend more time at our desks rather than going out and spending time getting a 
feel for this or that. There are more supplements, special projects, and other activities organised by the 
paper'; Richard Northedge (25.5.99), 'On a daily paper, unusually compared to other news sectors, 
everything has to be issued through the Stock Exchange and most of the news you read in your daily 
paper comes from these announcements. It's an easy source of news ... I would say that 10 per cent or 
even less is news that didn't appear over the wires - which is why the news is almost the same across 
newspapers. ' 
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unanimous. PRPs, many of them ex-journalists, were conscious of the fact that they 
tended to succeed quite simply because of the needs of their joumalist consumers. As 
Nick Miles (17.8.98), CEO of Financial Dynamics, explained: 
'What is increasingly the case, and worryingly so, is that the standard of 
journalism is dropping. Journalism is becoming recommodified. Since 
the price wars in journalism, many have become cannon fodder, except at 
the top end, such as the city editor. Most of them are being asked to do 
more and more for less and less. "' 
Who Guards the Guards? The Transfer of Media Knowledge 
As already documented in part one of this chapter, PR expenditure has expanded at 
the same time as journalist resources have declined. As such, the PR profession has 
been ideally placed to supply the rising demand for information subsidies - either 
directly or through third parties. What has also helped the PR profession to become 
regular suppliers is an increase in knowledge about journalists and the media 
production process itself. PRPs are now not only better resourced than journalists, 
they know an increasing amount about their customers and can thus produce tailor- 
made products without arousing suspicion or applying pressure. 
Knowledge about journalists and publications has been built up in several ways. 
First, many PRPs have been journalists before entering the profession. Their 
experiences give them a strong sense of 'news values', how and when journalists like 
information subsidies, and many ready-made contacts in the news industry. What 
percentage of PRPs have come from journalism is unknown and varies across 
sectors. However, it appeared quite significant in the sectors observed in this study. 
Amongst unions, 55.6% employed communications staff with experience in 
journalism (see chapter seven). Over 50% of the 36 PRP interviewees working in 
corporations and consultancies had media experience. Similarly, a considerable 
proportion of the top 'spin doctors' in the main political parties have senior press 
and/or broadcasting experience. 
Indications are that the joumalist-tumed-PRP appears to be a rising phenomenon as 
journalists lose their jobs and/or seek the better conditions and pay of the public 
16 Ellis Kopel (23.7.96 ), '... the whole of journalism has suffered from ... a slow drift that has made the journalist more dependent on PR ... In some ways they Dournalists] are more investigative, but only 
on the scandal side'; Stephen Farish (25.7.96), '... journalism can't function without PR of some 
description because modem media operations simply don't have the resources to be driven entirely by 
investigative reporting... '; Stewart Prosser (22.6.98), 'At the same time newspapers are under 
increasing financial pressures, with fewer staff, so it's easier to place stories'. 
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relations industry. PRPs work fewer hours, earn larger salaries (see figure 2.3), have 
better working conditions, and are better resourced. Just over 50 per cent of both 
employment sectors are likely to have some kind of company pension (NUJ, 1998 
and IPR, 1998). However, PRPs are more likely to receive additional benefits, such 
as: an annual bonus (31.9 per cent), private medical insurance (33.7 per cent), or a 
company car (36.9 per cent). They are also rather less likely to be on part-time or 
short-term contracts. In fact, not only have PR numbers increased, but the proportion 
of NUJ members who work in PR have also risen 17 . In 1994 (NUJ, 1994, p8) the 
'press/PR' sector made up 7.3% of NUJ membership. In 1998 (NUJ, 1998, p30), 
24.4% of members worked part or full-time in 'press/PR'. 







Source: IPR and NUJ Membership Surveys 1998 (* IPR collated slightly 
differently, in the form 'Up to 15,000', '15001-20,000', etc. ) 
Second, for those without media experience, there are many other means of acquiring 
knowledge about journalists and their personal information subsidy requirements. In 
fact, more than at any other time, journalists themselves are the subject of 
investigation. In fact, an expanding secondary industry is developing to support the 
specialist information need of PRPs. Databases and reference books, containing 
information on individual journalists, particular publications, and market trends, are 
widely available. Any PRP may currently employ specialist companies for 'media 
monitoring', 'media evaluation', 'media analysis', 'press cutting services', 'media 
training', TR delivery services' and 'video and audio news release services'. 
Two of the largest service suppliers, Two-Ten and PiMS offer extensive, and 
regularly updated, databases on publications and joumalists across the UK. Names, 
addresses, telephone and fax numbers, and e-mail addresses, are all available on line 
"In 1984, the IPR had approximately 2,300 members and the NUJ 33,400. By 1998 the IPR had over 
5,700 members and the NUJ 27,700 (figs. IPR and NUJ membership departments). 40% of NUJ 
members were also in irregular or short-term employment (NUJ, 1998) 
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to PRPs. Although as Colin Taylor, Marketing Manager of PiMS, explains, the 
available information has become rather more extensive (PR Week, 6.11.98, p 14): 
'We have always collected basic information on journalists but are 
constantly getting requests from clients on their specific areas of interest 
... We can also build up more personal 
background material, such as their 
career history, so that clients can bring these things up in conversation, 
helping them to develop a closer relationship ... This business is all about 
establishing relationships so it can also be useful to know about 
journalists likes and dislikes and even the names of their children. ' 
At the other end of the news production line are the media evaluation companies 
such as CARMA and polling companies such as MORI. They offer a range of 
services that effectively monitor and evaluate media outlets and individual journalists 
and gain journalists' opinions on PR clients. 
TARMA defines how your messages are being presented by the media, 
the favourability of news organisations and individual journalists, who is 
setting the agenda, and the relationship between journalists, analysts, 
lobbyists and others' (CARMA promotional material, 1996). 
Whether this information is used to blacklist journalists, lobby them, or shape PR 
copy, it is another powerful means of news management available to PRPs. 
The suppliers of information subsidies are thus able to research their targets as 
effectively as journalists research their stories. Key journalists are now observed at 
all stages of news production. As journalists now investigate sources and act as 
public guardians, PRPs investigate journalists and act as source guardians. Most PRP 
interviewees made use of such tools and devices and were capable of using their 
information to clinical effect. As Martin Jackson of Dewe-Rogerson explained 
(11.9.98): 
'What we try and do in a campaign is home in on a particular journalist 
and keep them on the case throughout the event. We can't chose who 
necessarily ... We will try to go for journalists who we know will have 
credibility. It's down to the city editor. We try and interest other 
journalists if we can ... If we know about a bid in advance, we draw up 
from the database a list of who we want to talk to. So before even the 
analysts orjournalists know we know, we contact them ahead and try and 
get our key journalists interested. ' 
49 
CONCLUSION 
As has been demonstrated, arguments about who is in control, who is setting the 
agenda, when is news news and when is it PR, are all rather vague and inconclusive. 
None of these approaches give a clear indication of whether news production has 
been significantly altered by the rise of professional PR. However, by looking at 
resources - information, economic and human - trends are rather more discernible. 
Study from this perspective suggests that while journalists continue to act with a high 
degree of conscious autonomy, that autonomy is subject to resource constraints. 
Clearly, as British journalism is repeatedly cut and squeezed, its fallibilities increase, 
its standards and objectivity decrease, and its need to cut comers becomes crucial. 
Journalists must do more with less resources and, therefore, are increasingly reactive 
and less discerning in their activities. Under such a state of affairs, the weakened 
media industry remains an easy prey for an increasingly powerful and predatory PR 
sector. Journalists are becoming outnumbered and out-resourced by their PR 
counterparts. Although PRPs may be in direct competition with each other, and 
journalists get to pick and choose, they are in effect making a reactive and less 
critical choice - rather than pursuing a proactive investigation. Without any arm- 
bending, dominant ideology, loss of editorial control, and so on, the influence of PR 
has slowly expanded its role in news production. In effect, the liberal gatekeeper 
models that have relied on journalistic autonomy have been strongly undermined by 
the effects of increased competition and the rise of PRPs. 
The next question to ask is: which elements of society benefit most from the changes 
in news production and the dependence on PR-supplied information subsidies? Is 
public relations simply a means by which particular elite interests can ftirther 
dominate access and manage media agendas? Or does it enable poorer and more 
excluded groups to gain a level of coverage in the media that was previously denied 
to them? So far, the implications indicate that those with greater resources - 
institutions and businesses - will be more able to supply information subsidies 
consistently, and will thus gain greater benefits from the new PR-mediated 
environment. However, as the next chapter on corporate PR argues, the production 
and reception of information subsidies in the media is a rather more complex 
process. 
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PART TWO: CORPORATE PUBLIC RELATIONS 
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CHAPTER THREE: CORPORATE PUBLIC RELATIONS - EVALUATING 
CORPORATE SOURCE INFLUENCE IN THE NATIONAL MEDIA 
This chapter looks at the rise of corporate public relations in the UK and asks: how 
effective has PR been in achieving corporate objectives? As the previous chapter 
noted, the expansion of professional public relations has been most impressive in the 
business sector. The occupational survey of IPR members (IPR, 1998), in 
conjunction with the client profile of the PRCA (1998), indicates that approximately 
two thirds of PRPs are currently employed in in-house corporate PR departments or 
act as consultants to businesses. One might therefore assume that corporate public 
relations has had the most significant impact on news production and public 
discourse. 
That the public relations profession is so heavily skewed towards the business sector 
adds weight to radical media sociology assertions about strong corporate influence 
over the media and public opinion. Common radical explanations for such influence 
have usually involved a focus on either macro-cultural trends and belief systems or 
economic explanations of ownership, advertising and news commodification. 
Although there has been little research on British corporate PR, the available 
information on the sector, when combined with critical work on PR in North 
America, produces an account that strongly supports the radical case. Simply put, 
since 1979: corporate PR has expanded; social and economic policy-making has been 
dominated by pro-business and free-market thinking; and the majority of national 
media producers have continued to support political parties which advocate such 
policies. Thus there appears a strong case for arguing that corporate PR has been 
instrumental in influencing both the media and public opinion towards an acceptance 
of business norms and values. In other words, corporate PR has contributed to a 
corporate 'propaganda model' (Herman and Chomsky, 198 8) or, as Habermas earlier 
argued, a corporate 'refeudalisation' of the 'public sphere' (Habermas, 1989)'. 
This chapter evaluates this thesis critically. By looking more closely at a) media- 
business source relations, and b) the corporate PR industry itself, problems with the 
radical thesis become apparent. Arguably, direct corporate source influence on 
national news production in the UK has been significantly weaker than most 
accounts assume. The logics that guide both journalist routines and business 
communication objectives both suggest that companies are neither able, nor strongly 
inclined, to concentrate their efforts on influencing the output of mainstream news 
'Habermas has since acknowledged the deficiencies of his earlier work in Habermas, 1997. 
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texts. Rather, they tend to pursue public promotion through advertising, and political 
objectives through direct contact with policy-makers. Thus, if public relations is 
benefiting the corporate sector it cannot simply be due to its ability to influence 
national journalists and public opinion. 
PART ONE: PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CORPORATE CONTROL OF 
NEWS PRODUCTION - THE RADICAL THESIS 
Public Relations and the Legitimisation. of Capitalist Democracy 
Looking at the development of public relations historically there appears to be a 
strong case for arguing that PR is closely connected to the management of public, 
opinion by elites. In North America, the history of public relations in the twentieth 
century is linked almost exclusively to governments and corporations (see, for 
example, Dreier, 1982,1988, Gandy, 1982, Berkman and Kitch, 1986, Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988, Nelson, 1989, Cutlip et al, 1994, Stauber and Rampton, 1995, 
Ewen, 1996, Hall-Jamieson, 1996, Graber, 1997, Marchand, 1998, Tye, 1998). For 
many of these accounts the evolution of public relations is indeed tied to the needs of 
elites in capitalist democracies. The introduction of universal suffrage, the 
industrialisation of economies, the expansion of mass communications, the emphasis 
on the consumer society, and the continuing need to legitimise both the state and the 
process of capitalist accumulation, are all factors requiring increased management of 
public opinion. Thus the needs of the governments and corporations - to control 
information flows within the public sphere in the name of the consumer citizen - 
necessitate the creation of a professional public relations sector. At crisis points, 
caused by union activity, war or economic depression, public relations has expanded 
as social psychology has been coupled with sophisticated propaganda methods to 
influence 'the American masses". 
According to many of these same accounts (see, in particular, Warner and Silk, 1979, 
Dreier, 1982,1988, Nelson, 1989, Cutlip et al, 1994, Stauber and Rampton, 1995, 
Ewen, 1996), the more recent rise in corporate public relations came in direct 
2 Thus, Cutlip et al (1985, p23) write 'Tbe history of public relations is meaningful only when it is 
related to these power conflicts and recurring crises of change. For example, it is not mere coincidence 
that in the past, business interests have taken public relations most seriously when their positions of 
power were challenged or threatened by the forces of labour, the farmer, the small shopkeeper ... '; 
Ewen (1996, plO), who interviewed the elderly Bernays, 'grandfather' of the industry, explains 
Temays conveyed his hallucination of democracy: A highly educated class of opinion-moulding 
tacticians is continuously at work, analysing the social terrain and adjusting the mental scenery from 
which the public mind, with its limited intellect, derives its opinions. ' 
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response to a general crisis of corporate perception in the 1970s. Economic 
downturn, together with the rise of media-oriented social movements and pressure 
groups, and a post-Watergate media suspicion of government and big business, 
combined to produce a wave of negative coverage for 'corporate America'. The 
response was the investment of billions of dollars in attempts to manage the public 
opinion and the media, including: media training of corporate executives; the rise of 
government relations and public affairs PR; the establishment of pro-business think- 
tanks; the establishment of corporate-sponsored business journalism courses; 
pressuring the media with 'flak'; the buying-up of media organisations by 
corporations; use of libel laws; and, above all, advocacy advertising. An obvious by- 
product of this corporate communications offensive was the growth in US PRPs. 
Their numbers rose from 19,000 in 1950 to 162,000 in 1990, with 197,000 predicted 
by the year 2000 (Cutlip et al, 1994, p27). Like the UK, over two thirds of PR 
employment was, and continues to be, in business (ibid. ). Thus, in theory, the 
corporate sector has developed the capacity to drown out opposition voices by sheer 
volume of its promotional output alone. Indeed, each of the above studies presents 
detailed case studies of large corporations using PR to manufacture news and sway 
public opinion to achieve particular objectives. 
These critical descriptions of the development of public relations clearly have some 
affinity with radical political economy accounts of news production (e. g., Herman 
and Chomsky, 1988, Schiller, 1989,1992 Bagdikian, 1997, McChesney, 1997, 
Herman and McChesney, 1997). All offer detailed accounts of the power of market 
forces and the ability of corporate interests to influence largely privately-owned news 
media. The 'filters' of business ownership, advertising, and news commodification 
join with a widespread media workers' view that is positive towards business and the 
notion of private property, and is conditioned to accept the dominant ideology of 
capitalist production and/or condemn communism. Such studies, as well as revealing 
a number of occurrences of media bias, myopia and inconsistency, also identify a 
steady stream of political legislation which has favoured business interests. This 
includes legislation which has resulted in: the marginalisation of anti-business 
organisations such as environmental pressure groups (Gitlin, 1980); the use of 
advocacy advertising by businesses and the funding of pro-business think-tanks and 
politicians (Dreier, 1988, Schiller, 1989, McChesney, 1997); a reduction of workers 
rights and union activities; moves towards privatisation, deregulation of industries, 
international trade, and the promotion of national business interests abroad (Herman 
and Chomsky, 1988, Nelson, 1989, Schiller, 1989,1992); a switch from direct to 
indirect taxation and the reduction in the proportion of tax paid by corporations to 
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govemment (Schiller, 1989). 
Few of the above-mentioned studies have actually looked at the reporting of 
businesses in the media or media-business source relations. However, if corporate 
public relations has expanded so significantly and above all other forms of PR, and 
business interests appear to win the political and media debates far more often than 
they lose, then clear links appear likely. The obvious conclusion is that corporate PR 
has helped businesses to further their influence over journalists and the general 
public and worked to support free-market policy-making agendas. 
Corporate Public Relations in the UK 
The radical thesis, although developed in North America, seems quite transposable to 
Britain. The recent history of public relations and government policy-making in the 
UK fits the above analysis well. First, as several historical accounts of the period 
record (see, for example, Middlemas, 1979,1991, Kavanagh and Seldon, 1989, 
Young, 1990, Middlemas, 1991, Letwin, 1992, Pollard, 1992), the Conservative 
governments of the 1980s decisively broke with the post-war tripartite consensus and 
initiated a period of free-market policy-making. These policies resulted in: greater 
concentrations of economic power in fewer companies; a crippling of union power, a 
steady casualisation of working practices and increasing insecurity for workers; 
rising inequality, greater levels of poverty and homelessness; a decline in 
manufacturing industry while the service and financial sectors expanded; extensive 
privatisation and deregulation of industries and the financial sector; the shift of the 
tax burden towards indirect taxation and away from top earners and corporations; 
and attacks on the Welfare State and public spending (see accounts of such shifts in, 
for example, Lowe, 1993, Mills, 1994, Taylor, 1994, Hutton, 1996, Mitchell, 1997). 
In effect, the power of international capital (the interests of the City and 
multinational corporations) has been strengthened at the expense of national wage 
labour (trade unions, manufacturing industry and the welfare state) and elected 
govemment. 
Conditions consequently required the rapid expansion of corporate public relations, 
in order to maintain the support of a majority of consumer-citizens - many of whom 
stood to lose out by such changes. The PR industry did indeed expand impressively 
during the 1980s (see chapter two). Much of it also appeared to be directly linked to 
the Thatcher policy agenda as a three-way alliance, consisting of the Conservative 
government, the corporate sector and the public relations industry, appeared to 
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develop. 
Several of the top public relations companies that grew to dominate the industry in 
the UK simultaneously worked closely with the Conservative party, gained many 
Conservative government contracts, and were employed by many of the UK's top 
companies. For example, Shandwick, Lowe-Bell (now Bell-Pottinger) and Dewe- 
Rogerson (now Dewe-Rogerson-Citigate) all grew at tremendous rates during the 
period of Conservative government - each becoming top-three companies in the PR 
consultancy sector. The chief executive of Shandwick is Peter Gurnmer, brother of 
the former cabinet minister John Selwyn Gurnmer. Shandwick also headed a 
consortium of four consultancies that freely advised the Conservative party 
throughout its term of office. Its directors/advisers (including its subsidiaries) during 
the period included: Lord Chalfont, Lord Strabolgi, Sir Michael McNair-Williams 
MP, Sir Fergus Montgomery MP, Alan Haselhurst MP, and David Mellor MP. In 
1996 the company listed 18 of the FTSE 100 companies as clients. Lowe-Bell was 
run by Tim Bell, personal advisor to Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative party. 
Its directors/advisers (including subsidiaries) during the period included: Anthony 
Grant MP, Michael Mates MP, and Peter Archer MP. In 1996 the company listed 19 
of the FTSE 100 companies as clients. Dewe-Rogerson(-Citigate) made donations to 
the Conservative party, was employed to promote a total of 14 privatisation projects 
in the UK, and has gone on to repeat the process in many other countries. In 1996 the 
company listed 14 of the FTSE top 100 companies as clients. 
Burson-Marsteller, Hill and Knowlton, the Rowland Company (owned by Saatchi 
and Saatchi), Valin Pollen (now Gavin Anderson) and Charles Barker have all also 
dominated PR Week's 'top 10' list for long periods. The directors/advisers listed for 
these companies have included: Sir Bernard Ingham, David Crouch MP, Ted Garrett 
MP, Lord Orr-Ewing, Peter Fry MP, Dudley Smith MP, and Tim Rathbone MP. 
Between them they listed another 34 of the FTSE top 100 companies as clients in 
1996 (sources for all figures and connections, PRCA, 1989-1997 and FT 500,1997). 
Even PR Week, the industry trade journal, is owned by Michael Heseltine's 
Haymarket group and has Bernard Ingham as its star columnist. 
Each of these PR consultancies benefited by being awarded communications 
contracts for government departinents, privatisations, and former nationalised 
industries. A look at the budgets for some of the Conservative privatisation 
campaigns of the 1980s - all awarded to PR consultancies - gives some indication of 
the extent of finances being filtered towards these companies. The promotional 
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budget for the privatisation of BT in 1984 was E25 million, for British Gas in 1986 - 
E40 million, for BP in 1987 - E23 million, for the water utilities in 1989 - E40 
million, and for the electricity companies in 1989 - E76 million (Franklin, 1994: 
p103). In fact, over 100 contracts for government departments, state institutions, 
privatisations, or recently privatised companies were awarded to the above 
consultancies during the Conservative period of goveniment3 (see also Miller and 
Dinan, 2000). As Kavanagh (1995) has also pointed out, these same companies also 
benefited by gaining numerous corporate contracts because of their government 
connections. Saatchi and Saatchi, for example, five years after it took on the 
Conservative party account, had increased pre-tax profits by 600% (Kavanagh, 1995, 
p 18) and had become the largest advertising agency in Britain. 
Throughout, the media in Britain appear to have played a part in this neo-liberal 
drive. For most of the period in question, the majority of national media 
organisations supported the Conservatives - only becoming more ambivalent as New 
Labour adopted many of those same free-market policies (see, for example, Curran et 
al, 1986, Hollingsworth, 1986, Williams, 1996, Curran and Seaton, 1997, Franklin, 
1997). That the media were pro-business was given further support in the few studies 
of business sources in Britain that were to emerge at the time. Work by the Glasgow 
University Media Group (1976,1980,1982), more recently supported by Tumber 
(1993) and Mitchell (1997), all suggested that management and government sources 
have managed to dominate reporting of industrial relations and the economy (see 
also discussion in chapter six). Some time after the Glasgow group's findings, 
Tumber (1993, p358) was again to confirm that, although there were pitfalls as well 
3 These included: Amersham International, Anglian Water, the Atomic Energy Authority, BAA, the 
Bank of England, British Aerospace, British Airways, the British Army, British Coal, British Coal 
Pension Fund, the British Council, British Energy, the BFI, British Gas, British Leyland, the British 
Library, British Nuclear Fuels, British Oil, BP, British Rail, British Railfreight, the British Railways 
Board, British Steel, BT, Cable and Wireless, the Central Electricity Generating Board, the Central 
Office of Information, the Departments of Energy, the Environment, Health, Social Security, Trade 
and Industry, and Transport, the DVLA, East Midlands Electricity, East of Scotland Water Authority, 
Eastern Electricity Board, the Equal Opportunities Commission, Eurotunnel, the Falkland Islands 
Government, the Health Education Authority, the Health Education Council, HM Customs and 
Excise, HMSO, the Home Office, the Industrial Development Board of Northern Ireland, the 
Information Technology Parliamentary Committee, the Inland Revenue, the ITC, the Office of Fair 
Trading, Leyland, the London Electricity Board, London Buses, the London Stock Exchange, London 
Transport, Manpower Services Commission, Manweb, Marconi, the Meat and Livestock Commission, 
the Ministry of Defence, the MMC, the Motor Industry Parliamentary Committee, NATO, the 
National Audit Office, the National Council for Vocational Training, National Grid, National Power, 
Northern Ireland Electricity, North Western Electricity Board, North West Water Group, 
Northumbrian Water, NORWEB, Nuclear Electric, the Office of Fair Trading, OFTEL, the Post 
Office, Powergen, Railtrack, Rolls Royce, Royal Mail, the Royal Mint, the Rural Development 
Commission, Scottish Nuclear, the Scottish Office, Scotrail, South Wales Electricity, Southern 
Electricity Board, Southern Electric, the Territorial Army, Thames Water, the TSB Group, Vickers, 
the Water Authorities Association, the Water Services Association, Southern Water, the Welsh 
Development Agency, Welsh Water (Source PRCA Annuals 1980-1998). 
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as benefits to new business promotional techniques, 'The majority of business 
coverage is supportive, complimentary and consonant with the media's role in 
reproducing dominant ideology'. Mitchell's 1988 (1997, p47) survey of trade union 
and business relations with the media similarly found that only 3% of unions said the 
media were 'sympathetic' and 66% said 'unsympathetic'. This was opposed to 
employment groups - 42% sympathetic and 21 % unsympathetic, and individual finns 
- 30% sympathetic and 17% unsympathetic. 
PART TWO: RADICAL MISCALCULATIONS AND THE FAILURE OF 
BUSINESS SOURCES 
Undoubtedly, the public relations industry has been widely employed by 
corporations and government and has also been significantly involved in the 
promotion of free-market policy-making. The question is: how successful has it been 
in its promotional goals? As the next two parts argue, if it has been successful, it is 
unlikely to have been entirely through attempts to influence mainstream journalists 
and the general public. 
The principal problem with the mass influence model outlined above is its lack of 
empirical evidence on business source activities, corporate source-media relations or 
corporate public relations in Britain. In effect, the power of'business sources and 
corporate PR to influence day-to-day reporting is assumed rather than demonstrated. 
Arguably, the few radical studies that have managed to observe business sources and 
mainstream business reporting fail to convince with their evidence (see critiques by 
Harrison, 1986, Tiffen, 1989, and Schudson, 1991). More importantly, these studies 
do not explain several empirical inconsistencies in their work - each of which tend to 
suggest that business-media relations require substantial reconsideration. In fact, 
there is a rather significant body of evidence which suggests that a) business sources 
are not particularly effective at gaining access to mainstream news, and b) 
influencing mainstrearn news with public relations is not necessarily a major 
objective of business elites at all. 
Reviewing Elite Source Dominance - The Economics of News-gathering 
It is often assumed that because elites generally dominate news, business sources do 
also. However, although journalists tend to pursue institutional and government elites 
the same can not be said of corporate elites. In fact, the findings of most empirical 
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studies of news-gathering and production (Tunstall, 1971, Sigal, 1973, Tuchman, 
1976, Gans, 1980, Gitlin, 1980, Fishman, 1980, Tiffen, 1989, Ericson et al, 1989, 
1991) suggest that mainstream journalists are rarely likely to cover business sources 
for clear economic and organisational reasons. 
First, all of these studies note that journalists attempt to cover beats, build up regular 
sources, and follow routines for news-gathering. In other words, news organisations 
must employ journalists efficiently by gaining regular and accessible sources of news 
supply in order to produce a consistent and continuous flow of news stories. It is for 
these organisational reasons, as much as the need to find authoritative and powerful 
sources, that institutional sources dominate most forms of news. However, 
businesses do not conform to these journalist requirements. As Ericson et al (1989, 
1991) discovered, they are not part of regular news-beats, do not have physical 
spaces for journalists to occupy, and generally do not offer a regular supply of 
'newsworthy' stories. 
Further barriers, which hinder active business source-journalist relations, have been 
recognised in both corporate and media circles for some time. Unless there is an 
emergency, business executives rarely make or have the time to give interviews to 
meet urgent journalist deadlines. Another problem is that economic and business 
issues can be very technical and complex and thus demand levels of specialist 
knowledge and time that journalists do not have. Finn's (1981) survey, of 187 
business executives, 204 PR directors and 198 journalists, found that both sides 
agreed that journalists were too ignorant of business and didn't adequately research 
their business stories. Each of these points have been repeatedly stressed by both 
journalists and corporate elites (see Warner and Silk, 1979, CBI, 1981, Finn, 1981, 
Hoge, 1988, Smith, 1988, Rees-Mogg, 1992). Thus, in the increasingly fast-paced 
news-gathering environment it is simply not efficient for businesses and business 
leaders to become regular sources for mainstream reporters. 
From the point of view of audiences, and therefore sales and advertising revenues, 
journalists are also less likely to cover businesses. Mainstream Journalists are aware 
the general public is not interested in good business news, which is technical, not 
personality based, and seemingly irrelevant to most people. As Silk explains (in 
Warner and Silk, 1979, p44), news media, with large audiences, often shy away from 
business reporting because of. 
'... the fear of dial-switching, as listeners tune out an explanation of the 
economics of gas pricing or energy development for a rock singer, a 
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baseball game, a quiz show, a soap opera, or some other piece of 
entertainment that will raise its ratings and hence its advertising dollars 
and profits'. 
Thus, as news outlets try to expand their audiences in order to draw wider audiences 
and more advertising (see Curran, 1978, Dreier, 1982, Garnham, 1990, Franklin, 
1997), so businesses are less likely to be sources in mainstream news. This is 
particularly the case in tabloid newspapers, which depend more on sales than 
advertising (see Curran, 1978). As Kahle (in Rubin, 1977 pl7l) concludes, 'The 
irony, then, is that as the media become bigger businesses, they become more 
problematical for big business'. 
in fact the few quantitative studies that exist, in which business and other sources are 
compared, all tend to agree that business sources are amongst the least cited. Several 
studies of industrial relations reporting (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976, 
1980,1982, Annan, 1977, McQuail, 1979, Harrison, 1985) all produced content 
analysis data demonstrating that both union and government sources gained 
significantly more coverage than business ones. Finn's survey (198 1, p3 7) similarly 
found that three quarters of 'Journalists and public relations directors are both aware 
that business executives have few outlets in which to express their views'. 
Reviewing Journalist-Business Relations - Antagonism and Scandal 
What several studies have also noted is that the majority of British journalists are 
union members and more sympathetic to the political left than they are to the pro- 
corporate right (e. g. Philo, 1977, Annan, 1977, McQuail, 1979, Jones, 1986, 
Harrison, 1986, Seaton, 1991). Lichter and Rothman's (1988) study in the United 
States produced similar results. A survey of 240 journalists and 216 business 
executives found that, in all elections since 1964, over 80% of journalists had voted 
Democrat. Asking their opinions on a series of issues, the study found that the 
majority of journalists could be classified as 'welfare state liberals' who supported 
policies and followed voting patterns that were in marked contrast to those of 
business leaders. Such observations suggest that business elites and journalists are 
unlikely to communicate on a positive, like-minded basis. 
Research by Lichter and Rothman (1988) and Finn (1981), in fact, recorded high 
levels of antagonism between the two groups. Lichter and Rothman's survey found 
that individuals from both business and the media regarded the other as constituting 
'the most powerful group' in society (from a choice of seven excluding the state) and 
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believed that its influence should be severely reduced. The AMA's study (Finn, 
1981, PIO) '... of public relations executives found that 73% believe reporters don't 
accurately research their topics, 62% believe reporters play on public emotions, and 
72% see anti-business feelings and public sentiment being on the side of the media'. 
For their part, 61 % of journalists thought 'business people are not honest'. Several 
US and UK publications, produced by the business sector since the late 1970s, record 
a high level of concern amongst business leaders about reporting patterns and '... the 
social evolution of "consumerism, envirom-nentalism and employeeism"' (Rubin, 
1977, p170). For example, the CBI's media guide for businessmen, under the 
heading 'Media people - are they humanT (198 1, p 14,16), warned that: 
'In general, those entering journalism are not 'business-oriented' - nor 
are they much helped in training to appreciate business ... Worse, from 
the businessman's viewpoint, he may well have picked up the 
fashionable anti-business attitudes common to some higher educational 
courses'. 
A decade later, Rees-Mogg was to observe that (1992, p9) '... there is still a good deal 
of misunderstanding about how business and the press can best relate ... Businessmen 
in general have an uneasy feeling the press is liable to go off like a bomb". 
Relations are not helped by the tendency for most journalists to report businesses 
only when there is a negative story. Since consumers are drawn to stories about 
personalities, drama, crime and the environment, businesses are most likely to be 
covered when they are involved in negative activity such as environmental 
catastrophes. As Hoge explains (1988, p422) 'The media write about the bad and 
ignore the good; they are fascinated by corruption, unsafe products, lawsuits and 
bribery, and sensationalism and conflict. ' Such findings are clear to those studies that 
look at business sources (Dreier, 1982, Tiffen, 1989, Ericson et al, 1991) and 
painfully obvious to businesses (Warner in Warner and Silk, 1979, CBI, 198 1, Hoge, 
1988, Smith, 1988, Rees-Mogg, 1992)'. Thus for businesses, appearances in 
4 See also: Arman (1977, p273), 'On the other side, management equally believes that its case rarely 
gets a fair hearing'; Warner (in Warner and Silk, 1979), 'The truth is that by speaking out, business is 
only beginning to redress an obvious imbalance ... If anything, it is the anti-business forces who 
manipulate the media'; Berkman and Kitch (19 86, p275), 'Business had long believed that journalists 
give a bad name to profits and exaggerate workplace and environmental hazards'. 
5CBI (1981, p6) 'Bad news will be with us as always. Media people want a good story, which 
disasters always are'; Norman Manners (in Englefield, 1992, p10), 'There is little doubt that the 
avarice of the 1980s caused the public perception of business to change quite radically. The public has 
come to mistrust the dominance of big business ... '; Tumber (1993, p358), 'Stories appearing on the front and main pages are exceptional and dramatic with an emphasis on crime, sex and scandal. The 
news values involved have not deviated from the old definitions of what is, or makes, news'; PRP (in 
Ericson et al, 1989, p270), '[news coverage] can kill you more quickly than it can make you. Ten 
times as fast as it can make you. The news is by definition more interested in crisis, agony problems 
I 
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mainstream news are unlikely to be advantageous. 
Returning to the work of Tumber (1993) and Mitchell (1997), their own data in fact 
suggests that businesses get little positive coverage - despite their pro-business media 
conclusions. Tumber's (1993, p354) figures show that less than a third of national 
newspapers have more positive than negative coverage, with the Financial Times 
being most pro-business by only producing 48.2% negative coverage. Mitchell's 
figures (see above), while showing that businesses have more positive coverage than 
trade unions, also show that business coverage is not particularly positive. Looking at 
his figures in more detail, only three papers have 50% or more 'sympathetic' news 
coverage of business, while all the tabloids are more 'unsympathetic' than 
'sympathetic". 
Fracture and Conflict in Pro-Business Ideology 
Another significant problem with the notion of business ideology influencing news is 
that businesses are far from united in their thinking. Studies of business elites and 
pressure groups (e. g., Ball and Millard, 1986 Richardson, 1993, Grant, 1993,1995, 
Mitchell, 1997, Boswell and Peters, 1997), while noting the advantages of businesses 
in the policy-making process, also stress the great divisions within the business 
community. The needs of the financial, service and manufacturing sectors are often 
quite different. In addition to being part of industry associations, businesses may also 
belong to a number of associations with conflicting aims, including the CBI, the IoD, 
the Federation of Small Businesses and the Association of Independent Businesses. 
The effects of taxation and interest rates policies, European integration, financial 
regulation, industrial and trade policy, energy and environmental policies, health and 
consumer policies, each impact the various businesses and business sectors in 
different ways. Thus, as Grant is led to conclude (1993, p 18): 
'... Britain has a business sector in which there is an increasing 
concentration of economic power, but that business remains politically 
weak ... It is not easy to define its interests or to select the best political 
strategy for pursuing them, in part because there are important divisions 
of interest between different sectors of business (and not just between 
financiers and industrialists), in part because the optimal strategy to 
secure a desired end is not always readily apparent or, at any rate, is the 
subject of dispute. ' 
6 It should also be taken into account that in 1988, at the time of the survey, the economy was very 
strong and unions were in the depths of economic and political crisis. In the late 1990s, figures are 
rather different (see next chapter on trade unions). 
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In effect the fact that business sources are often in competition does much to dilute 
their corporate messages. 
That business elites have been unable to consistently promote their views, through 
the mass media, to the general public is finiher supported by studies of 'dominant 
ideology' and audiences. Abercrombie et al (1984,1990) concluded that, historically 
and sociologically, there has never been a coherent dominant ideology that has 
persuaded the masses to accept many of the tenets of the prevailing system of 
production. Elites have remained too divided and fractured for that. Subordinates, in 
turn, have never been particularly persuaded by ideas as much as by social and 
economic pragmatism (see Turner, 1990, Pakulski, 1990, and Hill, 1990, and Held, 
1989). Work on audiences (Morley, 1980, Ang, 1985 Fisk, 1987) has similarly 
argued that dominant ideas are disrupted by the fact that: audiences actively 
consume, have very different habits of consumption, take pleasure in consumption, 
and respond quite differently to products according to their social and cultural 
backgrounds. As Abercrombie concludes (1990, p221) 'The net effect of these 
features is a great deal of diversity, pluralism and indeterminacy. ' 
However corporate sources are reported, public antagonism towards businesses and 
business ideals seems to have increased rather than diminished. Fidler's study of 
business elites (198 1, p254) found that 'Even within the middle classes, businessmen 
feel they have no particularly high status, for they remark on the traditional dislike of 
the British for industry. ' Page et al's (1987) research found that viewing publics 
distrusted information from business sources, as they did with special-interest groups 
generally. A MORI poll in 1993 (Dec, 1993) placed business leaders II th out of 15 
in a list of who the public trusted to 'tell the truth' (with only 32% support). A 
similar poll two years later (MORI, Dec, 1995) found that company directors had 
dropped to 12th out of 15. 
Similarly, while there is considerable tacit support for the capitalist system, many 
specific corporate elite ideals have failed to gain general public support. According 
to Jowell et al (1992, p 13 5), when people were asked who benefited from increased 
profits, 54% answered shareholders and managers, 28% said investment in 
machinery, research and training, and 8% said the workforce. When asked where 
increased profits should go, only 3% said shareholders and managers, 42% said 
investment and 39% said the workforce. Throughout the period 1975 to 1995, MORI 
found that: between 71% and 82% of respondents agreed that 'Trade unions are 
essential to protect workers' interests'; and that between 51% and 71% thought that 
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'Generally speaking ... trade unions are a good thing' 
(Between 18% and 34% 
disagreed). According to Jowell et al (1993) 85% of the British think the rich should 
be taxed more and 85% are in favour of a 'progressive taxation' policy of direct 
rather than indirect taxation. More recently, PR Week (2.10.9 8p 10/ 11) reported on 
the Institute of Directors 'Hub Initiative' -a E300,000 PR campaign deemed 
necessary to improve the public perception of business. They reported that a 1998 
MORI survey found that 67% believed profits were too high - up from 55% in a 
1990 survey, and only 28% believed company profits helped everyone - down from 
46% in 1990. 
In effect, either corporate public relations investment has given poor returns to the 
corporate sector or it has been used more effectively for other purposes. Aggregating 
the findings of all these studies, the clear conclusion is that, on the whole, reporting 
patterns are not consistently favourable to the needs of business. In general news 
coverage, corporations have no advantages of access and are unlikely to gain it 
according to factors governing routine reporting and audience demand. Clearly, 
despite the tremendous investment in corporate public relations during the last two 
decades, the ability of businesses to promote themselves in the news media has not 
really improved. 
PART THREE: ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS COMMUNICATION 
OBJECTIVES 
Looking at corporate communications activity the indications are that businesses 
actually avoid mainstream news coverage altogether. Indeed, according to several 
studies of business sources (Berkman and Kitch, 1986, Tiffen, 1989, and Ericson et 
al., 1989), corporate public relations appears to have best served businesses by 
restricting reporter access and information - not by promoting company views. As 
Ericson et al (1989 p390) conclude: 
'For the private corporation, power over the news is power to stay out of 
the news. Their news proactivity goes no further than reminding the news 
outlets that benefit from their advertising that the corporation would 
appreciate the odd "free" news or feature item on the wonders of its 
products'. 
Indeed, business elites seem to have realised the limits of proactive public relations 
when it comes to influencing news production, and indeed, have decided that it is not 
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an effective means of achieving many business ends'. Companies advertise if they 
want to promote particular products or opinions and go direct to politicians if they 
want to influence policy. Thus, total business advertising expenditure is still several 
times higher than that on public relations. In 1994, UK advertising rose to E10.136 
billion (Advertising Association, 15.6.98). In that same year DTI estimates for PR, 
acquired from the PRCA, IPR and WPP, varied between E400 million and EIA 
billion. Even taking this top estimate, advertising expenditure is still more than seven 
times that of public relations. A report by Mintel in 1995 estimated that advertising 
accounted for 50% of UK expenditure on marketing services while PR accounted for 
5-6% - roughly a tenth. In the US in particular, corporations spend a 
large part of 
their advertising budgets on 'advocacy advertising' (Warner and Silk, 1979, Vogel, 
1983, Berkman and Kitch, 1986, Dreier, 1988, Schiller, 1989, Bagdikian, 1992) in 
order to express their views on politics and the economy. Businesses, in effect, find 
advertising a more useful and controlled means to communicate with the public. 
In terms of political influence, studies also suggest that business elites already have 
considerable access to policy-makers, or the means to gain access through lobbyists - 
and so have less need to use the media. Studies of pressure groups and politics in the 
UK (Ball and Millard, 1986, Kavanagh, 1990, Richardson, 1993, Grant, 1993,1995) 
generally agree that businesses have an 'insider status' not equalled by other 
organised interests. Apart from contact through business associations (e. g. the CBI, 
IoD, ABCC, amongst many others), individual businesses are represented on a wide 
range of economic, legal, technical and financial committees. Business access to civil 
servants and ministers (and even prime ministers) is both regular and 
institutionalised. That access has been further improved by the employment of 
expensive lobbying firms - the recent expansion of which in the UK has been noted 
in several studies (Jordan, 1990, Crouch and Dore, 1990, Grant, 1993,1995, 
Mitchell, 1997) and drawn considerable media attention. 
All of which suggests that businesses have realised that political objectives are not 
necessarily best achieved by marshalling public opinion. Businesses are more 
successful going direct than using a potentially hostile, unpredictable and inaccurate 
news media. Ball and Millard (1986), Berkman and Kitch (1986), Ericson et al 
(199 1), and Mitchell (1997) have all reached the same conclusions. Mitchell's survey 
of trade unions and business associations demonstrates this most clearly (see table 
7 See also: chapter two; Cutlip et al (1985, p478), 'It was obvious to many sophisticated heads of large 
businesses that the credibility and confidence they had lost could not be regained through traditional 
public relations "techniques" openly bidding for public support'; Berkman and Kitch (1986, p293), 
'Business interests rarely promote initiatives in their own interest, and, when they do, these initiatives 
are not especially successful'. 
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3.1). Business associations, engaged in political activity, are far more likely to meet 
with civil servants and ministers, and to lobby, than they are to use PR campaigns or 
committees. Meeting ministers and civil servants is also regarded as the 'most 
effective' form of political activity. In contrast, the most effective means of political 
activity for unions is lobbying and public relations. 
Table 3.1: Types of Political Activity - Percentage Frequency of Use and 
Effectiveness for Business Associations and Unions 
Most Often Used Most Effective 
Bus. Assocns Unions Bus. Assocns Unions 
Committees 7 6 0 0 
Meeting Ministers 47 5 27 17 
Meeting Civ Servs 86 21 58 10 
Written Submissions 78 43 6 3 
Lobbying 57 29 10 24 
PR Campaigns 21 38 3 38 
Protests/Strikes 0 14 0 13 
Source: MitcheU (1997, p158) 
The obvious conclusion is that, if public relations is effectively achieving corporate 
political objectives, it must be doing so in other ways and in other forum. Two ways 
suggested in this part are: a) by restricting information and journalist access, and b) 
by increasing direct access to politicians through lobbying. However, this account 
omits too much. It does not really explain the continuing corporate investment in 
public relations - the vast majority of which is still directed towards media relations. 
The questions remain: how does corporate public relations influence media texts - if 
it does at all - and how does it benefit business? 
Corporate Public Relations for Corporate Audiences 
The answers lies in the fact that a significant proportion of corporate PR in Britain is 
not particularly focused on 'the masses' or mainstream news at all. This is initially 
demonstrated with a closer look at the PR consultancy industry itself. A breakdown 
of the major occupations of PRPs in rank order (see table 3.2), during the period 
1989-1996 are: financial, consumer, corporate, trade and industry, government 
relations, international, employee relations, high tech, and other. Consumer relations 
is the only one of these aimed at a wider public audience. Financial, corporate and 
trade/industry, three of the four major categories, are actually directed at the 
corporate sector itself. 
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Table 3.2: Employment Sectors for PR Consultants (per cent. ) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1996 
Financial: 28 25 16 20 22 19 
Consumer: 22 24 20 21 18 19 
Corporate: 16 17 16 12 16 12 
Trade/Industry: 14 15 8 9 10 14 
Govt. Relns: 7 6 8 7 7 3 
Employee: 3 3 3 3 3 3 
High Tech: 2 3 5 7 9 4 
Health: 1 4 6 7 10 4 
Other: 9 3 18 14 5 22 
Sources: PRCA (1990,1991,1992,1993,1994,1997) and Mintel (1995) 
As table 3.2 reveals, the dominant PR employment sector for most of the last two 
decades has been financial public relationS8 . For many commentators, the 
impressive 
expansion of the whole PR industry in the 1980s was in fact led by the rising demand 
for financial PR (Kopel, 1983, Nicholson and Trundle, 1986, Olasky, 1987, Smith, 
1989, Bowman, 1989, White and Mazur, 1995, Mintel, 1995, Hanrahan, 1997). The 
'City and Financial' section of the IPR, initiated in 1972, has remained the largest 
specialist group within the IPR and currently has 440 members. The IRS (Investor 
Relations Society), in existence since 1980, has expanded to over 350 members since 
individual membership was introduced in 1993. City and investor relations is also 
considered to be the most prestigious and financially rewarding employment sector 
in public relations. An IRS (1998) survey of its members revealed that the average 
salary in investor relations was E78,000 (plus generous benefits) - more than double 
the average of the industry (see PR Week annual salary surveys). According to the 
same survey, companies with a market capitalisation of over E5 billion spend 
E546,000, on average, just on investor relations. Companies with a market cap of 
between E500 million and E5 billion spend E447,000 on average. Thus it is clear that 
considerable resources have been invested in City and financial public relations with 
rather more specialist target audiences. 
The Rise of Financial News 
Parallel to the recent expansion of public relations has come an equally impressive 
gThese figures are also likely to under-represent public affairs and financial PR work. This is because, 
in order to retain anonymity for themselves and their clients, the majority of top City consultancies 
have not joined the PRCA. For example, at the time of writing, II of the largest 18 financial 
consultancies (as listed in Mintel, the Crawfords and Hernmington Scott City guides), are not PRCA 
members and remain virtually unknown outside City circles. 
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increase in the production of business and financial news. A number of media 
scholars have noted the rise of financial news media (Curran, 1978, Dreier, 1982, 
1988 Berkman and Kitch, 1986, Jones, 1987, Parsons, 1989, Tumber, 1993, 
Williams, 1996), both in the US and Britain. Jones (1987, p 12) observed in the 1980s 
that industrial relations reporting was seriously declining and that the main growth 
area was in financial reporting -a sector that had come to occupy a third of the 
editorial space in the Times, the Independent and the Daily Telegraph. For Tunstall 
(1996, p354-5), within the last two decades '... financial news has tended to take over 
from political news and foreign news as the premier serious news field'. As part of 
this transition the Financial Times has taken the place of the Times as the most 
respected broadsheet newspaper, acting 'as the semi-official voice of the City of 
London'. As well as the promotion of the Financial Times, Tunstall also argues that 
the Economist, Reuters and the London Stock Exchange have combined to form the 
basis of an expanding international centre for financial news. Tunstall estimated that 
by 1994 there were 200 financial journalists amongst the national press and a further 
200 on the Financial Times. Tumber (1993, p350), from a different vantage point, 
observed a similar expansion of financial news in television and radio news as well 
as in the development of 'many new investment magazines, newsletters and tip- 
sheets offering share recommendations to subscribers'. 
Of these works, only Tunstall (1996) made the connection between the rise of the 
financial media and that of corporate PR. However, for the PR industry, the two are 
obviously inseparable. For several authors (Bowman, 1989, Williams in Bowman, 
1989, Bland, 1989, Andrew, 1990, Andrew, 1995, and White and Mazur, 1995), 
corporate public relations has directed an expansion of financial news in response to 
financial activity - and has often acted as a direct subsidy for news outlets not 
prepared for this expansion. In Bland's assessment (1989, p4), the space for financial 
PR opened up because 'The financial coverage of newspapers has increased, but the 
supply of financial journalists has not kept up. Good financial journalists are in short 
supply... ' Regardless of what came first, the financial news text 'chicken' or 
corporate press-release 'egg', the two have followed very similar patterns of 
development. Financial PR and financial journalism are both now considered the 
premier employment sectors of their respective industries. Both led the expansion of 
their industries in the 1980s; both halted expansion during the recession of the early 
1990s, and both have begun expanding again since the mid- I 990s. 
Clearly the two are closely connected. One might therefore conclude that if public 
relations is benefiting the corporate sector it is likely to be doing so in specialist 
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magazines and news sections that offer business, financial and economic news. Tbus, 
further research in these areas would be the logical next step. How effective financial 
PR has been in the area of business and financial news, and its influence on financial 
decision-making processes, are the subjects of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CITY AND FINANCIAL PUBLIC RELATIONS AND 
BUSINESS NEWS 
INTRODUCTION 
Following on from the conclusions of the previous chapter, chapter four explores the 
development of financial public relations and its relationship with financial and 
business news in the national press. 
The chapter begins with what appears to be a classic liberal pluralist account of the 
expansion of financial and business news and corporate public relations. This 
account argues that financial and business news expanded because of a) rising public 
interest, and b) the greater information requirements of an expanding and volatile 
market. Increased post-war prosperity amongst the expanding middle classes led to 
greater personal investment in financial products which, in turn, led to greater 
interest in financial news and thus generated more corporate advertising. 
Privatisation programmes, as well as the promotion of wider home and share 
ownership in the 1980s, intensified such trends. At the same time government and 
stock market regulations required that companies become more open and 
accountable by supplying more information about themselves and their products. 
Business news therefore expanded - its funding provided by financial product 
advertising, and its fourth estate role established by the needs of the public and the 
requirements of a fair and perfect market. Thus financial PR grew reactively to 
service the information demands of a growing public audience. 
This account , however, is a particularly narrow one, in that it does not take account 
of the information needs of businesses themselves. As the greater part of this chapter 
argues, it is corporate communication imperatives that have been more instrumental 
in shaping business news in the last two decades. City corporations, aided by the 
employment of proactive financial PR, have managed to 'capture' financial news 
production. In this news sector, businesses pay for all advertising, dominate as 
sources, have a monopoly in the supply of information subsidies, and are the main 
consumers of business and financial news. It therefore stands to reason that, even if 
companies are in conflict, business agendas and business norms and values will 
shape financial and business news. Ironically, as corporate competition has 
intensified in the last two decades, so business and financial news has become less 
pluralistic and autonomous. 
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This has resulted in business and financial coverage being confined to reporting the 
concerns of 'financial elite discourse networks', thus excluding both the general 
public and rival elites. One might argue that such tendencies have contributed to the 
following trends: there is a greater level of unchallenged consensus in the beliefs of 
the financial elites that govern the City; financial elites have increasingly become the 
de facto experts on the economy - an expertise which continues to influence policy- 
makers and regulators in successive British governments; and the interests and 
requirements of non-financial elites are excluded. As such, corporate public relations 
has benefited parts of the corporate sector, most specifically the City, not so much by 
controlling public opinion as by excluding the general public altogether. 
Most of the supporting evidence for this chapter comes from a series of 38 semi- 
structured interviews. This material was combined with quantitative data from 
professional bodies in the PR industry, the Stock Exchange, City Business and 
Guildhall libraries, PR Week and the Advertising Association. 
PART ONE: FINANCIAL NEWS AND THE TRANSITION FROM PUBLIC 
INTEREST TO CORPORATE NEED 
Studies of business news and corporate PR (e. g., Kopel, 1983, Newman, 1984, 
Parsons, 1989, Bowman, 1989, Andrew, 1990, Turnber, 1993, Andrew, 1995, 
Tunstall, 1996) provide a range of explanations for the rise of financial and business 
news - many of which were reiterated by interviewees. These included: increased 
financial activity in the City, the rise in financial products and personal finance 
advice, investor and regulatory demands for greater fiows of financial information, 
the expansion of private share ownership, and greater competition and volatility in 
the City. Within these accounts two broad counter theses are discernible. The first, 
popular amongst financial journalists and the City, is that financial and business 
news expanded to serve the needs of an interested public and to impose a necessary 
transparency and equality on the London Stock Exchange. The second is that 
corporations, operating in an increasingly competitive environment, have sought to 
actively use financial PR to make business news serve corporate information needs. 
Arguably it is corporate influences which have increasingly come to shape business 
'These include: 10 with in-house directors of corporate affairs of FTSE top 150 companies; 15 with 
financial and City PR consultants at chief executive or director level - all from the top 20 financial PR 
consultancies; nine with financial journalists and editors of the national press; and four with 
individuals with a direct interest in financial PR - including the director general of the Takeover Panel, 
the executive director of the PRCA, and the director of external affairs of the Investor Relations 
Society. 
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and financial news. 
Public Demand for Financial News 
For the majority of financial journalists and joumalists-tumed-PRP, business news 
expanded because newspapers and advertisers perceived a rise in interest amongst 
the general public. Public interest developed as a result of the post-war period of 
affluence. According to social and economic historians (e. g., Pollard, 1992, 
Caimcross, 1992, Rubinstein, 1993) the standard of living for the general population 
rose considerably in this period. Consumer spending has grown as a proportion of 
GDP in every decade since 1950 (Caimcross, 1992, p274-5). Home ownership 
increased from 29% in 1951 to 56% in 1981 (Rubinstein, 1993, p42). As an 
increasing proportion of the population began to possess surplus capital, so the 
financial sector developed a range of financial products for them to invest in - from 
basic savings accounts and pensions to unit trusts and share investment schemes. 
Personal finance generated high rates of advertising which, in turn, increased 
financial sections and paid for more coverage of companies, financial products and 
economic and business news. According to Curran (197 8), by far the largest increase 
in advertising and advertising-related features, in the period 1946 to 1976, took place 
in the business and financial sections of newspapers. Newman's figures also show a 
strong rise in financial advertising from the 1950s onwards. In Newman's assessment 
(1984, p193): 'The space occupied by consumer-targeted, financial editorial was 
directly related to the amount of financial product advertising. As the advertising 
grew, so did the columns and the number of financial journalists. ' 
Advertising for these products was matched by the perception of editors that the 
general public wanted more information on these products. Journalists operating at 
the time saw it as their duty to open up the closed world of the City and to advise and 
speak for the small investor, be it on personal finance schemes or share dealing. As 
one recounted: 
'If you go back historically, the financial media were very restricted. The 
number of people holding stocks and shares was low, and financial 
public relations was little more than a delivery service ... Suddenly the 
newspapers woke up to the fact that there was a whole new generation of 
shareholders, and it was no longer the privileged few. This was a 
potential readership for financial news and it spawned the City pages ... 
On the back of these, very quickly, came the personal finance pages, as a 
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number of new financial products were launched. So came the growth of 
financial j oumalism, which attracted readerships and their advertising. " 
These trends were boosted by the policies of the Thatcher administration in the 
1980s. Government legislation promoted home ownership, the privatisation of 
nationalised industries, the widening of private share ownership, and incentives to 
invest in various savings schemes. Home ownership increased from 57% to 69% 
from 1979 to 1989 (Pollard, 1992,379). Between 1979 and 1996 there were 59 major 
public sales of government-owned businesses, worth E65 billion, and 88 private 
sales, worth a further E6.7 billion (Privatisation Yearbook 1997). In 1980 there were 
three million shareholders. The privatisations of the 1980s increased this number to 
II million by 1991. Following a number of demutualisations by leading building 
societies and insurance companies the total reached 17 million in 1997 (London 
Stock Exchange Fact File, 1998). Consumer interest again increased, as did financial 
advertising, which tripled in the period 1975-1983 (Newman, p221). Journalists were 
consequently given yet more space with which to cover business and financial news 
and to offer personal investment advice. 
Thus, the majority of interviewees tended to agree with Richard Northedge's 
(25.5.99) account. That is that the expansion of financial and business news 
continues to be: 
'... an expression partly of reader interest. People have more money to 
dispose of There are PEPs, ISAs, they invest directly in shares. It was all 
part of the business environment that was there during the Thatcher years 
... The other 
half has come from the corporate sector in the form of 
advertising. To be clear, if there wasn't the increase in corporate 
2 See also: Graham Williams (26.10.98) 'When I was a young man, the amount of coverage given to 
finance was tiny. Apart from the FT it was relatively small. Now it is huge ... The welfare state came into being and taxation changed and became more complicated. Suddenly people had savings and 
wanted pensions and mortgages to buy houses and life insurance to cover the mortgages. People began 
having bank accounts and to buy things on higher purchase, and then came credit cards. None of these 
things really existed in great numbers before the war ... It was a revolution involving money 
management ... So we are developing as a society which is financially literate - involved with savings 
and investments -a society which sees savings, for whatever purposes, as routine from the moment 
they leave school, if not before'; Anonymous financial PR and former journalist (1999), 'At the time 
[post WW2 period] it was Beaverbrook's Express that was the pioneer of modem financial 
journalism. The FT and Telegraph were not the sort of papers that would rock the boat and question 
the establishment. But Beaverbrook was a Canadian and not part of the City club. The Daily Mirror 
was another innovator. The Times also began offering investment advice in response to readers' 
letters. It was a chance to increase circulation. Derek Dale of the Mirror also decided to have a City 
column and the Evening Standard produced its own City page. So the City pages came in response to 
readership and advertising demand. At the start they were all very simple. The Mirror even had a strip 
cartoon which was used to give investment advice. As a result, letters poured in and the City editors 
could identify what was wanted'. 
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advertising there wouldn't be such expansion in the business sections. It 
goes hand in hand with advertising. " 
The Regulation of Financial Information and the Needs of the Perfect Market 
Another reason for the expansion of financial news, according to studies of financial 
PR (Kopel, 1983, Newman, 1984, Bowman, 1989, Andrew, 1990, VVhite and Mazur, 
1995) and several interviewees, is the increased demand for publicly available 
information for investors. According to Andrew (1995, p11-12) 'perfect 
communication' flows are essential for the functioning of the 'perfect market' - and 
work to ensure the inclusion of multiple, informed buyers and sellers and multiple 
transactions. As Alistair Defriez, director general of the Takeover Panel, explained 
(interview, 11.11.8): 
'It is important in any public market where investors are dealing and 
investing in shares that they have access to sufficient information in 
quantity, and also complete and accurate information in terms of quality. 
Anything that assists in achieving those objectives - information quality 
and quantity - is a good thing. The rise of all these things has meant that 
we have more transparency and better information. ' 
Directed by such principles, successive companies acts, in conjunction with 
increased stock market regulation, have demanded the publication of greater and 
more regular quantities of information by listed companies (see account in Newman, 
1984, chp one). During the 1980s, such factors as the introduction of the USM 
(Unlisted Stock Market), a rise in flotations, an extensive privatisation programme, 
and wider share ownership, led to greater calls for public accountability and the need 
for yet more financial information to be published (see Pratten, 1993). A number of 
acts and codes followed or were enlarged (including the 1985 Companies Act, 1986 
Financial Services Act, 1993 Criminal Justice Act, Stock Exchange Listings Rules, 
3 See also: Alex Brummer (16.6.99), 'In the main it [business coverage] has played an increasingly 
important part in people's lives. The concept of a cradle to grave welfare state has changed and it has 
become necessary for people to provide for themselves. We have had the opening up of the stock 
market, the Big Bang, privatisations, dernutualisations - all the while with a sense of events connected 
to the Reagan-Thatcher era'; David Black-well (17.5.99), 'The growth of financial news in the 
Telegraph, the Times and others has come because of financial advertising. They have seen that it's a 
lucrative area to get into because of the financial advertising revenues that can be gained. The second 
reason is things like pensions and life assurance which have produced all the personal finance 
sections'; Anonymous financial journalist (1999), 'It's expanded to a certain extent because of 
privatisations and the growth in the number of "Sids" (small shareholders) - which has increased the 
shareholding proportion of the general public. So the issue has been forced on the public and they 
want to know a lot more about what is going on in the Square Mile ... You have also got a more 
affluent public with more spare income and they are more prepared to put that spare income at risk in 
investments. Low unemployment also encourages more risk with savings. ' 
74 
the Takeover Code, and the Price Sensitivity Guide). 
PRPs interviewed were all very aware of the regulations and the financial watchdogs 
which had developed to oversee their activities. Infringement of these could result in 
investigation, censure and prosecution by a number of bodies, including: the Stock 
Exchange, the Financial Services Authority, the Takeover Panel, the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission, the Office of Fair Trading and the Department of Trade and 
Industry. Indeed, for many PRPs, all these restrictions made much of financial PR a 
fairly routine activity and ensured that financial or media manipulation would be 
limited. Several held quite firmly to their beliefs in the mechanisms of the market 
and denied that PR could have more than a temporary influence on market values. 
Michael Sandler's (19.10.98) remarks were fairly typical: 
'At the end of the day the market always gets it right. Public relations can 
only delay things - it can speed them up or slow them down. Any public 
relations person who thinks they can influence it any more than that is 
ahead of themselves'. 
This belief in 'the market' also appears to be common amongst financial journalists 
who continually refer to such things as 'market sentiment', 'City opinion' and 
'shareholder sentiment' as if they were objective universal laws '. 
Thus a popular liberal thesis seems clearly in evidence amongst those who work in 
the City and are involved in the production of financial and business news. 
According to the views of journalists in particular, the rise of financial and business 
news was driven by increased public interest, financial product advertising and the 
information demands of investors and regulators. The corporate sector responded by 
seeking to employ professional communicators and the financial public relations 
industry expanded accordingly. 
4 For example: Bob Gregory (21.8.98), 'Most of these things are standard and you have to show them 
according to Stock Exchange regulations and law - things like profit and loss accounts, balance sheets, 
cash flow ... There are standards for all these things and they are regulated as such ... This stops 
people generally from putting out inflated or false information'; David Blackwell (17.5.99), 
'Coverage is something and you really can affect the market ... Prices will change with 
announcements. But in the end the market is always right because things will settle back down - just 
like water; ' Anonymous financial journalist (1999), 'You can't buck the market but that's different 
from the market always being right ... It's very difficult to go against the market which is why you 
very rarely see the foreign markets getting involved'; Nigel Whittaker (14.10.98), Some guys will say 
yes they can double your share price. But the things that make a difference are performance, 
management and prospects ... Where a share price is hyped by PR it's only transitory and that share 
price is going to go down again. ' 
75 
The Rise of Corporate Conflict and Alternative Corporate Communication 
Needs 
The counter-thesis begins not with journalists, consumers and regulators, but with 
businesses themselves. From this perspective, financial public relations was initially 
driven by the corporate need to fulfil regulatory demands and to minimise the 
financial risks associated with increased coverage. But, in the last 15 years, it has 
become more proactive - developing into another means by which companies seek to 
gain a competitive edge in the marketplace. Under such circumstances, PR has 
advanced from its basic function of 'neutral' public information supplier, towards a 
role that is occupied with fulfilling corporate economic objectives through the 
generation and supply of partial information. Consequently, because corporate 
interests dominate news production in this sector, financial and business journalism 
has become reshaped accordingly. 
As several authors have noted (e. g., Parsons, 1989, Grant, 1993, Hutton, 1996, and 
Boswell and Peters, 1997), the rise of Thatcherism, while being broadly supportive 
of the business community, also did much to exacerbate competition and conflict 
within the UK markets. Legislation in 1979 and 1980 brought the release of 
exchange and credit controls and thus initiated a new credit boom. Financial 
deregulation continued, most notably with the 1986 Financial Services Act, leading 
to the frenzied activity of the 'Big Bang'. Privatisation programmes, the 
demutualisation of building societies, the application of GATT directives, a rising 
level of merger and acquisition activity, expanding international trade, and the 
developing sophistication of communications technology, have all kept financial 
growth and competition at a pitch not experienced before the 1980s (see Caimeross, 
1992 and Pollard, 1992, for an overview). 
In fact, for much of the financial PR sector, it is increased competition in the 
financial markets that has spurred the need for greater control of information by 
businesses and institutions operating in the City (see Olasky, 1987, Bowman, 1989, 
Meech, 1996, L'Etang, 1996, Maloney, 1997, and Hanrahan, 1997). Financial public 
relations thus became another tool, like IT or advertising, with which corporations 
attempted to gain 'an edge'. As a DTI report (BDO, 1994, p 10) on the expansion of 
corporate PR observed: 
'The boom period of the mid 1980s, with an aggressive, free-market, US 
inclined attitude towards business, a swathe of mergers and acquisitions 
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and significant privatisation, saw increasing commercial interest in image 
and reputation, with a consequent boost to the level and variety of PR 
activities. ' 
This view of PR as a competitive tool was one sketched out in several PRP 
interviewees'. 
As interviews with corporate affairs directors revealed, financial public relations is 
currently used to compete in a number of areas. First, on a day-to-day level, it 
involves the constant promotion of company products, services and brands over 
those of rivals. Second, it can involve the winning of government contracts and the 
influence of decision-makers involved in the creation of new legislation and 
regulatiorý. As Chris Hopson of Granada explained (13.10.98): 
'We frequently try to persuade the regulatory bodies - the ITC, OFT, the 
MMC, as well as influence the EU directives - DG 10,13,4. The balance 
and priority order entirely depends on what today's project is. ... A while 
ago we wanted to change the ownership rules to enable us to take over 
LWT and Yorkshire Tyne Tees. Were it not for our and other PR 
departments' activities, changes would not have happened and we would 
not have been able to take those companies over. That change and those 
take-overs have helped to increase our profits ten times since 1991. We 
have saved the company around ; C4O million on recent regulatory 
questions and probably saved the ITV companies f 100 million in total. ' 
Almost all of the in-house corporate affairs directors interviewed had participated in 
similar communications work to affect company-relevant bits of 
regulation/legislation'. 
5 Similar remarks were made by: Angus Maitland (17.9.98), 'It's not at all about Stock Exchange 
regulations. It's all about getting a competitive edge. It's 100% about competitive edge. It's about 
proving that if people invest in you they will get proper value for their company in terms of 
investment'; Chris Hopson (13.10.98), 'There is a group of thirty-somethings, brought up in the 
business world - not just ex-journalists or politicians - who know that the aim of the business world is 
to make profit. They, as individuals, are motivated by that task and they are mentally attuned to doing 
it. We add real value in PR. We now have people who understand how the whole business works. The 
aim is to improve profits and not just have lunch with journalists'; Alistair Defriez (22.12.9 8), '1 have 
been in companies where we did not deal with the press as well as we should have done ... By the time 
we came to the critical bit, the institutions said they didn't know anything about us. We had lost the 
press battle and we were ignoring the press. We had taken the high-handed City attitude that who 
cares what the press says. You will not find anyone in the Square Mile with that kind of attitude now 
... It's a necessary evil - necessary to make sure that you are still on the playing field by the time it 
gets to the closing stages. ' 
6 Two documented examples include: 1) Devonport Dockyards used the Rowland Company to gain a 
lucrative government ship-building contract by defeating rivals Rosyth Dockyards and their PR 
company GJW (IPR Sword of Excellence Awards 1994); 2) Charles Barker PR carried out a 
successful public affairs campaign on behalf of Virgin and British Midland to gain a greater share of 
European business trade fi7om British Airways (1992 Sword of Excellence Award). 
7 These included: financial regulation (Stuart Prosser, 22.6.98), pensions (Jan Shawe, 7.10.98), the 
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Third, for City and financial PR consultants the most frequent communications 
objective was to sustain and/or raise shareholder interest and support. As Kopel 
explained in an early financial PR guide (1982, p4): 
'The price of the share is directly related to supply and demand and 
therefore the amount of information known about the company ... This 
concern for the share price, and the means by which it can achieve and 
maintain its peak, is a thread running through everything that is done in 
financial public relations. " 
Related to the promotion of company share prices is the use of financial PR to 
engineer mergers and fight take-over battles. According to Sudarsanarn (1995, p2-4) 
merger, acquisition and divestment activity reached a new pitch in the mid to late 
1980s. The years 1986 to 1989 inclusive saw record highs in all these areas. At the 
1989 peak, 1337 companies were acquired, worth a total of E27.25 billion. Between 
1979 and 1997, despite a steady flow of company flotations, a significant increase in 
the total value of the stock market, and the introduction of the USM (Unlisted 
Securities Market), the number of listed companies declined from 3249 to 2683 (figs. 
in Stock Exchange Quarterly). In fact, for PR consultants, take-over work is both the 
most strenuous and the most financially rewarding, with consultancies earning 
millions of pounds for short-term contracts. 9 
Financial Elite Spinning and Market Rhetoric 
While the majority of PRP interviewees had a certain faith in 'market principles' 
they also acknowledged that: a) the markets left much room for short-term 
promotional manoeuvres, and b) skilled financial PR work was about rather more 
than presenting tightly regulated information. As Nick Miles of Financial Dynamics 
admitted (17.8.98): 
'The market isn't all that efficient. If it were then there would be no 
regulation of commercial airlines and changes to the health system (Peter Jones, 9.9.98), newspaper 
distribution (Tim Blythe, 15.9.98), and environmental legislation and regulation of the privatised 
water companies by OFWAT (Jonathan Russell, 14.1.99). 
8TIlree award-winning examples of increasing share prices are: 1) College Hill PR helped raise the 
value of Surrey Free hins in 1997 from 75p to 443p -a rise of 477% (PR Week Awards 1997); 2) 
Standard Chartered Bank, in the course of its 1996 campaign, increased its profit by 30% and rose 
from 84 to 32 in the FTSE 100 index (PR Week Awards in 1996); 3) Ludgate PR's work for FKI in 
1993 trebled the share price in the space of a year after generating widespread interest amongst 
institutions and analysts (PR Week Awards in 1994) 
9Two documented examples include: 1) Ludgate's work for Lloyds Chemists during its take-over of 
Macarthy in 1991, which also involved fending off competition from Grampian Holdings and 
UniChem, as well as pushing the bid through a MMC investigation (Mintel 1995); 2) Dewe-Rogerson 
helped defend William Cook against a hostile take-over bid in 1997 and, in the process, raised 
William Cook's share price from 312.9p to 425p -a rise of 36% (PR Week Awards 1997). See also 
the example of the Granada take-over of Forte in chapter five. 
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reason for us to exist. It doesn't make sense ... in the 
long term you can 
outperform the market by looking at your audiences, seeing what they 
believe and giving them what they want. It's a matter of bringing the 
mountain to Mohammed because Mohammed won't come to you. There 
are many things you can do which amounts to telling them the truth in a 
structured and interesting way. "' 
In effect, subjective judgements are inextricably linked with seemingly objective 
decision-making by investors, and PRPs can supply information which is constructed 
with the intention of affecting those judgements. 
impartial information is transformed into partial rhetoric at all levels and begins with 
the presentation of figures. Accounting dates, financial measures and forecasts can 
all be selected according to what corporations want to demonstrate. The 'reputation' 
of the chief executive and the management team are also highly influential factors for 
investors. A study by Burson-Marsteller, of 2,500 people across 360 Fortune 500 
companies in the US, found that (PR Week, 3.4.98, p2) 'Chief Executive reputation 
accounts for 40% of a company's reputation .... [and that] 75% of respondents 
believe the CEO's reputation will enhance the company's ability to attract 
investment capital and cam the company the benefit of the doubt in times of crisis. ' 
In a MORI opinion poll (Nov. 1998) of 'Captains of Industry', 51% of business 
leaders said that the 'quality of management' was one of 'the most important factors' 
to take into account when making 'judgernent[s] about companies'. Particular market 
sectors, in themselves, are yet another pull to investors (see Andrews, 1995). In the 
view of another experienced financial PRP (interview 1999): 
'... investment is a fashion business. There is no doubt. It's just like 
clothes, houses, universities - they are all fashion businesses ... what you 
don't know over a long time is whether a company is just riding the 
fashion or genuinely doing well because of the management. That's very 
difficult to calculate and I don't know anyone who has been consistently 
10 Other remarks include: Nick Boakes (18.8.98), 'Share price is really what people are prepared to 
pay and of course that varies. If something suddenly is in demand than the share price goes up and 
visa versa - it's all supply and demand. The answer is you probably can [buck the market]. A strong 
share price is very important for organisations ... If they feet they are misunderstood by the market, if 
they are not getting their share of voice and there's a lot of competition out there for a share of voice 
... and normally these things can be corrected'; Tim Jackman (8.10.98), 'You can't defy reality in the long term. But in the short term the market is often drastically wrong. You can do a lot in the short 
term but it all evens out over time'; Alistair Defriez (11.11.98), 'There are times when, for various 
reasons, the market forms the wrong perception of a company - too harsh or too favourable. It's one of 
the great conceits of economic theory - the idea of a perfect market. But of course if that was the case 
there wouldn't be a market at all. if we all had the same information and the same views then nothing 
would be bought or sold. ' See also the work of Klamer and McClosky (1988) and Heilbroner (1988) 
on the use of 'economic rhetoric' in markets. 
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good at calling that. ' 
At the same time PRPs are also aware that regulation of their activities will always 
be limited. Currently there exists no legislation and no form of regulation that 
specifically deals with their occupation. Although Stock Exchange regulations have 
been made tighter in recent years, many practices such as the 'Friday night drop', the 
leaking of information via third parties, and 'conditioning the market' with partial 
information, are common and almost impossible to monitor. Much PRP 
communication with audiences takes place on telephones or face-to-face, thus 
leaving no incriminating evidence. Although, in principle, financial PR consultants 
could be disciplined or ultimately prosecuted for breaching Stock Exchange rules, in 
practice PR companies have been no more than publicly reprimanded in a handful of 
cases. The professional associations, the IPR and PRCA, have their own codes of 
conduct. However, the majority of financial PR consultants are not members of 
either association. Those that are, are rarely monitored, let alone disciplined. The 
problems associated with regulating financial information flows are actually 
acknowledged by the industry itself with some frequency (Nicholson and Trundle, 
1986, BDO, 1994, and in regular pieces in PR Week and the PRCA annuals). 
The Rise of Public Relations Subsidies in Financial News 
That corporations have become more proactive in their attempts to influence 
financial news is indicated by the growth of financial PR relative to that of financial 
advertising. Reading Newman's (1984) detailed history of financial marketing in the 
UK, it becomes clear that much of the financial PR consultancy industry was actually 
bom out of the decline of City advertising agencies. During the post-war era, 
Newman identified a steady switch from City-based company advertising to financial 
product advertising dealt with by West End advertising agencies. Additionally, 
financial institutions objected to excessive corporate advertising bills, especially 
during take-over battles. In order to survive, the traditional City advertising agencies 
began to branch out and use their communications expertise in other ways. Several 
were already responsible for providing press cuttings, as well as presenting company 
results, dealing with new issues, and mergers and acquisitions, in the form of 
advertisements, to the financial press. A number of these hybrid agencies; for 
example, Dewe-Rogerson, Charles Barker, Good Relations, Broad Street and Valin 
Pollen; eventually formed the foundations of the modem financial PR consultancy 
sector. Corporations accordingly turned to financial PR as a means of ftilfilling their 
communication needs and there was a consequent shift from paid-for advertising 
80 
space in the financial pages to PR-fed journalism. 
According to reports by the DTI (BDO, 1994) and Mintel (1995), during the 1980s 
and 1990s, financial PR spend in fact increased at a much greater rate than financial 
advertising. Looking at table 4.1 (below), between 1984 and 1994, financial 
advertising rose by 144.4%. Next to this, PRCA consultancy fee income increased by 
400% (inflation not accounted for in figs. ) - and financial PR has been the largest PR 
employment sector. Thus, although advertising continued to increase, it never 
equalled the growth rates experienced in the previous three decades. According to 
Mintel (1995), whereas general PR expenditure in the UK is roughly ten per cent of 
that spent on advertising, in the financial sector the disparity has become much 
smaller. Between 1984 and 1994, financial PR expenditure was between 30 and 40% 
of that spent on financial advertising. 
All of which tentatively suggests that proactive financial PR has played a significant 
part in the recent expansion of business and financial news. But have corporate 
communication needs influenced the shape of business news more than factors such 
as wider consumer demand and the imperatives of fourth estate journalism? 
PART TWO: CLOSED DISCOURSE NETWORKS AND THE 
CORPORATE CAPTURE OF FINANCIAL NEWS 
As this section argues the evidence suggests that corporate communication needs 
have indeed come to dominate the production of business and financial news. This is 
because, in contrast to mainstream news, journalists are not torn between the 
competing demands of their suppliers and consumers. Corporate elites are 
simultaneously the main sources, advertisers and consumers of business and financial 
news. Thus, corporate PRPs are likely to find themselves in a strong position, vis-a- 
vis news producers, and the communication needs of corporations are likely to 
override the information requirements of regulators and the general public. 
In fact, the most significant consequence of increased corporate source/PR influence 
on business news production is the exclusion of the general public altogether. The 
principle that financial PRPs have managed to impress upon their City clients, is that 
their 'key audiences' are not the general public but rather those who count most - 
other corporate elites. This combination of corporate source advantages and 
corporate elite focus has resulted in the 'capture' of business news within 'closed 
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discourse networks'. In these networks, corporate elite debate and conflict are 
reflected in the business media but only within limited parameters. Journalists can 
report on a range of matters but have severely restricted remits. As a result, news 
paid for by advertising financial products to the general public has instead become a 
means of financial elite communication and debate. 
Corporate Source Advantages in Business News 
For several reasons, corporate sources are likely to have considerable success in their 
attempts to influence business news producers. First, business journalism, despite its 
apparent buoyancy, is highly dependent on information and advertising subsidies. 
Because of the complexities and speed of financial news, journalists are less able to 
investigate stories properly or generate independent data. As many business sources 
have complained, and journalists admitted (see especially Finn, 198 1, but also 
Warner and Silk, 1979, CBI, 1981, Finn, 1981, Hoge, 1988, Rees-Mogg, 1992), 
reporters cannot keep up - something confirmed in interviews with several PRPs". 
This not only leads journalists to rely on PR information subsidies and 'expert' 
business sources, it also entails a reliance on the specialist financial news press, and 
wire services. Both of these, like most sectors of the trade press, are even more 
reliant on PR and a few key business advertisers (see chapter two)". 
Second, just as corporate sources are severely hindered by the constraints of 
joumalist routines and consumer demand in mainstream news (see chapter three), so 
they are advantaged by these factors in business news. Unlike many other forms of 
news, the needs of sources, advertisers and consumers are much closer. In effect, the 
main consumers of business news want the 'expert' comments and influential 
opinions of leading figures in the business world - including chief executives, finance 
directors, and analysts. The main advertisers in business and financial news want 
those same comments and opinions. There is thus no longer a conflict of interest 
which determines that joumalists must neglect one side or the other in the production 
"Paul Barber (20.8.98), 'There are a large number of people with interests a mile wide and with 
knowledge an inch deep. Newspapers just don't have the specialists. Standards per se have not got 
worse. If a single journalist has to cover banking, aviation, etc., then your level of knowledge gets 
worse because there is just too much'; Richard Oldworth (26.8.98), 'But there is a large element of 
young people who know very little and it can be a frightening thing ... There are some basic bits of information that any financial journalist should be able to read - but increasingly the new ones get it 
wrong, not because they are malicious, they just don't know'; (Nick Chaloner, 16.9.98), 'Even 
experienced journalists who have been covering the financial services sector for years are not experts 
and some have admitted to me that they don't really understand the field. ' 
12 That the trade and local press are the most vulnerable to PR and advertisers is also borne out in: a 
Gallup survey (1991), a Two-Ten report (Two-Ten, 1993), Franklin (1997), Seymour Ure (1996), 
several public relations handbooks, and much of the rest of this PhD thesis. 
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of business news. 
Table 4.1: Increases in Financial Advertising, FT Journalist Numbers and 
PRCA Members Fee Income 
Finan. Adv. FT Jnlst PRCA Memb. 
(1997 Prices) Numbers Fee Income 
(fmillion) (Emillion) 
1984 176.7 379 33 
1986 258.2 362 58 
1988 367.5 403 101 
1990 367.7 441 146 
1992 284.7 391 156 
1994 431.8 410 165 
+144.4% +8.2% +400% 
Sources: Advertising Statistics Yearbook, 1998, Financial Times Personnel 
Department, PRCA Yearbook, 1998. 
In fact, indications are that public relations and advertising have a greater influence 
on financial news production than on any other news section of the national press. In 
the post-war period, advertising has increased more in the area of finance than in any 
other area of news (Curran, 1978, Newman, 1984). As table 4.1 shows, both 
advertising and public relations expenditure continues to outstrip the increase in 
financial journalist numbers. For example, between 1984 and 1994, FT journalist 
numbers increased by 8.2% while pagination for the paper increased by 62.5% - from 
48 to 78 pages (figs. supplied by FT). In the same period, financial advertising rose 
by 144.4% and PRCA consultancy fee income increased by 400%. Surveys by the 
public relations industry provide further evidence. A poll produced by the PRCA (PR 
Week, 1.7.94) found that the FT used considerably more public relations material 
than any other national paper, with 26% of its output being PR-generated - 62% in 
the companies and markets section. The majority of PR practitioners interviewed, 
also picked out the financial press as the largest consumer of PR information". Thus, 
Parsons's earlier predictions now appear fairly accurate (1989, p213): 'The danger is 
that, as in the past, the financial press may become more participants and "puffers" 
13 Chris McDowell (26.7.98), 'They really do a cut and paste job, especially in financial PR ... It's 
virtually all connected to PR in some way. The FT is at least 50% PR because much of it is just factual 
reporting of results etc. '; Tim Jackman (8.10.98), 'More than 50% [of financial news is PR]. 
Sometimes you look through a paper like the Sunday Telegraph or Sunday Times and it seems to be 
almost 100%'; Roland Rudd (15.10.98), 'Undoubtedly there is more PR in financial news than other 
sections'; Martin Adeney (17.12.98), '1 would say it [financial news] was 85 or even 90% driven by 
formal announcements or events ... The majority of journalists wouldn't even go down to Companies House to look up the annual reports and accounts. ' 
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than observers and more extensions of PR companies than independent 
cornmentators and reporters. ' 
The Financial Elite Focus 
The most significant thing about increased corporate PR activity is that is has been 
increasingly directed at a narrow group of established corporate elites. A survey by 
Fleishman Hillard (White and Mazur, 1995) of 80 US and 113 EU companies, 
demonstrates the lack of corporate interest in the mainstream media and general 
public. For each it is shareholders and analysts that count most. 
Table 4.2: Fleishman-Hillard 1993 Survey of US and European 
Companies and Their Communications Priorities 
us EU 
Shareholders 53% 48% 
Securities Analysts 51% 29% 
Employees 49% 35% 
Govt. Officials/Agen 23% 19% 
Business Media 18% 21% 
General Media 6% 7% 
General Public 6% 6% 
Activist Groups 3% 0% 
Source: White and Mazur (1995, p7) 
The focus on elite target audiences has a fairly clear logic. Although share ownership 
has increased since 1980, the actual proportion of shares held by private individuals 
has decreased. In 1964, private shareholders owned 59% of shares and City 
institutions 41%. By 1980 private ownership had dropped to 30% and institutional 
holdings had risen to 70%. By 1997, despite the fact that the number of individuals 
owning shares had increased more than five-fold, total individual holdings amounted 
to only 15% of all UK shares (Fig. s in Newman, 1984, p83, and Stock Exchange Fact 
Book, 1998). According to Newman (1984) and several PRP interviewees, the 1980s 
was a period of transition when corporations realised they had to reorganise their 
communication efforts. Instead of an 'unsophisticated courtship' of the media, the 
focus became the smaller number of institutions which held effective control of the 
company and those that influenced them - analysts, fund managers, financial 
journalists, and other City elites. In Graham Williams's words (26.10.98): 
'By around 1980 it [investor relations] began to appear, almost 
imperceptibly, within corporate affairs departments ... Companies also 
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suddenly realised that instead of the majority of shares being held 
privately they were now held by say 50 institutions ... It was no 
longer 
the 25,000 shareholders in Bournemouth and Bristol and Edinburgh that 
mattered any more. Rather, it was these fund managers ... The take-over 
battles of the 1980s and 1990s made this abundantly clear to the 
company - that a few institutions owned the company and could make the 
decisions that affected its future ... The companies now wanted to make 
sure that the institutions were happy and the institutions wanted to make 
sure their investments were safe. ' 
The communications focus on other financial elite audiences was rather obvious to 
all the PRPs interviewed. In fact, each one had a very accurate idea of who their 
targets were in the City. In every case, PRPs explained that the publicly quoted 
company they worked for had an audience of no more than a few hundred 
individuals - with a maximum of 100 being considered to be significant. As Angus 
Maitland of the Maitland Consultancy explained (17.9.98): 
'You have three significant audiences - the press, the sell-side brokers 
and the buy-side institutions. Any company has three sets of groups 
interested ... Out of these there are roughly two dozen journalists who are 
really influential. On the relevant sell-side you have the top-rated 
analysts and the most mentioned analysts - out of which about twenty are 
really key. On top of that you have about twenty top fund managers with 
about twenty to fifty people. So you could say that the perceptions of a 
company are dependent on 5 0-100 individuals. "' 
The City and the Formation of Financial Elite Discourse Networks 
The group of elite decision-makers in the financial sector has always been small and 
exclusive. The City itself has remained a highly restricted sphere with limited entry 
and limited interests (see, for example, Parsons, 1989, Grant, 1993, and Hutton, 
1996, London Stock Exchange Fact File, 1998). Many of the financial associations 
140ther examples include: Bob Gregory (21.8.98), 'In John Menzies, for example, there are a dozen 
big shareholders, the business press with maybe 20 key editors and journalists, and 10 analysts ... 50 
maximum'; Tim Jackman (8.10.98), 'The private investor, most of the time, is regarded as an 
irrelevance. 90% of shares are now held by institutions, so private investors are generally ignored. So 
we concentrate our efforts on institutions. 50% of shares for any reasonably sized company are held 
by between six and twelve institutions, depending on the size of the company. If you look at the 
market as a whole probably the top 10 to 20 fund managers control 70% of the market'; Jan Shawe 
(7.10.98), 'There are about 200 or 300 [key individuals] at most - of which 90 or 100 are critical, 70 
analysts of which eight are critical, 100 journalists of which 10 are critical. 20 institutional 
shareholders with three or four decision makers in each - 60 or 70 people. Then there are the personal 
finance j ournalists of which 10 are critical. ' 
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and institutions which now make up the City began originally as 'gentlemen's clubs'. 
The Bank of England itself was traditionally a privately run bank, managed by City 
merchants and bankers (until it was nationalised in 1946). The Stock Exchange has 
continued to operate under its own authority, avoiding direct government regulation. 
All its regulatory bodies tend to be made up exclusively of City insiders (the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission being the only obvious exception). Its board 
of directors is drawn entirely from the City and any company seeking a listing must 
appoint an 'approved sponsor' - of which there were 119 by the end of 1997. It also 
operates with its own police force and in an enclosed geographical space within 
London. 
The few sociological studies of the City and financial elites that exist (Fidler, 1981, 
Useem, 1984, Scott and Griff, 1984, Hill, 1990, Hutton, 1996) have each observed 
that the City is bound together by extensive financial and personal networks. Top 
managers, owners and fund managers all benefit through similar wage structures, 
share options and other performance-related perks and, as such, pursue similar 
objectives. As Hill explains (1990, pI 1): 
'This primary network of capital relations is supplemented by another 
form of inter-corporate linkage, namely networks of interlocking 
directorships which are mainly centred on the major banks. Their 
personal relations link different company boards, provide channels of 
information across the corporate world and link firms to the major capital 
brokers. ' 
The financial PR consultancy sector has developed, and continues to develop, as an 
integral part of the City elite establishment". Its activities have resulted in an 
increase in inter-corporate elite communications. As a result closed discourse 
networks have been formed around top company managers, PRPs, fund managers, 
analysts, merchant bankers and financial journalists. In Martin Adeney's experience 
(17.12.98), one repeated in several PRP interviews: 
'It is quite obvious that investor relations is becoming much more 
important than it was. Our current chairman and chief executive are 
15Many of the established financial PR agencies can be traced back to advertising agencies (see 
Newman, 1984) established in the City for most of the century. The Investor Relations Society holds 
all its initial meetings in the Stock Exchange itself and its president has always been the chairman of 
the Stock Exchange. As all financial PRP consultants confirmed, the vast majority of clients are 
obtained through word of mouth rather than through any advertising or marketing. Most of the top 
financial PR companies avoid publicity, even in the industry's own forums - the PRCA and PR Week. 
At the time of writing, II of the largest 18 financial consultancies (as listed in Mintel, the Crawfords 
and Hernmington Scott City guides) are not PRCA members and remain virtually unknown outside 
City circles. 
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spending more time in the City than the previous ones and those spent 
more time than their predecessors ... Now I have noticed 
during my nine 
and a half years here that the interaction with the City has steadily 
increased. ' 
According to the IRS (1998, p33, p43), 77% of analysts have at least weekly contact 
with their investor relations counterparts, 78% of chief executives have more than II 
one-to-one meetings with fund managers per year, and 10% of chief executives spent 
30% or more of their time on investor relations". 
On a day-to-day level, financial PRPs, analysts and senior corporate staff maintain 
the parameters of financial discourse networks with constant two-way exchanges. 
Several studies of PR (e. g., Kopel, 1982, Bland, 1989, Andrew, 1990, Cutlip et al, 
1994, Andrew, 1995) and business news (Dreier, 1982, Ericson et al, 1989, Parsons, 
1989, Andrew, 1995) have observed the development of such closed communication 
channels. Within these networks PRPs both bestow access and information on 
analysts and journalists, and gain access and information from them. Those same 
analysts and journalists also communicate with fund managers and other corporate 
elites in order to get their views and keep abreast of their activities. In effect, 
communication is frequent, multi-directional and exclusive. 
PRF interviewees all tended to confirm this picture of intense communications taking 
place within exclusive networks and saw it as an accepted part of the job". The 
responses of financial journalists and editors suggested similar patterns in their 
newsgathering activities. When asked who they liked to quote in their pieces, the 
answer was invariably chief executives, followed by other senior company figures 
and analysts". Asked where they got their information from, the answer invariably 
16 35% spent between II and 20% of their time on it; 47% spent between 6 and 10% of their time on it. 
72% said they spent more time on investor relations than two years ago and 47% predicted it would 
increase still further in the next two years. Of the 50 fund managers interviewed, 91% wanted greater 
contact with the finance director and 82% wanted greater contact with the chief executive. 
17 For example: Tim Jackman (8.10.98), 'There was a long tradition at the Sunday Telegraph of putting 
on a Christmas party. It was the establishment paper read by City-type people. And to that party 
would come, and still come, very eminent industrialists, businessmen and PRs. They would all stop 
by, even if it was just for half an hour... '; Martin Adeney (17.12.98), 'We are very conscious of where 
we are with the analysts. That is generally seen as primarily the role of investor relations, but what is 
quite apparent is that journalists and analysts swim in the same waters. Journalists increasingly write 
stories based on analysts' reports and comments... '; Graham Williams (26.10.98), 'At the same time 
brokers, institutions, and the press all wanted and needed more current information. A constant 
dialogue was created, a daily exchange of views. Some analysts used to speak to me daily, or at least 
two or three times a week in the 1980s. And so IR has grown. ' 
18For example, David Blackwell (17.5.99), 'Chief executives are the ones you want. If you can't get 
the chief executive you want the finance director and then the chairman'; Roland Gribben (21.5.99), 
'First of all the chief executive or someone from the company itself - rather than the PR or analyst. 
Analysts don't want to be quoted directly although they are useful in terms of judgements that are 
reflected in the market; ' anonymous financial journalist 'First of all you like to quote the chief 
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was established contacts in the City, including analysts, fund managers, the 
companies themselves, and PRPs. As Alex Brummer, financial editor of the 
Guardian, explained (16.6.99): 
'But we are also working all the time with chief executives and chairmen. 
I see CEOs four times a week. I also see Treasury officials, Bank of 
England officials and others on a regular basis ... I talk to one or two PR 
men each day. The people I talk to are usually the more senior people 
who ring up with stories. ' 
As another senior City editor (interview 1999) replied: 
'... you still have lunches. My diary is still full of lunches with chairmen 
and chief executives - that hasn't changed ... But in the end it's a village. 
They need you as much as you need them. Usually they need you more, 
so there's always a negotiation to be done. ' 
Financial journalists also said little to dispel the notion that financial news was 
written increasingly for City elite consumption. When asked who they wrote for, in 
order of importance, only two of the nine placed small private investors at the top. 
The others all put business managers, fund managers and professional investors at 
the top of their lists. Analysts and City institutions, even other financial journalists, 
were often mentioned over private investors. As one financial journalist typically 
confirmed (interview, 1999): 
'We have the highest percentage of businessmen and managers - the 
highest proportion after the FT. So it's businessmen, managers of big and 
small businesses and professional investors. Then there are also the 
private investors, financiers, corporate accountants and lawyers. "' 
Conclusion 
As one PRP, Martin Jackson of Dewe-Rogerson (11.9.98), confidently asserted: 
'The national financial press are written for the City by the City. So we 
executive or the chairman or a top analyst - and you like to quote them on the record if you can. ' '9See also: David Blackwell (17.5.99), 'For us it's the people who are running companies and 
investing in them - the company managers and the fund managers [we write for] ... There aren't any 
private investors. I don't know what percentage of the Stock Exchange is invested in by private 
investors - between 10 and 20 per cent'; Alex Brummer (16.6.99), 'Traditionally we wrote for 
Guardian readers rather than City ones. Now the view is that we are a much more mainstream paper, 
which means we spend more time on traditional City and business coverage'; Richard Northedge 
(25.5.99), 'On Sunday Business we write for people who are in business. Certainly we write for the 
captains of industry but there is a limited amount of them. So a lot of our readership are middle 
managers and personal investors, many of whom have a day job in business. But there are different 
sections for different people. The bread-and-butter stuff, though, is about business for business - take- 
overs, new directors and other changes. ' 
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know that when we are getting coverage we are getting through. What 
you use the press for is to provoke a thought or confirm a thought. So if 
an investor is interested and if it's in the press then it gets discussed. ' 
In effect, business news has been 'captured' by financial elites. Even though it is a 
space for business conflict and competition, and journalists operate with a degree of 
conscious independence, coverage remains fairly restricted. Journalists are 
significantly limited by the fact that they are highly dependent on the goodwill of 
City elites in their roles as sources, advertisers and consumers. They must therefore 
abide by the unsaid 'rules' of financial reporting in order to maintain their access to 
the City's 'elite discourse networks'. As Michael Walters of the Daily Mail 
explained (19.10-98): 
'In a way the vacuum is filled much more easily by PR. They offer you 
an interview or some other source - and you have to be very stubborn- 
minded to pursue an investigative story on your own. The companies 
don't like it, the PRs don't like it, the brokers are against it and the City 
doesn't want a knocking story. There's a million and one reasons why 
you can't do it. But if you want to do a positive investigative piece then 
everyone will help you. ' 
PART THREE: THE IDEOLOGICAL AND MATERIAL CONSEQUENCES 
The corporate capture of business and financial news suggests a number of long-term 
consequences. First of these is the exclusion of non-financial elites from the 
production and consumption of business news texts. Second, business, financial and 
economic news coverage has been shaped to the needs of corporate elites; thus 
bringing more technical and pro-business news rather than debate and critical 
analysis. Third, an unchallenged business consensus has developed that promotes 
policy-making and regulation which naturally support City institutions, large multi- 
nationals and City elites. As a result, important questions of economic and industrial 
policy that affect the larger population, from entry into the ERM to levels of 
corporate taxation, are covered less and/or are covered from the point of view of 
business elites. Consequently, non-financial elites, from ministers to voters, when 
seeking 'expert opinion' on a variety of economic and industrial issues in the 
business pages, are unlikely to come away with a balanced overview. 
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Public Exclusion 
The expansion of business and financial news has never been matched by a 
corresponding increase of public interest in corporate activities. Curran (1978, p238), 
noted that the rise of business features in the post-war period, being advertising- 
driven, did not tally with readers' interests. A 1993-94 survey, reproduced by 
Tunstall (1996, p217) makes the point more explicitly. A list of 23 items which 
readers of the Sun, Mail and Times, 'specially chose to read', placed 'personal 
finance' sections at number 22, with only 6% of readers wanting to read them. At 
number 23 was business and company news with 4% of readers interested. In the 
Times, with the highest proportion of AB readers and shareholders, personal finance 
came 13th with 14% of readers interested, and business news came 17th with 12% 
interested. 
The information exclusion of the general public through more subtle means is also 
evidenced in share dealing. Although, in principle, the rules of the Stock Exchange 
are designed to treat all investors equally, in practice, private investors are 
continually disadvantaged. As well as being excluded from financial elite networks, 
they are hindered by the slow speed of their information delivery, a lack of specialist 
knowledge, and little research time. Professional dealers now get up-to-the-minute 
information through wire services such as Reuters, Extel and Bloomberg. These 
services are too expensive for private investors and, once again, are largely sourced 
by financial PRPs (although the opening of markets to Internet trading may 
overcome this to a degree). Even where time is not a consideration, City documents 
and financial news texts are really directed at professional investors. They are 
therefore full of specialist jargon and accounting procedures that are unintelligible to 
non-specialists (see CBI, 1990, London Stock Exchange, 1996). Even for those who 
do understand, the rising Stock Exchange demands for more financial information 
mean that private investors have impossibly large amounts of data to consume -a job 
that employs several full-time analysts in each investing institution. As such, the 
production of more financial information and business news has only worked to 
disadvantage private investors. The gap between the information 'haves' and the 
'have-nots' means that institutional shareholders will continue to benefit at the 
expense of private ones. 
The end result, despite repeated government attempts to encourage wider share 
ownership, is minimal private shareholder interest and no power in corporate 
decision-making. As Sir Peter Thompson of the CBI Wider Share Ownership 
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Taskforce was to admit (CBI, 1990: 7): 
'Like many others, I suspect, I thought the 1980s was the decade when 
popular capitalism really took root in the UK ... The reality is very 
different. Millions of the new investors have never traded a share, nor do 
they know how. They only own one or two shares bought in the 
generously priced and heavily marketed privatisation issues. ' 
According to a 1996 report (London Stock Exchange, 1996), when private share 
ownership hovered around ten million, only 4% of private shareholders had 
substantial holdings, owning 74% of all privately owned shares; only 3% were active 
traders, trading at least once per month; only 5% had obtained any advice from 
brokers; and only 6% had ever attended an AGM. In effect, although individual share 
ownership had, at that time, increased to 10 million, only about 400,000 people had 
any significant shareholding and/or took an active interest in share dealing - roughly 
the readership of the Financial Times. 
Pro-Business News and City Elite Consensus 
According to Parsons, critical discussion of industrial and economic policy in the 
financial and business pages ended with the debates over monetarism in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Instead, the information needs of the financial community 
have come to dominate business news. As he concluded (Parsons, 1989, p8): 
,... nowadays you are more likely to read a piece by an economist from a firm of 
stockbrokers on the latest set of figures or predictions than a professor from a 
university offering some explanations or solutions. ' Not only is business news 
catering to business needs, it is also likely to be 'pro-business' and unquestioning of 
business norms in its outlook. Indeed, this is the picture drawn by several observers 
(Dreier, 1982,1988, Newman, 1984, Berkman and Kitch, 1986, Parsons, 1989, 
Tumber, 1993). Thus, whereas companies are often reported as negative, scandalous 
and self-interested in mainstream news, they appear positive, respectable and 
objective in business news. 
Such conclusions are also implied in the quantitative data collected in other studies 
(e. g., Rubin, 1977, p172, Finn, 1981, plO, Hackett, 1992, Tumber, 1993, p354, and 
Mitchell, 1997, p47). Looking at Tumber's figures, for example, it should be noted 
that negativity ratings do not, as would be expected, correlate with the party political 
leanings of newspapers. Instead they appear to correlate rather more with the size of 
financial sections in newspapers. In other words, the more financial news there is, the 
less negative a newspaper is towards business. Thus the Financial Times is the least 
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negative, followed by the Times and Daily Telegraph. All the tabloids - the Sun, 
News of the World, Daily Mirror and Sunday Mirror - are the most negative. A 
return to Mitchell's 1988 figures shows the same pattern. Only the Financial Times, 
Times and Daily Telegraph are more 'sympathetic' to business than 'unsympathetic'. 
All the tabloids, including the Sun, are far more unsympathetic. 
Although financial elites may be in constant competition, that competition is 
constrained by a great deal of cultural consensus. A number of studies (see Fidler, 
198 1, Pool et al, 198 1, Useem, 1984, and Hill, 1990) noted that senior business elites 
frequently shared a number of social and cultural similarities and/or that moved in 
the same social circles. Fidler (1981) went further, arguing that, in general, they: had 
little contact with those outside their circles, knew little about their company 
employees, and generally assumed that employee interests and expectations simply 
concurred with their own. As one might assume, if City elites had similar social and 
cultural backgrounds and pursued similar objectives, albeit it in competition, they 
ought to share a number of norms and values. Indeed, these and other studies (see 
also Abercrombie et al, 1984,1990, Hutton, 1996, Boswell and Peters, 1997) have 
suggested just that. 
For Hill (1990), Hutton (1996), and Boswell and Peters (1997) these common 
corporate elite ideals found a large degree of coherence in 'Thatcherism', or what 
Boswell and Peters (1997) refer to as, 'liberationism'. This outlook broadly believes 
and argues that: business is the creator of wealth, it should be free to develop as it 
wants without state control and interference, and if business benefits so does the 
country. As long as business flourishes, government income, employment levels, 
consumer spending, etc., all rise. In terms of specific policy directions this involves 
such measures as: the end of collectivism and continued privatisation; the weakening 
of trade unions; the endorsement of material inequality and the end of the 
commitment to ftill employment; an end to high levels of public expenditure; and a 
reduction in taxes, 'red tape' (regulation) and other barriers to the 'enterprise 
culture'. Poole et al (198 1, p74,80, and 85), for example, found that 81% of business 
elites wanted cuts in public expenditure, 89% wanted controls on secondary 
picketing, 79% wanted legislation to deal with strikes, 91% were against the 
establishment of state monopolies, and 87% thought unions were not acting in the 
country's economic interests. Attitudes towards the Labour Party, the traditional 
opponent of all these measures, is even more striking. In the 1987 General Election, 
91 % of business leaders voted Conservative. In 1992,94% voted Conservative and 
2% voted Labour. In the 1997 General Election, in the face of Labour's landslide 
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victory, 69% voted Conservative and only 7% voted Labour (MORI, 1987,1992, 
1997). Such attitudes are clearly in marked contrast to the beliefs of the majority of 
the population (see chapter three, part two and chapters seven and eight). 
According to Hutton, these belief systems are clearly identifiable in the City, the 
Treasury and Bank of England; which all work to enforce London's position as an 
international financial centre with (Hutton, 1996, p144) '... its basic credo that the 
promotion of the City of London's financial markets is synonymous with the public 
interest. ' Within the City, these beliefs are most obviously translated into the need to 
make profits and demonstrate shareholder value. Hill's (1990, p13) study of 48 
directors in top companies echoed the findings of Fidler (198 1) and Pool et al (198 1) 
almost a decade earlier: 
'These main board directors were unanimous in their belief that the role 
of the board is above all to serve the interests of shareholders ... A board 
serves the owners by maximising the sustainable return on assets and 
providing a good flow of dividends, and, in so far as this can be 
influenced by what the company does, by maintaining or increasing the 
price of shares. "' 
A 1998 MORI poll of 'Captains of Industry' (MORI, 1998) makes the same point. 
Asked 'What, in general, are the most important factors you take into account when 
making your judgement about companiesT, the top two answers were financial 
performance (45%), and quality of management (51%). In contrast, 'Social 
responsibility' was noted by only 6%; treatment of customers by 7%; and treatment 
of employees by 6%. 
Business News Influencing Political Policy-Makers? 
There is some suggestion that the pro-business and free-market consensus, that has 
come to dominate in business and financial news in the last two decades, has acted as 
a form of influence on government policy-makers. Corporate elite views are already 
privileged over others because they have much greater direct access to ministers and 
civil servants (see, for example, Ball and Millard, 1986, Jordan, 1990, Crouch and 
Dore, 1990, Richardson, 1993, Grant, 1993,1995, Mitchell, 1997). Arguably, these 
'insider' advantages have become regularly reinforced with the very public output of 
20poole et al (1981, p144) concluded that for managers, even for those without shares, '... equally it 
was clear that owners and shareholders were placed highest in the overall priorities of our 
respondents'. Similarly, Fidler found that (1981, p253) 'Although I distinguished carefully between 
capitalists and managers in the sample, a distinction recognised by the interviewees themselves, I 
found no deviation from the traditional goals of capitalism. Profit remains the aim and measure of 
success. ' 
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business and financial news - news that privileges business elite views on the 
economy. As such, one might surmise that policy-makers, in their search for 
guidance on economic and industrial policy, would find it hard to go against the 
considerable 'expert' consensus that has accumulated. 
Although it is impossible to determine conclusively how much influence such news 
texts have had on government policy-making, several authors have indicated that it 
has been quite significant. For Herman (1982), Parsons (1989) and Hutton (1996), 
debates in the financial press have always been a crucial part of the adoption of new 
economic theory and policy, from the late nineteenth century onwards (see also 
Klamer and McClosky, 1988) - and such influence was clearly in evidence in the 
1980s. Herman (1982) argued that economists, businessmen and analysts became 
regular 'co-opted experts' for the presentation of neo-liberal economic policies in the 
Thatcher-Reagan era. According to Parsons, the adoption of monetarism took place 
more as a result of (1989, p7) '... its impact on influential sectors of press and 
political opinion than its ability to make converts in economic departments in British 
universities through the weight of its scientific arguments. ' For Hutton (1996, p23): 
'The powerful voice of the international financial community has helped 
to sanctify the New Right's calls for budgetary austerity, free trade, and 
price stability. Economic analysts from the great City investment houses 
regularly broadcast the capital's incantations on TV and radio. ' 
Whatever the level of business media influence, with the arrival of the Thatcher 
administration, Keynesianism was rejected and corporate - or more specifically City 
- influence once again came to the fore. Many of the policies listed above came to be 
regarded as part of the new economic consensus. The material consequences have 
been two decades of policy-making that have benefited those who dominated City 
6elite discourse networks'. The interests of 'big business' have predominated at the 
expense of many other parts of society. For example, government attempts to 
intervene in the regulation of the financial sector have repeatedly collapsed or been 
made ineffective (Hutton, 1996, Farrelly, 7.11.1999). Manufacturing industry has 
steadily declined (Caimcross, 1992, Pollard, 1992, Hutton, 1996) as corporate profits 
and shareholder dividends continue to outstrip manufacturing investment. Public 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP has decreased and remains the second lowest in 
the EU (Caimcross, 1992, Pollard, 1992, Lowe, 1993). Union power has been 
severely pruned (Taylor, 1994, Mcllroy, 1995), employment made increasingly 
insecure, and the disparity between rich and poor has grown (Hills, 1996, Goodman 
et al, 1997). Taxation policy has clearly contributed to this. Between 1979/1980 and 
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1996/97, income tax was reduced from 33% to 24%, the top rate of tax from 83% to 
40%, and corporation tax from 52% to 33% (Hutton, 1996, p7 and 13). Perhaps the 
most significant indication that corporate elites have benefited lies in a comparison 
of the finances of the UK government and the London stock market. In the first year 
of Conservative power, in 1979/80, the equity value of the stock market (00.8 
billion) was roughly 40% of government income (06.6 billion). By 1996/97, its 
value (LI012.5 billion) had risen to more than three and a half times government 
income (E284.8 billion, figs. in HMSO 1980/81 and 1997/98, and in London Stock 
Exchange, 1998). 
Added together these social and economic changes appear significant. That there has 
not been an outcry in the national media suggests collusion or approval on their part. 
However, it is more likely that opposition has been diluted simply because many of 
these macro-scale outcomes have resulted ftom an accumulation of less visible 
micro-scale events and activities. Most legislation, regulation, budgetary directives, 
take-overs, and other financially relevant changes, on their own, do not appear 
particularly significant. They are either not given space in the news or, more often, 
confined to the financial and business pages - to be discussed in terms amenable to 
corporate 'elite discourse networks'. Understandably most observers, including very 
knowledgeable journalists, cannot perceive what the long-term social effects will be 
of a take-over and dismemberment of an established company, or the privatisation of 
a minor national utility, or a small shift in taxation policy towards indirect taxes, or 
the dernutualisation of an established building society. 
CONCLUSION 
The strongest conclusion to be derived from chapters three and four is that corporate 
public relations has benefited the corporate sector as a whole, less by manufacturing 
6mass consent' than by excluding both the general public and non-corporate elites. In 
terms of mainstream news, corporate sources and their PRPs have failed to inculcate 
the mass of the population with pro-business thinking. While the majority do support 
4capitalist democracy' per se, they are not persuaded by many free-market policy 
ideals and have a negative view of the business community overall. Instead, 
corporate PR has been used to a) minimise profiles and negative coverage in 
mainstream news, and b) slowly gain more control of news more favourable and 
relevant to the corporate sector - financial and business news. 
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Arguably it has been extremely successful in this latter task. The impression given by 
other studies and journalist interviewees was that, in the post-war period, financial 
product advertising aimed at the expanding middle classes was the main impetus for 
the expansion of financial and business news. To a large extent the economic policies 
of the 1980s perpetuated these trends, and both public interest levels and financial 
advertising increased again. Such trends forced companies to invest in largely 
reactive PR operations. However, as competition increased during the decade, 
reactive public relations measures became proactive operations. Because corporate 
PR is far more advantaged in the area of business and financial news, corporate 
communications came to play a much larger part in this news production process. 
All of which indicates that, whereas financial news expanded to feed a perceived 
consumer interest, and as a challenge to the City's closed world, financial PR has 
been used to reshape financial news to corporate needs. The public interest remits 
that guided such news production are likely to have been steadily altered to fit 
corporate information needs in an era of increased competition. The consequences of 
this corporate battle over financial news has been the virtual exclusion of all non- 
financial elites and the 'capture' of financial journalism. In other words, financial PR 
has worked to close off the City once again. As Parsons explains (1989, p217): 
'... in the beginning the press and political economy evolved in the 
context of a debate in which the educated classes were participatory 
observers. However, by the 1870s economics began to develop in an 
altogether more closed environment. This tendency towards the 
privatisation of its discourse has continued apace in our own times. ' 
Within the resulting 'closed discourse networks' of the City, the financial elite 
consensus on certain macro belief systems frequently guides the ongoing processes 
of media reporting and micro-level decision-making. Such processes not only affect 
activities in the City but, arguably, also has some influence on wider economic, 
political and legal decision-making circles. Non-financial elites are not aware of 
most of these decisions and their implications - each of which alters conditions in a 
barely perceptible way. However, if added up during the period of Conservative 
government the changes are quite stark. As opinion polls show, the average voter 
does not support such a system. If presented with something clear, as in the case of 
the 'poll tax' in the 1980s, subordinate and media responses are, accordingly, rather 
more critical (see Deacon and Golding, 1994). Unfortunately, most of the time, the 
decision-making process remains invisible to most and, even if made more visible, 
no single decision appears to be of real consequence. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE GRANADA TAKEOVER OF FORTE 
INTRODUCTION 
The following case study illustrates the findings of chapter four. The study looks at 
the professional communication campaigns involved in the Granada Group take-over 
of Forte Plc in 1995/96. 
On November 22nd 1995, the Granada Group unexpectedly announced its intention 
to take over Forte Plc with a bid of E3.28 billion. Forte immediately decided to 
oppose the bid and both groups gathered together large teams of top City advisers. 
The bid was vigorously contested by both sides throughout the 60 days allotted by 
City take-over rules. A large part of this contest involved the communications 
campaigns managed by two of the largest financial PR consultants in the City - 
Brunswick for Forte and Citigate for Granada. Both Granada and Forte were 
considered to be leading companies in high profile consumer markets' and the 
campaigns accordingly producing several thousand articles across the national, 
regional and trade press. Both campaigns were ultimately successful. Forte 
succeeded in forcing Granada to raise its already generous bid to 0.8 billion. The 
value of Forte's shares rose 54% over a 64-day period (from two days before to two 
days after the bid period) - almost putting the company out of Granada's reach. 
Granada's campaign eventually helped in winning the bid; a process that involved 
persuading both Forte and Granada shareholders to back Granada in spite of the 
rising costs and risks involved. By the deadline, Ipm on 23rd January, Granada had 
received 67.58% of acceptances from Forte shareholders. 
However, the success of the two campaigns can also be looked at rather more 
critically. City elite sources almost entirely dominated the reporting of events in the 
media. In this closed 'elite discourse network', the future interests of employees and 
customers, and the long-term development of the businesses themselves, were 
considered unimportant next to the will of the market and promises of 'shareholder 
value'. By the end of the bid, the high stakes involved meant that, whichever 
company won, Forte was going to have to be dismantled and approximately half of it 
sold off. Thousands of jobs would be at risk, costs cut, and high levels of debt 
incurred - all in order to fulfil promises to shareholders. Ultimately, the only real 
'In 1995 Forte (formerly Trust House Forte) came 92nd in the FTSE index and 35th in the Times 
1000. Its market capitalisation was E2.236 billion, its turnover was E1.789 billion and it had 36,000 
employees. Granada was 118th in the FTSE and 127th in the Times 1000. It had a market cap of 
E3.278 billion, a turnover of E2.098 billion and 43,000 employees. 
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beneficiaries were those who dominated the media debates - City advisers, large 
institutional shareholders, and the senior management teams of both sides. Thus a PR 
conflict between elites, involving elite winners and losers, also ensured that certain 
financial elites could only win and many non-financial elites could only lose. 
The research for this study involved accumulating information on the activities of 
sources and their PR practitioners, through documents and interviews with 
participants'. The findings were compared with a detailed content analysis of the 
national press during the 60-day take-over period and accounts of business 
journalists who reported on the take-over'. 
PART ONE: CORPORATE CONFLICT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
CONFLICT - THE SPINNING OF ELITES 
City Conflict 
The bid itself must also be looked at as part of a general war of position and 
manoeuvre that continues to take place in the City. In this case both businesses had 
grown through a mixture of expansion and aggressive acquisition. Granada, with 
Gerry Robinson as chief executive since 1991, had acquired several smaller 
companies, and had proved victorious in a hotly contested take-over of LWT in 
1994. Forte's history included a merger then take-over of Trust Houses, a successful 
defence against an attempted take-over by Allied Breweries, and a protracted battle 
for control of the Savoy. The Granada-Forte take-over undoubtedly became a full- 
scale conflict between City elites. Both companies began by assembling impressive 
teams of stockbrokers, financial advisers, accountants and PR consultantS4. 
2 The principal source of documentation, records and news cuttings was the archives of Granada's PR 
firm Citigate Communications. Available texts included: all public documents produced by both sides, 
most of Granada's and some of Forte's press releases, Citigate/Granada's internal communications 
documents, analyst/fund manager briefings and presentation materials. Nine interviews were 
conducted: three with Citigate directors, two with Granada management staff, two with ex-Forte 
management staff, and two with other Forte advisors. 3 The newspaper content analysis recorded a total of 582 articles appearing in nine national daily 
newspapers and three Sunday papers. Articles selected had to be specifically focused on the take-over 
and had to be 6cm or more for broadsheet publications and 3cm or more for tabloids. Preliminary 
analysis was applied to all articles appearing in these newspapers between the 23rd November 1995 
and the 23rd January 1996. Seven of the 12 publications, carrying 425 articles, were selected for 
closer analysis: The FT - 107, The Times - 105, The Telegraph - 83, The Sunday Times - 28, The Sunday Telegraph - 19, The Guardian - 70, and The Observer - 13. For each of these articles a number 
of elements were coded and recorded. A further six interviews were then conducted with journalists 
who had covered the take-over. 
4 These included: Lazard Brothers, JP Morgan, SBC Warburg, UBS, Cazenove and Morgan Stanley 
(merchant bankers/financial advisers), Hoare Govett and BZW (stock broking firms), Touche Ross 
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Many other parties had an interest in the outcome of the bid and were quickly drawn 
into the conflict. Seven of the ten largest institutional fund managers in the City had 
significant share holdings in Forte. 87 institutions had stakes in both Granada and 
Forte, including Mercury Asset Management (MAM) which had the largest single 
holding (13 -14%) in both companies. The Savoy (part-owned by Forte), the Council 
of Forte (which owned 0.1% of Forte shares but 5 0% of its voting rights), Whitbread 
(which also bid to buy part of Forte) and other rival hotel and leisure companies all 
joined the conflict. Many of these organisations stood to gain or lose, and saw 
movements in their own share prices, as the bid shifted in one direction or another. 
Additionally, a number of external institutions, including the Takeover Panel, the 
Inland Revenue, the DT1 and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, were all 
temporarily pulled into the take over by one or both sides. 
Communications Conflict 
As part of the conflict the two sides expended significant resources in trying to 
control communications channels and influence media coverage. Citigate added a 
team of nine to Granada's in-house team. Forte, in addition to its own award-winning 
in-house team, brought in six people from Brunswick plus advisers from Makinson 
Cowell. Both sides ran election-style campaigns, which included: investigating the 
other using teams of accountants and analysts, preparing themselves for attack by 
running their own fake opposition teams, and constantly monitoring the media and 
operating with a 'rapid rebuttal' system. Between them they generated eight public 
documents (sent to 75,000 shareholders, all media, analysts, fund managers and 
others) and over 200 press releases in the 60-day period. But the public documents 
were only a small part of what was involved. Most of the communications work 
involved numerous telephone conversations and private meetings with journalists, 
analysts and fund managers. Since the written output of respected commentators 
helped to influence shareholders, every major journalist, editor and analyst also 
became a target'. The communications battle also extended itself towards private 
and Price Waterhouse (accountants), Linklaters and Paines (solicitors), Citigate, Brunwsick and 
Makinson Cowell (financial PR consultants). All of these advisers were rated in the City as being in 
the top half dozen operating in their sectors (see Hambro Company Guide, No. 48). 
5As Granada documents (Granada, 1996) explain, they: 'Provided regular and early comment to the 
wire services to set the tone, ensuring early contact for the Granada team with the most influential 
City editors, commentators and journalists following the bid; and being accessible to them at all times 
... Recognised importance of 
FT to investment community, meeting at all stages and gave the FT team 
Granada's institutional presentation. ' In Richard Power's (interview, 30.11.98) words: 'We did have a 
bad start but I do think we won the media campaign ... We never convincingly won over the Lex 
column of the FT - except when there was a temporary change of editor - but we won almost all the 
rest of the columns (Questor, Telegraph, Tempus, Times). ' 
99 



















investors in the last few weeks when the two groups began advertising campaigns, 
telephone canvassing and embarked on a series of nation-wide presentations. 
Table 5.1: Most Common Points/Arguments, Favouring Granada, Appearing in 
Selected Newspapers 
Most Repeated Arguments % of Articles 
Rocco Forte out shooting/Nepotistic family-run business 13.4% 
Forte management is distracted by 'trophy' assets 8.7% 
Forte management is generally poor/Poor results & 'track record' 9.6% 
Forte's poor returns to shareholders 7.8% 
Granada management's 'track record' is better than Forte's 7.5% 
Granada management's results and 'track record' are very good 8.0% 
Gerry Robinson has a great 'track record'/Profile and philosophy 10.4% 
Granada can make f 100 million savings after take-over in I" year 9.4% 
Granada's plans to sell assets and 'exploit synergies' 12.7% 
Forte's new plans unworkable: hotels unstable, dividends high, etc 15.5% 
Analysts/The City favour Granada 14.6% 
Sample: 425 Articles 
Table 5.2: Most Common Points/Arguments, Favouring Forte, Appearing in 
Selected Newspapers 
Most Repeated Arguments 
Granada is a 'I 980s style conglomerate'/Conglomerates are bad 
Granada is an 'asset stripper'/Bid has no 'industrial logic' 
Gerry Robinson and Granada know nothing about hotels 
Forte's new management changes, new directors, etc 
Forte's previous disposals, rebranding and new focus 
Forte disposals during bid 
Forte's sale of the roadside business to Whitbread 
Hotel market has been through a poor cycle/Start of upswing 
Forte profit forecasts up 
Forte hotels revalued upwards 
Forte's special dividend payments 
Forte says it is worth more 
Analysts say Granada must raise bid/Forte will escape 















Both sides also made extensive use of third parties to put their case for them. The 
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most significant group in this case were analysts; those considered to be the 'experts' 
in the field. Analysts, like journalists, had to process information and offer advice to 
shareholders and therefore maintained close contact with the participants. If 
persuaded to one side or the other their assessments got taken up and used in public 
documents and press releases. Other third parties were also encouraged to get their 
views on the take-over directly into the business columns. These included William 
Shawcross, William Rees-Mogg, Melvyn Bragg, PKFA hotel analysts, several 
business academics (at Henley Management College, the London Business School, 
and LSE - in Citigate, 9.1.96,10.1.96) and a number of respected chief executives. A 
Citigate memo (16.1.96) explains the extent of this activity in the last week: 
'... Bernard Talyor's piece is still with The Times ... The FT have agreed 
in principle to a piece to be submitted by Melvyn Bragg for Friday's 
paper. XXX and I are liaising with Melvyn and XXX has also agreed to 
speak to Melvyn to give him some reassurance ... David Blackwell at the 
FT has written an article on Sutcliffe for Wednesday's paper which I 
think will be OK. He has talked with Don Davenport at Sutcliffe and we 
have tried to provide him with everything he needed... ' 
The campaigns focused on a complex mixture of issues, all of which were calculated 
to have an impact on the deliberations of financial decision-makers. Tables 5.1 and 
5.2 record the most common points and arguments that appeared in the content 
analysis of the broadsheet press. The tables reveal that there were a number of 
subjective issues that appeared to be linked with the presentation of seemingly 
objective figures. Thus, commentary on personalities and managements, and general 
speculation about management styles, future markets and performances, were 
merged with past and current financial measures. All these factors made up the 
promotional campaigns in which City decision-makers were the targets to be 'spun'. 
In response, financial elite opinion and press support for the two sides swung 
significantly over the 60-day period (see figure 5.1). 
Lies, Dan= Lies and Statistics 
Spin-doctoring began with the presentation of very different sets of financial 
performance figures. At every opportunity Granada unfavourably compared Forte's 
poor results to their own impressive ones. According to Granada's documents 
(24.11.95a, 14.12.95,9.1.96,16.1.96), Forte's five-year history read: operating 
profits down I I%, earnings per share down 41%, dividends per share down 24%, net 
assets down E590 million, share price relative to the FTA All-share Index - down 
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40%. Granada's own five-year history (ibid) read: operating profits up by 341%, 
dividends per share up by 68%, cash flow up by L775 million, etc. The two graphs 
that were widely reproduced at the time (see 5.2), of operating profit and earnings 
per share, illustrated the differences clearly. As a Granada press release (15.1.96) 
was to proclaim: 'Small wonder that, for total returns for shareholders over the 
five years prior to our offer, Forte ranked 86th out of the FFSE 100; Granada 
ranked 5th. ' Looking at table 5.1 above, 7.8% of articles mentioned Forte's poor 
return to shareholders and 8% mentioned Granada's strong results and track record. 
7.5% directly compared the two companies, showing Forte in a poor ligbt next to 
Granada. Granada also maintained the focus on Forte's financial record by 
comparing them unfavourably with other hotel groups. Documents were produced by 
Citigate (20.12.95,21.12.95) and Touche Ross (19.12.95) which, due to careful 
selection of examples and figures, made Forte's performance seem below average in 
the hotels sector as a whole 
Figure 5.2: Granada Charts of Operating Profit (left) and Earnings 
Per Share (right) 
Source: Granada (24.11.95, pl 0 and pl 1) 
Forte's first line of defence was to present its figures in ways that made the 
fluctuating performance of one five-year period into a dramatically improving 
performance over three years. Using a shorter time-span, alternative accounting 
periods, and forecasts for a year that had not yet been completed (see charts below), 
Rocco Forte was able to declare (Forte, 2.1.96a: 1): 
'We are forecasting profits before tax and exceptional items for the year 
ending 31st January, 1996, of not less than E190 million, which 
represents an increase of 50 per cent over the previous year. We have 
more than trebled profits and increased earnings per share by five times 
over the last three years ... ' 
Forte also hit back on the issue of its performance relative to the hotel sector as a 
whole. It commissioned and published research from PKFA (Pannell Kerr Forster 
Associates) which showed that a number of Forte hotels had operating profits of 
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between 9% and 47% above average; and room yields up to 22% above average 
(Forte, 2.1.96). 
Figure 5.3: Forte Charts of Increased Profit Before Tax (left) and 
Earnings Per Share (right) 
Source: Forte (15.1.96, inside cover) 
For the first month of the bid, the force of Granada's arguments about its superior 
track record, and Forte's poor financial record, were the ones that dominated 
reporting and City elite debates. Analysts and commentators all thought it would be a 
'tough battle' but generally predicted a comfortable Granada victory (see figure 5.1). 
It was clear that Forte would have to do something more radical. 
New Improved Forte 
The company responded by attempting to transform itself completely over the 60 day 
period. As Richard Power explained (Interview, 30.11.98): 
'Our aim was very much to present the company as a new one ... the 
presentation of a new company for the new millennium. Although Rocco 
is a strong Conservative supporter and Gerry Robinson a New Labour 
man, we presented New Forte as the forward-looking business - as 
opposed to the tired old bureaucratic conglomerate. And it persuaded 
people, it worked. ' 
The transformation was enacted in three different ways. The first of these was in 
management. It began with bringing in new, externally recruited senior managers 
(see Forte, 8.12.95, pl, p4), continued with changes to the board of directors (Forte, 
2.1.96, p2), and was completed with Rocco Forte relinquishing his joint roles as chief 
executive and chairman (with the CEO role going to Sir Anthony Tennant). By the 
end of the bid, Forte was able to declare that (Forte, 15.1.96, inside cover): 'Over 
two-thirds of Forte's management team have joined during the last three years. 
Forte's new management team is committed to achieving continuing growth for 
shareholders and is delivering growing profits and earnings. ' Looking at table 5.2, 
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10.4% of articles mentioned Forte's changes of management or announced new 
board appointments. 
The second part of the transformation involved a massive disposals programme - 
aimed at turning the company into a 'new focused hotels group'. Forte declared in its 
first defence document that it had sold off E950 million of assets in the preceding 
three years. As the bid progressed, it announced a series of deals and disposals, the 
most significant of which was the E1.05 billion sale of its roadside business to 
Whitbread. 11.3% of articles talked about Forte's recent disposals and rebranding, 
and 16.5% of articles featured one of Forte's many disposal deals during the 60-day 
period. The Whitbread sale alone featured in 42 articles (9.9%). As Forte made clear, 
not only would the disposals transform Forte into a 'new focused hotels group', it 
would release enough capital to enable the company to pay off its mounting debts 
and/or increase dividend payments to its shareholders. 
The third part of the campaign involved talking up the financial future of 'new 
Forte'. In its first defence documents, poor results were blamed on the ailing hotels 
market which was, in turn, blamed on a combination of the Gulf War and recession. 
Research, commissioned from PFKA, linked changes in GDP to profits in the hotels 
market and, on the basis of GDP currently rising, predicted that (Forte, 2.1.96, p9) '... 
the UK hotel industry has entered a period of strong growth in profits which should 
continue for three or four years. ' 9.2% of articles reported that the hotels market had 
been through a poor cycle and was now at the start of an upswing. Forte also began 
to get new valuations of its properties and made much of the higher estimates that 
were produced. 5.4% of articles mentioned the rise in value of Forte's properties. 
The other side of this strategy was to cast doubt on Granada's future profitability. 
Granada was criticised (Forte, 8.12.95) for its lack of focus, lack of hotel sector 
experience (33 hotels next to Forte's 398), and lack of 'commercial logic' in trying to 
link its existing businesses with Forte's. On top of that, Granada had high levels of 
debt (0.6 billion) and several businesses that had stopped growing and/or were in 
decline. In other words, Granada was becoming '... a 1980s style, acquisition driven 
conglomerate' at a time when 'the City' had decreed 'focus' was in fashion and 
conglomerates 'under-perfon-ned the market' all too often. As Rocco Forte was to 
declare (Forte, 15.1.96, p2) 'This highly leveraged break-up bid follows the now 
discredited pattern of 1980s-style conglomerates - whose shares have consistently 
under performed in the 1990s. how long will it be before its shares suffer a similar 
derating? Do not trust the highly questionable value of Granada's shares. ' Looking 
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back at table 5.2,12.5% of articles reported the Forte argument that Granada was an 
casset stripper' and the bid had 'no industrial logic'. 9.9% referred to Granada as a 
6conglomerate' and questioned the value of conglomerates to shareholders. 8.7% of 
articles repeated the charges that Gerry Robinson and Granada knew little about 
hotels. 
Clearly, six weeks into the bid, Forte's campaign had turned financial elite opinion in 
its favour. It had persuaded 'the City' that: its figures were respectable compared to 
others in the struggling hotels sector; it was becoming a dynamic new company with 
new management associated with an upturn in fortunes; it had focused on hotels at a 
time when hotels were going to be very profitable; and Granada's bid was an attempt 
to make short-term profits at the expense of long-term ones and a highly risky 
venture. Citigate's own research (Citigate, 4.1.96) found that analyst support had 
now switched to Forte: 
'The robustness of Forte's defence and the perceived inaction of Granada 
to date means that Granada will have to increase its offer by 15% ... 
Granada has never shown any understanding of trophy assets ... The 
basic numbers do not stack up for Granada to take on the bid and they 
never did ... A number of people think Granada should walk away from it 
... Granada will 
have to raise its offer by at least 10%. ' 
Analysts came out by a ratio of six to one in favour of Granada either withdrawing or 
substantially increasing the bid (ibid. ). A swathe of 48 articles in the period 
subsequently reported that 'analysts' and/or institutions thought Forte would escape. 
The content analysis (see 5.1) accordingly shows that Forte had overtaken Granada 
in the level of favourable coverage it was attracting. Consequently, Forte's share 
price began to creep up while Granada's own share price edged down - thus 
indicating that investors would not support the bid. 
From Focused Hotel Group to Balanced Modern Leisure Company 
In response, Granada developed its own version of what the future held. The 'new 
Granada', rather than becoming an 'unwieldy conglomerate', would be a 'balanced 
modem leisure company' with 'potential synergies' and protection against 'cyclical 
markets'. Its plans were most solidly illustrated by repeated claims that it could save 
an extra E100 million in profits from Forte's operations in the first year of 
management (Granada, 14.12.95). As Gerry Robinson explained (9.1.96, p7/8): 
'This is the shape of the new Granada and as you can see it is 
extraordinarily well balanced with 29% in Leisure and Services, 25% in 
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Television, 22% in Rental and 24% in the most profitable and predictable 
end of the hotel market ... This mix of businesses will 
leave us with a 
very well balanced group... ' 
Forte, on the other hand, had suffered by being too reliant on the highly cyclical 
hotels industry -a matter made worse by its focus on the top end of the market. 
Doubts were also cast on the viability of Forte's future financial plans. These 
included a generous share buy-back scheme and a promise to increase dividends by 
20% each year for three years. Such promises, according to Gerry Robinson 
(Granada press release, 2.1.96), would require profits to double in three years. 
Consequently, new Forte was going to be a very risky venture to invest in (Granada, 
16.1.96, p8/9): 
'Forte's defence is flawed ... creating an unbalanced risk ... A 
buy back 
scheme that may never happen coupled with an imprudent dividend 
commitment ... A management change that isn't a change ... retaining up- 
market hotels which are highly capital intensive, are vulnerable to an 
economic downturn and provide low returns, even in buoyant times... ' 
Looking again at table 5.1: 9.4% of articles reported Granada's ElOO million savings 
plan, 12.7% repeated Granada's arguments about potential synergies and cash 
generated from the disposal of 'trophy assets', and 15.5% printed Granada's 
concerns over Forte's plans. Granada was therefore able to create a very different 
interpretation of future markets and appropriate management styles. In the last three 
weeks of the bid it managed to turn City opinion once again. Focused companies 
were now unbalanced, hotels were a risky investment, Forte's commitments were too 
difficult to support, and Granada offered a balanced future with a proven 
management team. 
For investors, with the stakes as high as they were, both ventures now appeared fairly 
speculative. Since both sides offered very similar financial packages to shareholders', 
the question of management competence became increasingly important. The 
Investors Chronicle (19.1.96) summed up 'City opinion' at the time: 
'In which case, two other factors loom large: 
* the shareholder's view of risk 
* which management is likely to shape up better 
6 The mathematics were somewhat disputed but, according to many assessments, the end offers were 
roughly equal. The Investors Chronicle (19.1.96), for example, concluded that the figures were rather 
similar with Forte offering slightly more. It calculated that keeping Forte would be worth E416 for 
every 100 Forte shares, as opposed to accepting Granada's offer of EA02 for every 100 Forte shares. 
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... Conventional wisdom says the 
Granada's management is far better. 
Quite likely. We do wonder, however, how much of Granada's recent 
growth came from improving the businesses its management inherited 
and how much from acquisitions ...... Forte's record is 
dismal. The 
question, however, is to what extent the current top management is 
responsible for that and to what extent it has tried to correct the messT 
A Question of Management 
The greatest weapon for Granada was the perceived strength of it management team 
and chief executive when compared to Forte. Granada thus finished its campaign as 
it had begun it - by focusing on management teams and personalities and, more 
particularly, on the Forte family. The Fortes, although well connected in certain 
political and business circles, were poorly perceived in 'the City' and had developed 
a reputation for being 'nepotistic', overly 'extravagant', and outdated in their 
working practices. All these elements were played upon and exploited to the full by 
Granada. It began on day one of the bid when Granada informed the press that Rocco 
Forte had been out shooting on the day the bid was launched. As Chris Hopson of 
Granada explained (interview, 25.1.99): 
'The shooting thing was, in fact, a perfect analogy for our views and 
claims about how Forte was running the business. It summed up a 
company that was being run as a series of trophy hotels, that was an 
archaic family business, that wasted time on pomp and ceremony. So it 
was a perfect analogy and it fell into our hands - too good to resist. ' 
Granada continually referred to Forte's interest in 'trophy assets', the shooting 
incident, and other wasteful extravagances - all images distasteful to hard-nosed fund 
managers and analysts. Looking again at table 5.1,13.4% of articles mentioned 
either Rocco's 'shooting fiasco' or made reference to Forte being a family business 
run on nepotistic lines. 8.7% of articles repeated Granada's claims that Forte had 
been 'distracted by trophy assets'. 
These images were in direct contrast to those associated with Gerry Robinson and the 
Granada management team - all of whose reputations had been firmly established in 
'the City' in recent years. In contrast to Rocco Forte, Gerry Robinson had come from 
a poor family background in Ireland and had worked his way up through a number of 
UK corporations. At each he had built up a reputation for improving businesses and 
profits. In fact, 10.4% of articles in the period talked about Gerry Robinson's track 
record and management philosophy, or relayed information about his upbringing and 
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past business record. This was how the two chief executives came to be presented 
throughout the contest. As one former Forte adviser explained: 
'Bids become very personal, particularly if you are Gerry Robinson, a 
highly successful businessman, the smartest man to come out of Ireland 
in the last 20 years, and especially if your opponent is Rocco Forte, seen 
as a bit thick, there because it's the family business. If we had been on 
Granada's side, we would have advised them to focus on management 
and personalities. Working for Forte the obvious thing was to play that 
down. And yes, that kind of thing does influence people. If you went and 
asked all the brokers "Who would you back, Gerry Robinson or Rocco 
Forte? ", they would say "Gerry Robinson" every time. It's all part of the 
calculation. " 
In the last two weeks Citigate and Granada proved particularly adept at pushing their 
case. They also pulled off a series of daring manoeuvres, including a last-minute deal 
to purchase the Council of Forte's shares, and a 'dawn raid' in which they stepped in 
ahead of Whitbread to buy up 10% of Forte. Crucially, they also increased their offer 
by a further 15% to E3.8 billion - achieved not by greater borrowing, but by offering 
to sell off more of Forte and pay back shareholders with a special dividend (final 
offer document, 9.1.96). Once again, analyst and media opinion turned and 
increasingly began to favour Granada (see figure 5.1) - something the company was 
quick to publicise. They compiled lists of pro-Granada analysts and analysts' 
comments (Granada, 18.1.96), presenting them in a letter to journalists (Nolder, 
15.1.96): 
'Listed below are analysts following the Granada/Forte bid. The majority 
back Granada either outright on the record, or if pushed, off the record ... 
I thought you might find the list of assistance especially if you wanted to 
carry out your own survey of opinion'. 
During the final two weeks, when Granada was regaining the initiative, 62 articles 
(see table 5.1) reported that 'analysts' and/or institutions backed Granada to win. 
Many of these mentioned a straw poll of analysts that had been carried out. By the 
final offer date (23rd of January) most of the major shareholders had been convinced 
7 See also: David Nolder (22.12.98) 'So you had the great debate - drive, enthusiasm, earnings per 
share, professional management and not a lot of sentiment, versus the old man, autocratically driven, 
lacking drive, lacking the hard edge, into trophy assets, letting profitability go a bit flabby'; Alistair 
Defriez (22.12.98) 'But the previous six or seven weeks were an outstanding example of a full-blown, 
almost gladiatorial public relations battle - right from the start, as I saw it ... Rocco, in some people's 
minds, was a dilettante playboy inheriting the business from his father and pursuing aristocratic 
country sports. As opposed to Gerry Robinson, who was a self-made man, one of 13 children, risen 
through the ranks on merit, an advocate of meritocracy, a man who through his own skills and abilities 
had risen to the top of Granada. ' 
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and Granada received acceptances for two thirds of Forte's shares. 
Questioning the Effectiveness of the PR Campaigns 
It is very difficult to reach firm conclusions about the importance of the respective 
public relations campaigns. In many ways they were indivisible from the general 
campaigns in which financial PRPs contributed to meetings on financial strategy, and 
accountants, financial advisers and solicitors jointly produced documents and press 
releases. Everyone involved spent large amounts of time promoting the key messages 
to analysts, journalists and institutions. All, in effect, became involved in one large 
communications operation. 
Interviewees gave mixed responses when asked about how much the public relations 
operations contributed to the eventual outcome. Several, including all of the PRP 
interviewees, played down their role, believing that decision-making came down to 
simple financial calculations. They argued that advisers, analysts and, above all, 
institutional fund managers, were, and continue to be, driven purely and simply by 
figures and profits. Ultimately, Granada won because it made an offer that couldn't 
be refused. In Simon Rigby's words (interview, 20.11.98): 
'For institutional shareholders it all comes down to the finances. Because 
fund managers all deal with large amounts of other people's money, they 
don't make decisions on a whim or on who they like or dislike, etc. They 
make decisions clearly on who offers them the best deal. " 
Thus, many would argue that the success or failure of the bid rested on the financial 
manoeuvres of various participants and, above all else, on the sums involved. 
However, as this part has attempted to demonstrate, the presentation of accounts 
varied considerably and financial decision-making was influenced by a number of 
highly speculative factors. Thus, future profit forecasts, predictions for the market, 
and the present and past performances of comparable businesses and management 
systems, were all speculative factors dressed up as objective facts. All too frequently, 
such factors were dragged into the debate by one or other of the protagonists 
8Richard Power (30.11-99), 'We lost basically on price. I suppose we have all asked ourselves if there 
was something we could have done differently ... But at E4.00 a share, no, I can't think of anything we 
could have done beyond pushing it to that'; David Nolder (23.12.98), 'If Gerry is delivering and 
Carol's all about earnings per share ... In the end Gerry was deemed more successful than the old man 
and that he would have done more with those assets in the long term ... Gerry was always clear about 
the earnings potential and what to sell. He was less sentimental about the deal .. '; Keith Hamill (17.2.99) 'A number of our friends said to us we would have to accept simply because of the size of 
the bid in the end. We had done very well and in the end this is more important than the PR. They 
[Granada] did it with money. They certainly didn't do it with PR. ' 
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themselves. Decision-making was also smothered in personal prejudices and 
associations - from Rocco Forte's interest in shooting to arguments about what 
constituted a conglomerate and whether conglomerates were profitable. 
Considering the fact that the final offers were rather similar in financial terms, one 
would thus assume that decisions were based on more than financial calculations. If 
not, why were two public relations firms paid 0 million between them for 60 days 
work? How could opinions and values swing so dramatically in such a short space of 
time if it was only a matter of presenting figures? All bids are expected to be raised, 
but the overall increase in the value of Forte appeared quite dramatic. A share price 
that had been steadily dropping for some years was suddenly raised by 54% in a 64 
day period. 
Indeed, several interviewees, including journalists and those working on the financial 
side, admitted that highly speculative, non-financial factors were very important'. In 
fact, for all the journalists interviewed, it was the issues of management and 
personalities that doniinated the story. As Richard Northedge (25.5.99) recalled: 
'Granada had a very good long-term image. Gerry Robinson had 
managed to build up a specific image of the company and himself over a 
period of time ... It was one reason why the City was prepared to accept 
Granada's bid. Citigate's work was important and in Granada's case it 
was generally true. But on the other hand Brunswick changed Forte's 
perception. Before the bid Forte had a terrible reputation in the hotel 
sector. They were like British Rail in that they were generally thought to 
be bad. But during the bid it suddenly became an institution we should 
have been preserving. It was all the sort of stuff of Jeffrey Archer novels. 
Both sides had personalities and offered a story with appeal. Granada 
turned Gerry Robinson into a personality and one could argue that it was 
the personalities that decided the issue. "' 
9Tim. Weller, group financial controller for Granada (interview 19.1.99), 'Ultimately you would like to 
believe that institutional shareholders make decisions based on the financial merits. But undoubtedly 
they were affected. They read the newspapers and they would have been at least a little affected, just 
as you or I would be. At the time there were multiple issues that could have affected an individual's 
judgement and all these issues were plastered right across the financial. press throughout the bid 
period. Undoubtedly they would have'; Alistair Deffiez, financial adviser for Forte at the time 
(interview, 22.12.98), 'It's a necessary evil ... you can't afford to ignore your public relations. You do 
so at your peril. If the other side steals a march on you in PR terms it's very hard to come back. In a 
closely contested take-over things like PR can tip the balance at the margins. It's not the most 
important thing but it can tip the balance. ' 
loAnonymous financial journalist (interview, 1999) 'One really chummed-in thing was that Rocco 
Forte was out on the grass moors when Gerry Robinson phoned him to make the offer. That was used 
extensively to show how patrician Rocco was ... Gerry Robinson on the other hand was seen as much 
more a man of the people'; David Blackwell (17.5.99) 'All I can really remember is that poor old 
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PART TWO: FROM SPINNING CORPORATE ELITES TO CORPORATE 
ELITE CAPTURE OF THE MEDIA 
Although the media actively reflected and relayed the conflict between elites 
involved in the take-over, it was also highly constrained in its reporting. What is 
demonstrable is that coverage of the take-over battle was appropriated by the 
business media and the business media was largely 'captured' by the 
communications campaigns of Granada and Forte. The results of this capture were 
that all source input and all debates came from the City. Other voices and other 
concerns were ignored. As a result, regardless of the outcome, the winners in the 
whole take-over process were guaranteed to be City elites of one kind or another. 
The losers were going to be those whose concerns and interests were barely heard. 
This is not to say that the media was acting in league with their sources, or that they 
simply reproduced PR material uncritically. Certainly, journalists were critical of the 
two sides and attempted to get a variety of opinions from those involved and those 
whom they considered to be independent experts - analysts, fund managers and other 
CEOs. However, their agendas, and the materials they worked with, came almost 
exclusively from a small City community which was severely limited in its 
objectives, priorities and general norms and values. 
Corporate Capture of the Business Media 
Despite the take-over drawing extensive media coverage, it was a rather select group 
that participated in the debates. The two companies, their advisers, rival CEOs, 
institutional shareholders, and analysts, all formed a closed network of 
communications in which journalists had to be accepted or risk being left out 
altogether. For the two sides involved the communications emphasis was primarily 
directed at some 25-30 key institutions and those that influenced them. This was 
because, despite there being some 75,000 private shareholders, their holdings 
amounted to no more than 15% of Forte - the same amount as the largest institutional 
shareholder MAM. In fact, at the time, the top 10 institutional shareholders together 
owned 34.22% of Forte (Horseman and Shepherd, 4.1.96). The two chief executives 
accordingly spent a large proportion of their time in one-to-one meetings with top 
Rocco Forte was out on the grass moors when Gerry Robinson made his lightening strike ... Gerry Robinson was very much the flavour of the time whereas poor old Rocco was seen as the not too 
successful son of a successful father ... So ultimately Gerry Robinson was highly thought of in the City and Rocco was not'; Raymond Snoddy (17.5.99) '1 think the decision in the end was taken by a 
small number of City investors who believed in Gerry Robinson. It was mostly down to financial 
decisions. There were a few emotional things flying about though that were used as symbols, for 
example the shooting event. That symbolised in Gerry Robinson's mind what it was all about - the 
grass moors, old money, lazy money - it was a powerful symbol. ' 
112 
ftind managers in City institutions. Rocco Forte visited each major institutional 
shareholder twice during the 60-day period (in Forte, C, 1997); Gerry Robinson 
visited each of them approximately four times (interview with Chris Hopson, 
25.1.99). 
Around the CEOs and fund managers, analysts, advisors and PRPs maintained the 
communication channels and defined the terms of the debate. Those journalists 
accepted" - automatically joined the two-way communication channels that stretched 
between the companies and the top institutional shareholders. As Alistair Defriez 
(interview, 23.12.98), explained: 
'There was enormous communication with the brokers. You are talking 
to them all the time. They get feedback from the institutions and we find 
out what arguments are weak and which are strong and we go back and 
work on our messages accordingly ... At the same time the press are also 
talking to the analysts. The press is going to the market and asking what 
they think about all this. ' 
Table 5.3: Article Positioning in National Newspapers 
Newspaper Business Pages Home Pages Other Total 
The FT 107 N/A N/A 107 
The Times 95 6 4 105 
Daily Telegraph 80 2 1 83 
The Independent 65 8 1 74 
Guardian 65 3 2 70 
Daily Mail 37 - 2 39 
Daily Express 23 1 24 
The Mirror II - - II 
The Sun 7 2 - 9 
Sunday Times 26 2 - 28 
Sunday Telegraph 18 1 - 19 
Observer 12 - 1 13 
Total 546(93.8%) 24(4.1%) 12(2.1%) 582 
Sample: 582 Articles 
Because journalists covering the story were 'captured' in such a way, the news 
"Interviews suggested that there was strong competition between journalists to gain access. David 
Nolder (interview, 23.12.98), 'At the time it was a major issue and they were queuing up to meet 
Gerry and the Pacemakers. So we talked and set up meetings with all the ones that we thought were 
important'; Alistair Deffiez (interview, 23.12.98), 'With such a big deal every journalist in town 
wanted to hear about it every day. There was a voracious appetite for stories - some of which had been 
generated by our earlier actions'. 
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production process was also. Looking at table 5.3, of 12 national newspaper titles, 
93.8% of all articles appeared in the financial and business news sections. Of the 
4.1 % that appeared in the home pages, nearly all were smaller extracts of larger 
articles written by financial journalists for the business sections. The 2.1% of other 
features were generally larger, often written by other journalists, and expressed other 
concerns - but were, however, always placed in the middle of the paper. 
The two sides were themselves the most common contributors to news articles and 
produced a steady supply of infort-nation subsidies - all of which found willing takers 
amongst the financial press. 383 out of 425 (90.1%) articles, of the seven 
publications selected for further analysis, included contributions from Granada, 
Forte, or both sides. That is, they included figures, quotations or arguments supplied 
by those companies, or, they discussed such contributions in comment Pieces. Where 
figures were used, they came almost entirely from the public documents and press 
releases of the companies or from standard Stock Exchange information on share 
values and trades. Even when journalists appeared sceptical of the figures or 
arguments they were reporting, they rarely found alternative ones. 
Table 5.4: Contributors Cited 
Forte Total (27.1%) 
Rocco Forte (13.4%) 
Forte Named (6.8%) 
Forte Anon (7.0%) 
Granada Total (26.3%) 
Gerry Robinson (14.2%) 
Granada Named (6.6%) 





Other Business (8.8%) 
Other Non-Business (2.8%) 
Total (100%) 
Sample: 501 Citations Recorded in 425 Articles 
Looking at table 5.4, it is clear that virtually all other contributions to news texts 
came from City and business sources. Anonymous analysts and fund managers were 
the main alternative providers of comment. Granada and Forte between them 
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provided 53.4%. Other business sources - mostly company CEOs and directors in 
related businesses - accounted for 8.8%. All non-financial elite sources provided just 
2.8% of citations. 
The target audience for most articles was shareholders - more specifically 
institutional shareholders. The simple message that both sides wanted to 
communicate was that they would offer 'more value to shareholders'. Forte 
attempted to argue that Granada had undervalued the company and therefore 
shareholders should not sell. Granada attempted to communicate the impression that 
Forte had not given shareholders value in the past and, if the bid was successful, 
Granada would offer more value to them in the future. Many of the 36 press releases 
and all the eight public documents featured the topic of 'shareholder value"'. This 
focus, in all its guises, was similarly reflected in a majority of news items. For 
example, looking back at table 5.1,7.8% reported that Forte 'offered poor returns to 
shareholders' and 9.6% stated that its general financial results and track record were 
6poor'. In table 5.2,8.5% of stories repeated Forte's claims to be 'worth more' and 
11.3% stated that analysts actually thought that Forte was 'worth more'. Looking at 
table 5.5 below, it also becomes clear that the principal audience for news stories was 
considered to be institutional shareholders. 63.5% of articles either address 
shareholders or refer to them. 
Articles similarly acted to reinforce a number of other City norms and values. The 
first of these was that 'the City'Pthe market', this objective yet anonymous body of 
opinion, knew best. News items frequently used such phrases as 'City opinion 
believes 'Market sentiment dictates 'Analysts have determined that ... ' 
Looking again at table 5.5,39.8% of articles referred to 'the City' or 'the market' in 
such phrases. 21.4% referred to 'analysts' in similar ways. 12.2% referred to the 
Takeover Panel and take-over regulations. Second, those most cited had their status 
as 'experts' and authoritative sources on corporate/City matters reinforced. As table 
5.4 confirms chief executives, analysts and fund managers provided 43.7% of these 
'non-aligned' comments. 
12 For example: Granada (24.11.95, p6), 'Granada believes that in recent years, Forte has failed to 
deliver adequate value to shareholders... '; Rocco Forte (in Forte, 8.12.95, p4), 'Well structured and 
carefully timed disposals of businesses have achieved excellent value for shareholders ... '; Gerry Robinson (Granada Press Release, 29.12.95), 'Forte is failing to achieve a decent return on its assets 
and is not delivering real value for its shareholders'; Forte (2.1.96, p19), 'On the basis of Granada's 
latest full-year dividend, any such shareholder accepting the bidder's all-share terms would have 
suffered a shortfall of income... ' 
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Table 5.5: Those Referred to or Addressed 
Those Referred to/Addressed % of 
Articles 
Shareholders/investors (generally refers to institutions) 63.5 
'The Market'/'The City' (as in 'The City backs Granada') 39.8 
'Analysts' (as in 'Analysts think the bid should be raised') 21.4 
Takeover Panel/take over rules 12.2 
Employees 7.1 
Private investors 4.2 
Customers 4.2 
(Total number mentioning one or more of these three 13.4) 
Sample: 425 Articles 
Non-City Elite Exclusion 
Financial elite capture of the news production process also resulted in the automatic 
exclusion of other participants. Looking back at table 5.4,14 citations, or 2.8% of the 
total, were taken from non-City elites. These appeared in seven different articles, or 
1.65% of the total". Table 5.5 also shows that employees, private investors and 
customers, are only referred to in 13.4% of all articles. Not only were non-corporate 
elites excluded, so were potential rival elites from the worlds of academia, politics, 
law and industry. The Fortes actually had extensive links with the Conservative 
Party, both houses of Parliament, and business communities around the world". Such 
connections, although far superior to Granada's own, proved to have little influence 
on financial news coverage. 
Looking at table 5.6, it is clear that few articles questioned the take-over or showed 
concern about how it would affect those outside the 'Square Mile'. 4.7% of articles 
expressed some sort of cynicism about the take-over - its short termism and 
destructive nature. 3.5% articles, mostly emanating from Forte in the early stages of 
the campaign, suggested that jobs might be lost. City adviser fees, tax loopholes, and 
the exclusion of private shareholders voices, were each mentioned in just over I% of 
articles. Only 12 (2.8% of the total) articles actually chose to make objection to the 
13 The 14 quotes were from three customers, eight private shareholders, Egon Ronay (for Forte), 
Melvyn Bragg (for Granada), one DTI spokesperson, and Alistair Darling - Labour City affairs 
s&esperson. 
The Forte family made regular donations to the Conservative Party and Thatcherite think tanks. Olga 
Polizzi had even redecorated No. 10 Downing Street for Mrs Thatcher. Charles Forte was made a lord 
and Rocco Forte knighted during the Thatcher administration. The Fortes regularly dined with 
politicians, nobility and business leaders across the UK and abroad. 
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process a main theme. The other 97.2% did not significantly challenge the take-over 
on anything other than grounds of shareholder value. 
Table 5.6: Critical Points/Arguments Appearing in Selected Newspapers 
Critical Arguments of Articles 
Cynicism about the take-over/take-overs, their short-termism and value 4.7 
Jobs will be lost as a result of the take-over 3.5 
Cynicism that the main winners will be the advisers involved 1.2 
Concern at the tax loopholes being exploited by either side 1.2 
Concern at inequality of private and institutional shareholders 1.2 
Sample: 425 Articles 
In effect, the capture of the story, by corporate PRPs and the City more generally, 
resulted in a closed financial 'elite discourse network'. The parameters of the debate 
were narrowly defined by the fact that both news sources and news audiences were 
predominantly from the financial sector. Despite there being a high level of both 
conflict and critical debate, many City norms were perpetuated and remained 
unchallenged. All others with a stake, including employees, customers and 
legislators, could not participate in the debate and, most of the time, were not even 
aware of it. Thus, the effects of the take-over on 80,000 employees and millions of 
customers, and the voting intentions of 75,000 private shareholders (many of them 
loyal Forte customers), were virtually ignored. 
The Material Consequences 
The material consequences of the whole take-over process very much reflected the 
inherent balance of power suggested by this closed 'elite discourse network'. The 
biggest beneficiaries were in fact the large trading institutions. For the whole 60-day 
period Forte and Granada shares were heavily bought and sold. Two days before the 
bid Granada were trading at 680p per share. They ended, two days after the bid was 
accepted, at 714p per share -a modest, but respectable increase of 5%. Forte moved 
from 260p two days before the bid to 402p two days after -a rise of 54%. The total 
increased value of the two stocks over a 64-day period thus amounted to fl. 534 
billion - the vast majority of which was gained by institutional shareholders. 
Although private shareholders stood to gain too, the great majority of them actually 
backed Forte. 
The other clear winners were the advisers. Estimates of total advisers' fees for both 
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sides were E155 million". Similar fees, of between one and three million pounds, 
were given to each firm of accountants, lawyers and PR consultants - much more to 
financial advisers and underwriters. Estimates for Brunswick are between fl. 75 
million and E2 million, and for Citigate, between F. 800,000 and EI million. More fees 
were to be expected when Granada began its disposals programme of large parts of 
Forte. The final beneficiaries were the senior managements of both companies. Most 
of the directors on both sides had share holdings in their companies and, likewise, 
would have seen substantial rises in their personal income. Gerry Robinson, voted 
the 13th most powerful man in Britain (Observer, 1.11.98), added to his growing 
reputation in the City with yet another successful take-over. The Forte family, 
although they had lost their business, came away with over E300 million from the 
sale of their shares. Rocco Forte has since gone on to found a new, international, up- 
market hotel chain called RF (Rocco Forte) Hotels. At the time of the research the 
chain had, in a period of 18 months, expanded to a total of 10 luxury five-star hotels. 
The most obvious victim in the battle was the 60-year-old Forte company along with 
its 38,000 employees. By the time the conflict was over, the stakes had become so 
high that, whatever the outcome, either company would be forced to carve up Forte 
and sell off large parts of it. During the bid, in an effort to stay afloat, Forte began 
disposing of what would have amounted to 40% of its assets. It also offered to give 
away its Savoy shares to loyal Forte shareholders and committed itself to raise 
dividend payments by 20% a year for three years. Granada, on the other hand, had to 
take on significant debts in order to buy Forte and also pledged a special dividend to 
shareholders as part of its raised offer. It eventually became apparent that, to pay for 
this, Granada expected to dismantle and dispose of between 45% and 60% of its new 
acquisition. In fact, over the next two years it made sales of ; EI. 75 billion - or 46% of 
the Forte empire. Neil Bennett, in the Sunday Telegraph, (14.1.96) was thus led to 
comment: 
'On the one side Granada is taking on debts of E3 billion just so it can 
sell more than half of what it is buying: on the other Forte is naturally 
disembowelling itself with a fire sale of businesses, a massive share buy 
back and reckless commitment to increase dividends by 20 per cent a 
year. Whatever the outcome neither side will win. ' 
Additionally, Granada claimed it would make savings in the first year, from what 
remained of the company, of ;E 100 million. Since Forte's profits at the time were 
15f 105 million was specified in Granada's documents. There were also a number of unconfirmed 
estimates of E50 million for Forte (in PR Week, 26.1.96, FT, 23.1.96, Daily Telegraph, 22.1.96). 
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E258 million for the whole of the company, it intended to increase profitability 
through quite considerable cuts. There were many ways and means by which the 
large debts incurred were paid off and the extra savings extracted. One obvious way 
was through job losses and by generally economising on staffing costs. According to 
Richard Power (interview 30.11.98), as he described daily events at Forte during the 
60 days: 
'Every day a piece of news went down the line to employees - telling 
them both the good and the bad news ... We knew that if we won the bid 
it was going to be a complete blood bath to make the profit increases we 
had promised. There were going to be lots of cuts and we would have to 
hack off bits of the business on all sides. But then we knew the same was 
going to happen if we lost and we thought it was better to do it from our 
side. ' 
Thus, employees already working in two of the poorest paid and least secure 
industries (hotels and catering), were about to have job cuts and 'greater flexibility' 
imposed on them". 
The last to lose out were taxpayers. The plans of both companies involved making 
use of tax loopholes. These meant that one side or the other could claim to be paying 
shareholders more because the construction of their deals meant that certain fund- 
holders would not have to pay tax on the deals. According to Graham Seaýant of the 
Times (22.1.96), if Granada won the bid the take-over would have cost taxpayers up 
to E450 million. Unfortunately, such results were rarely looked at by the financial 
journalists involved. Most either ignored the implications or were prone to giving 
such advice as that expressed by the Fl's authoritative LEX column (10.1.96): 'No 
public interest is served by a loophole that involves taxpayers subsidising corporate 
raiders. But until the rules are changed, bidders would be mad not to exploit them to 
the full. ' 
CONCLUSION 
Although this take-over gained more media coverage than most in was not atypical in 
16 As Richard Thomas, in one of only two articles to focus on employees during the period, reported 
(Guardian, 10.1.96): 'These are the pawns in the game being played by Forte and Granada - the people 
from whom "more value" is to be squeezed to boost profits. Those at the bottom of the pile already 
work long hours for lowly wages .... the 312,000 people working in British hotels are at the cutting 
edge of the Conservative drive for a "flexible" labour market. Big leisure firms spearheaded the 
campaign for the abolition of the wages councils - which guaranteed minimum rates in industries like 
hotels and catering - and most vehemently oppose Labour's plans for a minimum wage and adoption 
of the social chapter. ' 
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terms of its size or in terms of those who gained or lost most by it. 1995 was in fact a 
record year for merger and acquisition activity with deals worth E69 billion, or 10% 
of the value of the stock market (3 times the previous year) taking place -a figure 
that now appears small next to current levels of activity. Over El billion was paid out 
in City advisers fees alone. Seven of the principal institutions with shares in Forte 
were, in fact, amongst the ten largest fund managers in the UK and controlled E313 
billion worth of funds - equivalent to 48% of the value of the UK stock market at the 
time". As stated, they, along with the armies of City advisers involved, made 
considerable profits from the take-over. Most studies of mergers and acquisitions 
similarly conclude (see Sudarsanum, 1995, Hutton, 1996) that the main beneficiaries 
in mergers and acquisitions are the managers of the acquiring business and the 
shareholders of the target company. The acquiring company rarely benefits in terms 
of innovation, output or growth. A recent study by KPMG (Buckingham and 
Atkinson, 30.11.99) typically found that, while 82% of executives thought their 
acquisitions successful, only 17% actually 'added value' in the long term". 
Neither was there anything unique about the low level of mainstream coverage. In 
fact, this was one of the most high-profile take-overs of the decade, involving well- 
known consumer companies, employing 80,000 people and serving millions of 
customers. Even so, it still drew relatively little non-financial media attention. As 
Will Hutton was to exclaim amidst all the take-over activity at the time (Guardian, 
6.12.95): 
'Hundreds of thousands of workers in a myriad of businesses have been 
subject to the uncertainty, dislocation and asset-sweating that take-over 
brings ... But this is not deemed mainstream news: nor has it forced itself 
into the wider political and intellectual culture ... neither the prevalence 
of take-overs nor the individual consequences of the companies 
concerned are reckoned to rank alongside, say, an exchange at Question 
Time over tax cuts or hospital closures as an economic and social event. 
It is a tragic myopia. ' 
17 These were: 1) Prudential with E76 billion, 2) MAM with E72 billion, 5) Standard Life with L45 
billion, 7) BZW with 04 billion, - 8) Legal and general with E33 billion, 9) Hermes with f28 billion, 
10) Gartmore with E25 billion. 
18 Whether the take-over of Forte was in the best long term interests of Granada has been the subject of 
much comment and a few academic studies. Interview responses on this mattei were divided 
according to company loyalties. The Forte side generally believed that Granada paid too much and 
that, in the long run, its share price had under-performed the FTSE 100 average. Granada's opinion 
was different. Within the year it had managed to increase profits through savings by f 124 million, 
made all its disposals at a 'full price' and had paid back E2.5 billion of its loans. Granada was thus in a 
strong position, running a profitable and balanced business with 'acceptable levels of debt'. Although 
it should be noted that, at the time of completing this thesis, Granada were talking about a demerger of 
their entertainment and leisure businesses - something Forte claimed would happen all along. 
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The benefit of corporate public relations to the corporate sector has thus slowly 
become clearer in chapters three to five. Corporate influence of journalists and the 
general public is only part of the equation. The main advantage that PR has brought 
to corporate elites has been to restrict access to the production and consumption of 
information about corporate activities. This is not generally achieved through covert 
control of, or organised conspiracy with, journalists. Indeed, corporate elites are in 
frequent competition and conflict, both with journalists and each other. Rather, 
business source advantages, business consumer needs, and financial journalist 
requirements have all combined to produce recurring patterns of corporate source 
dominance in the financial press. These patterns have resulted in significant financial 
and economic debates being confined to discussion amongst 'elite discourse 
networks'. Inside these networks there is little consideration of the consequences of 
decisions for the majority of the population. The example given here is take-overs 
but the implications for other forms of corporate activity and decision-making are 
quite pronounced. In all of this, corporate public relations has played a significant 
part. It has cultivated a financial media dependency on its steady supply of 
information subsidies and developed sophisticated techniques to encourage and block 
journalist access. PRPs have also identified the individuals and information that 
matter most to their corporate employers and have thus been an essential part of the 
process whereby closed 'elite discourse networks' are formed. 
With the benefits of public relations for the corporate sector established, the question 
then becomes: can other groups acting in civil society also gain from the rise of 
public relations? Can 'resource-poor' and 'outsider' groups also use PR to increase 
their media access and therefore disrupt the elite discourse networks that form in 
news reporting? This is the question that occupies the third part of this thesis. 
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PART THREE: TRADE UNION PUBLIC RELATIONS 
CHAPTER SIX: TRADE UNIONS, OUTSIDER GROUPS AND MEDIA- 
SOURCE RELATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Section three asks: can 'outsider' and 'resource-poor' groups also use professional 
public relations as a means to achieve specific political and economic ends? Can they 
use PR to increase their media access, improve the quality of their coverage and, 
ultimately, influence 'elite discourse networks'? The focus for the research is the 
British trade union movement. Trade unions in the UK have been increasingly 
excluded from mainstream British politics, seen their resources decline significantly, 
and complained about negative media coverage for some decades. Thus, if unions 
can use public relations effectively, it is likely that PR would be useful to a variety of 
outsider and resource-poor groups attempting to influence media coverage and 
policy-making. 
Chapter six therefore begins by evaluating the existing literature on industrial 
relations coverage, union communications, and media-source relations. The first part 
critically reviews the early work of the Glasgow University Media Group and other 
radical accounts of industrial relations reporting (from the mid- I 970s onwards). Most 
of these studies concluded that the media were essentially hostile to unions and 
labour politics and, as a result, would only ever report unions negatively. Each 
therefore deduced that better union communications would not be particularly 
effective and that unions were better off pursuing other types of strategy to achieve 
their objectives. 
In response, it is argued that the Glasgow Group's findings did not adequately 
explain the causes of media bias. While their claims of negative union reporting had 
some substance their explanatory frameworks tended to be flawed. Taking account of 
the more recent work on media-source relations, an alternative, and more optimistic, 
perspective emerges. In this it is suggested that the media were, and are, less 
inherently hostile to unions than previously suggested, and defamatory reporting 
was, in part, accounted for by the inadequacy of union communications. At a time 
when government and corporate sources were making increasing use of professional 
PR (see chapter two), poor union-media relations proved to be a significant cause of 
negative union coverage. 
Part two returns to the debate by focusing on media-source relations literature - more 
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particularly on research on 'resource-poor' and non-official sources. Even if the 
Glasgow Group's work offered an incomplete account, are unions still too 
disadvantaged as sources to make a meaningful impact on news texts? The findings 
of studies, from the 1970s to early 1990s, suggest that they are. A lack of economic 
resources and institutional legitimacy have been deemed to be almost insurmountable 
obstacles to such groups as they attempt to gain productive, long-term media access. 
As part three concludes, while more recent research indicates that the potential for 
such groups to use professional communications is greater than hitherto 
acknowledged, they still suggest that that potential is limited. 
PART ONE: UNION COMMUNICATIONS AND THE GLASGOW 
UNIVERSITY MEDIA GROUP THESIS 
Trade Unions and the Mass Media: The Glasgow University Media Group 
Thesis 
Most radical research on industrial relations reporting in the UK has argued that a) 
the national media is inherently biased against trade unions, and therefore, b) union 
PR can make only a marginal impact on news production. These conclusions were 
initially formulated, and vigorously argued for, in the early work of the Glasgow 
University Media Group (GUMG, 1976,1980,1982,1993, Beharrell and Philo, 
1977). As several members of the group explained at the time (Philo, Beharrell and 
Hewitt, 1977, p 136): 
'... there is little evidence to suggest that "better communications" or 
closer working relationships between public relations departments and 
the media ever significantly change the character of media coverage ... 
rendered meaningless in isolation within a framework of reporting that is 
fundamentally hostile to the aims which trade unions represent in 
industrial society. ' 
The Group noted several trends during an extensive textual analysis of the 'contours' 
of news coverage. First, patterns of news coverage, which were remarkably similar 
across all channels, tended to focus overly on strikes and on particular industries 
(automobile, transport and public administration) at the expense of general industrial 
news and other industries. Second, strikes were always reported in a manner which 
undermined trade union positions. Images of unruly trade unionists, filmed on the 
shop floor and picket lines, were always juxtaposed with pictures of managers and 
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ministers, giving interviews in calm and controlled office settings. The consequences 
of strike action for the general public were usually highlighted but the causes of the 
strike rarely explained. Third, management and government sources dominated the 
reporting of industrial and economic issues generally and therefore set the 
interpretive frameworks for news coverage. All these patterns meant that reports of 
strike action repeatedly gave the impression that powerful unionists were simply 
holding the country to ransom for personal gain. Similarly, in the wider reporting of 
the British economy, excessive wage claims and union obstructionism were to blame 
for, amongst other things, inflation and national economic decline. In contrast, 
government and/or management were rarely singled out as the cause of either 
industrial unrest or national economic difficulties. 
These findings added up to a strong case of media bias against trade unions. The 
Group's explanations for this were based on a combination of 'cultural structuralist' 
and 'political economy' perspectives: the influence of 'dominant ideology' and the 
effects of corporate and state control over media organisations. According to the first 
of these approaches, as Walton and Davies explained (1977, p124), '... the general 
output of the mass media is ideological; but it is not consciously so. Rather, cultural 
assumptions of the dominant groups within our society are given privileged and 
central treatment. ' As a result the ideas of 'dominant groups' tend to construct the 
normative frameworks through which journalists and consumers understand the 
world. Journalists, because 'they share a common culture with the most powerful 
groups and interests in society' (GMUG, 1982, p 13), are further prone to reproducing 
those ideas. From a political economy perspective they also argued that dominant 
ideas were more consciously promoted by the direct control and ownership of the 
news-producing organisations. The BBC has never strayed too far from the reach of 
government control, and the press is owned and maintained by corporate 
conglomerates and media magnates pursuing free-market objectives. Ownership, 
coupled with advertiser pressure, dictates editorial appointments. Editors, in turn, 
employ journalists and take editorial lines favourable to corporate governing boards, 
advertisers and shareholders. 
Whatever the explanation, the mass media appeared to be responsible for generating 
and perpetuating deep-seated prejudices against trade unions. The Group's core 
arguments were subsequently repeated and built upon by both media scholars and 
trade unionists. For example, reporting of the 1984/85 miner's strike in the UK was 
critically examined with the same conceptual framework advanced by the Glasgow 
Group (e. g., Douglas 1986, Hollingsworth, 1986, Curran et al, 1986). Studies by 
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Winter (1990), Knight (1992) and Hackett (1992) also attempted to reproduce the 
Glasgow Group's findings in Canada. Winter, Desbarato, Waddell, and others (see 
Winter, 1990), looking at reporting of the issues pertinent to Canada's entry into 
NAFTA, argued that coverage had strongly advanced the positions of corporate, free- 
trade advocates over those of unions and other pressure groups. Knight (1992) and 
Hackett (1992), looking more specifically at industrial reporting, concluded that 
union members were depicted as 'disruptive' and 'conflictive', whereas business 
sources were treated more neutrally, with greater authority, and 'received more 
coherent treatment' generally. 
In the UK in the last decade, although the Group's work has been referTed to less 
frequently, no major body of research has come to replace it. Indeed, its thesis is still 
periodically supported by similar studies of union reporting (see Seaton, 1991, 
Mitchell, 1997, Watts, 1997). As Seaton remarked (1991, p256 and 261) 'Union- 
bashing is one of the great conventions of the British media ... The "human interest" 
aspect of industrial affairs distorts real developments and changes to a kind of re- 
occurring moral fable, one in which unions are always the "baddies"'. The Group 
itself, in re-publishing much of its early work in a two-volume reader (Eldridge, 
1995, Philo, 1995), has reinforced the standing of its thesis once again. Although 
offering a broader range of explanations for the causes of media bias, they still 
appear fairly sceptical about the ability of the left to influence the media with what 
Philo refers to (1995, p 194) as 'the shallow science of imagistics'. Consequently, the 
conclusions about union communications also remain unaltered; i. e., any attempts to 
improve union reporting with PR are unlikely to be fruitful and precious resources 
are better employed elsewhere. 
Re-evaluating the Glasgow Group Thesis 
While there exist many studies that document instances of anti-union media bias', the 
Group's own empirical findings do not always support their interpretive frameworks. 
First, the trends noted in the content analysis reveal several things about news 
reporting - but do not concretely demonstrate that coverage is prejudicial. For 
example, similar patterns of news coverage across channels, and an over-emphasis 
'There are several accounts of the Thatcher government's close relations with editors of the 
predominantly right-wing press in the 1980s (e. g., Young, 1989, Hollingsworth, 1986, Curran et al, 
1986, Douglas, 1986, Curran and Seaton, 1997). Several 'liberal' and official studies of industrial 
relations reporting (Annan Committee, 1977, McQuail, 1977, Weber, 1979) also offered muted 
support for the Group's claims about the way strikes were reported. There are also numerous political 
economy accounts of corporate and government influence over news producers and the dominance of 
institutional sources in reporting (see chapter one of this thesis). 
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on strikes and certain industry sectors out of proportion to industrial activity in 
general, do not in themselves mean that journalists are antagonistic to unions. That 
managers are interviewed in their offices and union officials on picket lines, only 
indicates that individuals are interviewed in their natural surroundings - not a media 
attempt to de-legitimise striking workers (see similar arguments put in Harrison, 
1985). That strikes are reported more than other industrial issues, and the 
consequences of action are covered more than the causes, indicates that 'news 
values' are driven by sensation and public interest rather than conscious attacks on 
the union movement. That trade unions are subject to negative and superficial 
reporting does not mean they alone suffer negative and superficial reporting (see 
chapter three, for example, on the reporting of businesses). 
The claims that journalists are guided by dominant ideology are similarly vague and, 
at times, presented in a contradictory manner. At one point the Group accuses 
broadcasters of bias because industrial reporting is not an even reflection of reality; 
at another it demands that all minority opinions are reported equally. It rejects 
4 conspiracy' in favour of dominant ideology but then explains bias as resulting from 
the conscious acquiescence of journalists to owners and ministers. In one paragraph 
it is stated that management dictates to media by maintaining its distance from 
journalists. In another, it is revealed that management views dominate because of 
greater media access. 
Second, a closer examination of research on industrial relations reporting reveals that 
unions actually possessed distinct advantages in the news production process. As 
argued in chapter three, most j oumalists are, in general, not particularly pro-business. 
Indeed, as Philo et al (1977, p 140) noted at the time, 'people who work in the press 
and television are often themselves trade unionists'. More importantly, several 
studies (GUMG, and also Philo, 1977, Annan, 1977, McQuail, 1979, Jones, 1986, 
Harrison, 1986, Seaton, 1991, Manning, 1998), have pointed out that industrial 
relations correspondents are closer and more sympathetic to unions than they are to 
business or government sources'. Additionally, a closer examination of the work of 
the Glasgow Group and others (GUMG, 1976,1980, Annan Report, 1977, McQuail, 
1979) reveals that, at the time, union sources actually gained more media access than 
business managers and government officials put together. In fact, such was the 
2 For example: McQuail (1977, p 13 9), 'It would seem as if reporters of industrial relations events are 
"closer" to local trade union officials than to Government or employers'; (Seaton, 199 1, p263), 'Most 
industrial correspondents believe themselves and their colleagues to be politically on the left. They 
also argue that even journalists who enter the field for 'careerist' reasons develop an interest and 
respect for trade unionists' 
3 McQuail's study (1977, p137/8), for example, offered the following results. TUC 
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media presence of union leaders in the 1970s, Hall et al. (1978) identified them as 
being amongst the nation's 'primary definers'. Such findings were also apparent in 
the data produced by several critical and institutional studies in Canada (see 
Tuchman, 1978,1981 Canadian Royal Commission on Newspapers in Ericson et al, 
1991, Knight, 1992, Hackett, 1992). 
In effect, the Group's empirical evidence fails adequately to support its interpretive 
frameworks - regardless of whether its conclusions are accurate or not. The 
arguments about biased reporting patterns, vaguely accounted for by the notion of 
'dominant ideology', are far too weak. Similarly, the influence of corporate owners 
and government officials over news production appear to have been countered, to a 
degree, by the closeness of reporters to unions at the time. Clearly, explanations for 
the negative reporting of unions, and for their poor public image' in the 1970s and 
1980s, thus require fin-ther thought. 
Trade Unions and the Mass Media: A Media-Source Relations Perspective 
An alternative, but in many ways complimentary, explanation can be developed by 
looking at industrial relations coverage from a media-source relations perspective. 
Subsequent to the publication of the Glasgow Group's early work, there has been 
renewed interest in the study of news sources (most significantly Ericson et al, 1989, 
Hansen, 1993, Schlesinger and Turnber, 1994, Miller, 1994, and Deacon and 
Golding, 1994). Much of this work suggests that a significant proportion of media 
bias is caused by uneven media-source relations and that those who are able to gain 
regular media access are also more likely to gain positive coverage and set news 
agendas. Applying this schema to the reporting of industrial disputes in the late 
1970s and 1980s, it may be shown that most trade unions not only neglected the 
communications issue, they frequently took an adversarial approach in their dealings 
with journalists. Conversely, management and government devoted significant 
resources to managing the news (see chapters two and three). In effect, the anomalies 
in the Group's findings, as well as much of the negative coverage of strikes and 
unions are, in part, explained by the unions' own communications failings. 
officials/spokespersons and shop stewards accounted for 59% of citations and 41% of total 
'mentions', 'reported statements' and 'quoted interviews'. Government ministers/MPs, CBI 
leaders/spokespersons, and managers/employers accounted for 24% of citations and 38% of the total 
category. Others, which included members of the public and workers, accounted for 17% and 21% 
respectively. 
4 Between 1975 and 1984 MORI polls recorded that between 68% and 82% of people thought "Trade 
unions have too much power in Britain today". This included between 55% and 73% of trade union 
members. For the same period, between 60% and 70% thought "Most trade unions are controlled by 
extremists and militants", including 550/6-64% of trade union members. 
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For much of the twentieth century media hostility towards unions has been more than 
matched by union hostility towards the media'. As union membership grew, and 
industrial action increased through the 1960s and 1970s, mass media attention was 
further directed to unions and union leaders (see Manning, 1998,1999). However, a 
mixture of union ignorance and hostility continued to inform union responses to 
media enquiries. Thus, when unions, in the mid-1970s, decided to address the 
problem of negative media coverage, they chose to attack the media rather than 
reorganise their public relations. The lead taken by the newly established TUC Media 
Working Group, one that seemed strongly influenced by the work of the Glasgow 
GroUp6, was that the media would always be biased against labour. Therefore trade 
unionists should monitor it, attack it and/or attempt to set up rival national 
newspapers controlled by unions (See TUC, 1977b, 1980a, 1980b, 1982,1983). 
As the last in a series of TUC publications (TUC, 1983) on the media explained: 
'What this report sets out to do is discuss means of redressing legitimate grievances 
against the actions of the existing media - against abuses of their powers by 
particular newspaper articles and broadcast programmes'. In the early 1980s, much 
research was devoted to setting up and funding a new national newspaper -a project 
which was never realised (see McCarthy, 1984, Power and Sheridan, 1984). Several 
guides to the media were also produced, each aimed at educating union officials in 
media methods (TUC, 1977a, 1979a, 1982,1985,1986). These were, however, 
minor efforts that drew far less interest than the more aggressive alternatives. None 
made mention of appointing experienced media professionals or of seeking outside 
advice. All explained themselves to sceptical unionists with the argument that '... the 
media is a nettle you must grasp - before it stings you' (TUC, 1979a, p5). 
5For example, in 1923, a Labour Research Department pamphlet, entitled 'The Press' (p47) declared: 
'Thus the sources of news are largely controlled by people who are closely associated with big 
capitalist interests and, like the proprietors of the newspapers themselves, are concerned to maintain 
the capitalist organisations of industry. ' The combination of the BBC being forced to take the 
government's side in the 1926 General Strike and during the 1930s depression, coupled with the 
reactionary and dictatorial style of many 'press barons' in the inter-war period (See Curran and 
Seaton, 1997), did not alter this view. In the post-war period, for example, the Labour Research 
Department declared (1946, p17): 'It is clear that the mere fact of the "independence" of a newspaper 
may mean anything or nothing. A Tory newspaper representing big industrialists remains a Tory 
newspaper and, as such, hostile to the labour movement and the Labour Government'. 
6The output firom the TUC Media Working Group (1978-90), and the statements supporting TUC 
Conference motions on the media, all bore close resemblance to the arguments expounded in the 'Bad 
News' series (see particularly TUC Conference Report, motion p552-553,1975, Beckett, 1977, 
Griffiths, 1977, TUC, 1979b, Douglas, 1985, Myers, 1986). Philo, Beharrell and Hewitt (1977, p136), 
clearly encouraged this approach: 'The severe limits of seeking improved communications with the 
media have driven some unions towards a "complaints strategy". This is a more positive and realistic 
approach to the problem in that it holds few illusions about the nature of "news" and journalistic 
practices within the media. ' 
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Continued union intransigence, at a time when government and businesses were 
increasingly employing professional PR techniques and personnel (see chapter two), 
resulted in a growing communication gap between unions and their opponents. The 
Glasgow Group's research into union communications (GUMG, 1976) revealed that 
the three largest unions, the TGWU, the AUEW, and the GMVVrU, had four 
media/press officers among them. Over a decade later, Manning's (1998) 1988 
survey revealed that only seven of the 37 largest unions had a full-time press officer. 
Verzuh's (1990) study of union communications noted that, in the 1980s, journalists 
had frequently experienced great difficulties in obtaining information and/or suffered 
personal abuse from union officials. These findings were corroborated by journalists 
(Adeney and Lloyd, 1986, Hollingsworth, 1986, Harrison, 1986, Jones, 1986,1987) 
and even by the work of the Glasgow Group itself'. As Verzuh suggests (1990, p5): 
'Significantly, the unions were unable to turn opinion around in their 
favour. Few had media relations officers with a mainstream media 
background. The tradition had been for the general secretary to make a 
call to a friendly reporter in a crisis. This lack of professionalism led to 
an increased deterioration in relations with the mass media'. 
In effect, hostility justified ignorance, bringing a vicious circle of declining media 
relations. The consequences were decreased access for unions, badly managed union 
images, poor presentation of union positions and weak communication with union 
members. 
The communications imbalance between unions and their opponents was made 
abundantly clear during the NUM's 1984/85 clash with the National Coal Board (see 
Adeney and Lloyd, 1986, Jones, 1986, Verzuh, 1990). While there is significant 
evidence that senior editors and proprietors kept abnormally close to Downing street 
at the time (See Douglas, 1985, Hollingsworth, 1986, Young, 1989), the NUM's 
poor lines of communication were also a telling factor in the conflict. During the 
dispute the NUM had one press officer who also doubled as Arthur Scargill's 
assistant. The National Coal Board began the dispute with 6 communications officers 
and ended it with 25 (COI directories, Sept 1984, Sept 1985). They also had the 
assistance of Tim Bell and Gordon Reece, advisors to the Conservative Party, 
advertising agency Lowe-Howard-Spink-Campbell-Ewold and much of the output of 
the government's own communications machine. The NCB spent E4,566,000 on 
7 Hollingsworth (1986, p 242), '... One Guardian journalist described the situation as "excruciating ... 
wherever you went you were told to fuck off and sometimes hit"; Harrison (1985, p77), 'Whatever the 
failings of the broadcasters, few unions could at that time have claimed to honestly have had any 
sustained or concerted effort to meet the needs of television ... a TUC survey in 1984 showed that in 
many unions internal and external relations remained a low priority. ' 
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advertising (Jones, 1986), while the NUM rejected any attempt at a publicity 
campaign. Reporters were forced to use 'official' figures because the NUM had no 
reliable information on the activities of its own members'. 
Clearly, there was some justification in claiming that there existed an anti-union 
consensus amongst official sources, and much anti-union news coverage during the 
1970s and 1980s. However, union action during this period only encouraged more 
negative and/or ignorant reporting. Although unions had close links with industrial 
reporters, and they were widely reported and cited, they merely squandered these 
advantages. They were thus perceived to be a powerful force in British politics - but 
a force that had little sense of public accountability, and did not take the time to 
communicate its case to members or the general public. By the early 1990s, even 
industrial relations researchers had begun to notice that poor union communications 
were severely hampering their efficacy as political actors9. 
PART TWO: UNIONS AS OUTSIDER AND RESOURCE-POOR SOURCES 
Even if poor union communications have played a large part in the production of 
negative news, will improved union PR make a significant difference? Past studies of 
the attempts of 'outsider' and 'resource-poor' groups to use the media have produced 
rather bleak prognoses. Research has commonly found that such groups are so 
disadvantaged, in terms of economic and institutional resources, that they are 
unlikely to make more than a minor or temporary impact on news production. 
Unions, meanwhile, have become considerably weakened over the last two decades - 
losing precious resources, institutional legitimacy and power. As marginalised and 
4resource-poor' groups, much of the existing literature suggests that unions are now 
even less likely to make a strong impact on news texts - regardless of whether or not 
they improve their communications. 
8As Jones explains (1987, p6-8): 'The management had succeeded in dictating the pace and so 
exposed the weakness of Mr Scargill: his communications strategy was based on one person, himself 
... Why did the media concentrate on the Coal Board's figures? The point was that the NUM had no figures of its own. In the big urban areas it did not even know the home addresses of its own members 
... It was management that had the monopoly of that information. So during the strike the NUM could 
not even post its own members a copy of The Miner'. 
9Bassett and Cave (1993, p17), 'In part because their [trade unions'] overall organisation as public 
affairs lobbyists is so poor ... their effectiveness as a single-issue pressure group, advocating 
employees' interests, is now probably less than other bodies ... It is certainly considerably less than 
organisations such as the newly revitalised Confederation of British Industry ... '; Taylor (1994, p 178), 'Britain's trade unions have not been very effective in recent years in presenting a public face to the 
world. Too many of them for too long were careless of what people thought about them. ' 
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Resource-Poor and Outsider Group Media Relations: Radical Pessimism 
Early work in the United States (see Goldenberg, 1975 and Gitlin, 1980) found that 
coutsider' and 'resource-poor' groups, when attempting to gain media access, were 
severely impeded by a number of factors. For Goldenberg (1975), the key 
disadvantage for smaller pressure groups was resources. Lack of finance hampered 
background research, promotional operations and a sense of official authority - all of 
which hindered attempts to form regular media contacts and gain long-term media 
coverage. Several other studies (Gandy, 1980, Fishman, 1980, Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988, Tiffen, 1989, Miller, 1994) have also emphasised the correlation 
between economic resources and public relations efficacy. Greater resources mean 
more communications equipment and professional personnel which, in turn, mean 
more media contacts, greater production of news information subsidies, multiple 
modes of communication and continuous media operations. As each concluded, 
extreme variations in the possession of economic capital mean that well resourced 
organisations can inundate the media and set agendas while the attempts of resource- 
poor organisations become quickly marginalised. 
Miller (1994, p132-33), for example, recorded that in Northern Ireland in 1989, Sinn 
Fein, with five voluntary press staff and a budget of E7,000, attempted to compete 
against official government sources with 145 communications staff and a twenty 
million pound budget. Herman and Chomsky (1988, p20-21) make a similar point 
about the US military and its oppositions. In the early 1980s, the U. S. Air Force 
produced 150 times as many press releases as its two strongest challengers combined 
(the National Council of the Churches of Christ, NCC, and American Friends Service 
Committee, AFSQ and held 94 times as many press conferences. During that period, 
the AFSC had II staff, compared to the last known figure for the Air Force of 1,305 
(recorded in 1968). The differences take on greater significance in times of conflict - 
when companies and government departments rapidly employ more PRPs and/or hire 
consultancies to manage crises. Miller (1994, p78) found that, as tensions heightened 
in Northern Ireland, between 1968 and 1971, the British army increased its press 
staff from two to 40. Jones (1986) similarly observed that the National Coal Board 
was able to call on extensive communications resources in its conflict with the 
National Union of Miners in 1984/85 (see back). 
Presently in the UK, even though smaller organisations are increasingly drawn to 
using PR consultancies and employing PRPs, most continue to be effectively 
deterred from operating large-scale professional operations. In 1997, the average fee 
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per client for a small PR consultancy was E17,781. The larger firms averaged 
E72,629 per client (PRCA, 1998). The PRCA also calculated that the costs involved 
in maintaining an in-house depailment in 1994 worked out at E42,000 per head (DTI, 
1994). Thus the market determines that professional PR in Britain continues to be a 
service that is only affordable to large institutions and businesses. 
The second factor that hinders smaller, outsider sources is their lack of legitimacy in 
the eyes of reporters. Gitlin (1980) and Goldenberg (1975) identified a strong link 
between an organisation's legitimacy and authority and its ability to gain regular and 
favourable coverage. It was thus clear to both that outsider sources struggled to gain 
regular media access, because they could never gain more than a fraction of the 
legitimacy that was naturally conferred on institutional and some corporate sources. 
Their research was echoed in the work of Hall et al. (1978) on media coverage of 
mugging in the UK. Hall et al. (1978) explained that journalists, in their search for 
'objective' and 'authoritative' accounts, automatically sought out institutionalised 
sources. These sources, already legitimated by their power, representativeness and 
expertise, became the 'primary definers' of news agendas. Alternative sources, and 
journalists themselves, could only respond to those agendas and frameworks already 
determined. Thus, official source dominance resulted from the media's 'structured 
preferences' for the opinions of the 'dominant class'. 
As many subsequent studies have shown, non-official sources find it difficult to 
maintain group consensus while simultaneously gaining media access and media 
legitimacy. What Cracknell (1993) called a conflict between 'commanding attention' 
and 'claiming legitimacy' has been repeatedly experienced by student groups in the 
United States (Gitlin, 1980), terrorist groups in Northern Ireland (Miller, 1994), 
international environmental groups (Cracknell, 1993, Anderson, 1993,1997), and by 
groups dealing with HIV and AIDs (Miller and Williams, 1993,1998). In each case, 
certain strategies - demonstrations, the promotion of individual leaders, industrial 
action and terrorist acts - while achieving media coverage, were also prone to ftu-ther 
de-legitimising particular groups in the eyes of the media and/or risked internally 
destabilising those groups in the long-term. 
A third, more general set of 'outsider' source disadvantages has been highlighted by 
the work of media sociologists. The state, many of its institutions and large 
corporations will always have the political, legal and financial means with which to 
apply pressure to journalists, influence their movements, and/or court them (e. g., 
Curran et al, 1986, Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Nelson, 1989, Miller, 1994, Philo, 
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1995, Eldridge, 1995). Institutions also have a 'bureaucratic affinity' (Fishman, 
1980) with media organisations; i. e., they attract journalists because they are usually 
physically accessible, well resourced, and provide a regular supply of information 
subsidies (Sigal, 1973, Fishman, 1980, Tiffen, 1989, Ericson et al, 1989). As a result, 
of such political, legal and bureaucratic factors 'outsider' groups are further 
obstructed in their attempts to gain comparable media access. 
Trade Unions as Resource-Poor and Outsider Pressure Groups 
In fact, since the Glasgow Group's work was completed, unions have become both 
weaker and more excluded from the political process. They have lost funds and 
members, had the strike weapon impeded and links with government eroded, and lost 
what institutional legitimacy they formerly possessed (see accounts in Bassett and 
Cave, 1993, Taylor, 1994, Millward, 1994, McIlroy, 1995). They have thus lost their 
cprimary definer' status and increasingly come to resemble the 'outsider' and 
6resource-poor' pressure groups discussed above. 
Trade union memberships, finances and traditional methods of industrial action have 
all steadily declined. In 1979, at their post-war peak, unions had 13.2 million 
members and union density was 56.9% nationally. By 1992, membership had 
dropped to 9.5 million members and density to 41.8% - 34.19% among TUC 
affiliated unions (McIlroy, 1995, p20-26). Changing employment patterns have 
fractured and dispersed memberships across middle class, service sector professions - 
often leaving members working in small firms and on a part-time or temporary basis 
(Taylor, 1994, Millward, 1994). Legislation, in conjunction with changing 
membership patterns, have combined to blunt the strike weapon severely and change 
the shape of British industrial relations. A series of ten employment and trade union 
acts, passed between 1980 and 1995, imposed extremely tight restrictions on union 
industrial action and, unsurprisingly, strike activity has declined rapidly since 1979. 
By the mid-1990s, the average annual number of stoppages and working days lost 
had returned to the levels of the 1950s, and 1993 recorded the lowest rates since 
statistics began (McIlroy, 1995, p120/1). In Millward's view (1994, p5/6): 
'... there were major and probably irreversible changes in employee 
relations during the 1980s ... Indeed so great were these changes that it is 
not unreasonable to conclude that the traditional distinctive 'system' of 
British industrial relations based on collective bargaining is no longer 
characteristic of the economy as a whole'. 
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The institutional legitimacy of unions has also been denied by their steady exclusion 
from government and mainstream party politics. This process accelerated rapidly 
when the Thatcher government ended the tripartite post-war consensus - declaring 
the end of the commitment to full employment and war on unions (Young, 1990, 
Middlemas, 1991, Taylor, 1994). Ministerial communication with unions was 
immediately reduced. Government institutions, concerned with industrial relations - 
such as the NEDC, industrial training boards, ACAS, the Manpower Services 
Commission and the National Enterprise Boards - were either abolished or had union 
representation reduced and/or cut altogether. Joining a union was no longer 
considered a 'right'. Indeed unions, and union activity in general, were denied 
legitimacy in the 1990 and 1993 Acts. After the collapse of the Wilson government, 
unions also came to be regarded as a liability for the Labour party and connections 
were slowly cut there too (Minkin, 199 1) ". Labour also dropped its commitments to 
full employment and to reversing much anti-union legislation. As Taylor was to 
comment (1994, p 164): 'In no other country in Europe have unions had to face such 
hostility from their government. Uniquely Britain also remains the one country 
where the role of trade unions in national life is still questioned. ' 
With the decline of union power, reduced strike activity and a distinct lack of 
institutional legitimacy, the media have consequently lost interest in union activities. 
Indeed, coverage of unions and industrial relations has been wound down to the point 
of extinction (see Jones, 1987, Manning, 1998,1999). 
In effect, by the start of the 1990s, unions had become doubly disadvantaged as 
sources. On the one hand, poor union-media relations had become the norm and 
negative public images had become entrenched over decades. On the other hand, 
unions had lost many of the economic, political and institutional resources that would 
help reverse such trends. It was thus clear that, in the new public relations 
environment, they would have to struggle to get media access and favourable 
coverage. Under such circumstances radical observers appeared to have some 
justification for being sceptical about the value of improved communications for 
unions. 
1OBy the mid 1990s more than 50% of funding for the Labour party was gained from sources other 
than the unions (reduced from 95% in 1979) and, following the Nolan report, union sponsorship of 
individual MPs was ended. 
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PART THREE: RADICAL PLURALIST OPTIMISM AND NON-OFFICIAL 
SOURCE STRATEGIES 
This negative outlook, in the light of more recent work on media-source relations, 
now requires rethinking. As Schlesinger (1990, see also Schlesinger and Tumber, 
1994, Curran, 1996) explained, such findings, left alone, risked repeating the 
mistakes of 'cultural structuralists' and 'radical functionalists'. In a critique of Hall et 
al (1978), that was also applicable to the work of the Glasgow Group, he put the 
following arguments. Primary definers, being often in conflict, did not speak with 
one voice; neither did they retain the same levels of access over time, let alone 
possess equal amounts of access. Similarly, journalists and non-official sources were 
not always relegated to positions of subordinancy and counter-definition, but did, on 
occasion, challenge official accounts. In effect, the work of Hall et al., the Glasgow 
Group, and other critical work on sources, gave an unduly determinist picture that 
did not account for change and the 'dynamic processes of contestation in a given 
field of discourse'. 
Instead, work by Schlesinger and others, in the 1990s, not only offered an alternative 
radical pluralist perspective, but observed several instances of resource-poor and 
outsider groups successfully employing more professional communications. The 
elements of this alternative thesis have developed out of the following: a) discussions 
of elite sources in the United States (Nacos, 1990, Hallin, 1994); b) studies of 
environmental pressure groups (Anderson, 1993,1997, Hansen, 1993); and, above 
all, c) comparative studies of official and non-official sources in Britain (Miller and 
Williams, 1993, Miller, 1994, Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). All three approaches 
have suggested means by which a 'more dynamic process of contestation' in given 
'fields of discourse' takes place. As such, each offers an explanation of how sources 
such as unions may gain access to a media production process that was traditionally 
dominated by 'elite discourse networks'. 
Schlesinger and Tumber (1994), Miller (1993,1994) and Anderson (1991,1993, 
1997) have observed non-institutional source strategies for building up media 
contacts and attempting to develop authoritative media profiles. Each (see also 
Wilson, 1984, Miller and Williams, 1993,1998, Hansen, 1993) documented cases of 
smaller pressure groups and charities successfully accumulating in-house media- 
relations expertise and sustaining journalist contacts over a period of time. 
Additionally, they found that repeated positive appearances in the media brought 
long-term benefits. By providing a constant supply of information subsidies (news 
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stories and research) to journalists, outsider sources managed to establish themselves 
in media discourses as legitimate sources. This process in itself encouraged a higher 
media profile and usually resulted in a further increase in institutional legitimacy. It 
was also observed that access, legitimacy, and the ability to set agendas could be 
further improved by collective action amongst resource-poor groups. If well co- 
ordinated, such groups could combine, seemingly to isolate a government or 
corporation in a particular media discourse. 
These studies each presented examples of pressure groups developing quite 
sophisticated media strategies, which effectively identified them to the media as 
reliable and authoritative sources in particular subject areas. Miller and Williams 
(1993,1998) observed such strategies being applied by the Terrence Higgins Trust. 
Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) found the same with trade associations/unions, such 
as NAPO, the POA and the Police Federation, and by pressure groups, such as 
NACRO and the Prison Reform Trust. Cracknell (1993) and Anderson (1993) 
offered similar accounts of the development of media strategies by Friends of the 
Earth and other environmental groups. All these organisations have managed to 
establish positive media profiles without necessarily resorting to dramatic stunts or 
actions. Along with organisations such as Amnesty, Liberty, the BMA and FDA, 
each has shown that a steady accumulation of media capital may go some way 
towards overcoming traditional institutional advantages. 
In effect, institutional legitimacy and authority is likened to a form of 'cultural 
capital' (Bourdieu, 1979,1993) that is itself linked to, but not simply determined by, 
economic capital. In theory, such media/cultural capital can be accumulated and lost 
over time. Just as research indicated that non-official sources could use public 
relations methods to accumulate such capital, so studies have also looked at the ways 
official sources could lose it. Hallin (1994), for example, explained that news 
producers became more critical of institutional sources during the Vietnam War 
because of dramatic 'shifts in elite consensus' amongst official sources. In the UK, a 
number of studies have similarly highlighted tendencies for institutional conflict 
(either internally or with external allies) resulting in PR strategies becoming 
inconsistent and journalists becoming more critical. Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) 
noted differences between civilians and police officers engaged in public relations 
activities on behalf of the police services. Deacon and Golding (1994), Kavanagh 
(1995), and Jones (1995) observed frequent conflicts, involving professional PRPs, 
civil servants, advisers and politicians, taking place within political parties and 
governments. 
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More obviously, disparate departments or state institutions, like different corporate 
sectors, may have conflicting communications objectives. Miller (1993,1994), 
Schlesinger and Tumber (1994), Deacon and Golding (1994), and Miller and 
Williams (1993,1998) have shown, in the continuing conflict in Northern Ireland, 
ongoing debates on the criminal justice system, opposition to the introduction of the 
community charge in the late 1980s, and in debates on AIDS/HIV respectively, that 
clear disagreements have surfaced between government departments. In these cases, 
individuals and institutions have come to be regarded as 'unreliable' by journalists 
and, on occasion, been seen to lose their standing as legitimate sources altogether. In 
effect, official sources frequently waste their economic and institutional resource 
advantages by engaging in conflict amongst themselves (see also part two of this 
thesis). At such times, outsider groups, if they have pursued clear PR strategies and 
built up legitimate media profiles, are able to challenge official media discourses. 
As several studies have shown, such groups have indeed managed to achieve such 
interventions - occasionally to the point of managing to dictate agendas and affect 
govermnent and corporate policy-making. CLEAR's campaign for lead-free petrol 
(Wilson, 1984), Hart District Council's defence of its land against government 
building plans (PRCA, 1994), and Greenpeace's success in halting Shell's plans for 
the Brent Spar oil rig (Anderson, 1997), are three examples of government and 
corporate policies being altered as a result of skilled PR campaigns on the part of 
lesser-resourced organisations. Several other campaigns, while not necessarily 
achieving their ultimate goals, have similarly managed to embarrass governments 
and corporations - from the GLC's successful 'battle for public opinion' (Curran, 
1990) to environmental groups obstructing the introduction of genetically modified 
foods. Thus, as some authors argue (Shoemaker, 1989, Blumler, 1990, and 
Scarnmell, 1995) there appears significant potential for a range of interest groups, 
including unions, to use PR to gain a level of media access that was hitherto denied 
them. In Shoemaker's words (1989, p215): 
'Journalistic routines (such as news-beats) result in media content that 
reinforces the status quo and limits media access to new ideas and 
organisations off the 'beaten' path. As a result, public relations efforts 
may be the only realistic strategy for a group to get media coverage'. 
New Unionism and New Communication 
In the last decade it has became apparent that unions, like many pressure groups, 
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have indeed begun taking their communications more seriously. Many unions went 
through extensive restructuring processes and began employing more specialists and 
consultants (See Bassett and Cave, 1993, Jim Conway Foundation, 1993, Taylor, 
1994, McIlroy, 1995) - including in the once ignored area of public relations. 
The end of the TUC Media Working Group appeared to coincide with a new attitude 
towards the media. As Manning (1998, introduction) noted, indications are that 
unions have developed their public relations work quite considerably since he 
completed his fieldwork in the early 1990s. The TUC, for example, was relaunched 
in 1994 as a 'campaigning and public affairs organisation'. In addition to investing 
E300,000 in computer and communications technology, the newly created 
'Campaigns and Communications Department' was expanded from 6 to 10 with an 
annual budget of E260,000 (PR Week, 9.8.96 and 23.8.96) - all carried out at a time 
of general organisational cuts. Professional PR has been present at all stages, with 
Burson-Marsteller, Delaney-Fletcher-Bazell, Two-Ten and CARMA all providing 
consultancy services to the new department. 
The external signs of improved union communications, more generally, are to be 
found in the recent increase in union advertising and the development of union 
journals. In 1970, the TGVVU was the only union listed in the annual advertising 
records of MEAL (Media Expenditure Analysis Ltd). During the 1980s, the TUC, the 
NGA, the NUR, NALGO and the BMA had all joined the TGV*1U as significant 
purchasers of advertising space (MEAL Digest). During the 1990s, the NUT, AEU 
and newly formed UNISON also became listed. Between 1990 and 1996, the largest 
union UNISON spent between E775,000 and f. 1,965,600 each year on advertising. 
Greater efforts have also been made to communicate with union memberships - as 
evidenced by the investment in union journals. A number of commentators have 
signalled the recent improvement in journal output as both content quality and 
circulation have risen (Marsh and Gillies, 1983, Rice, 1984, Labour Research 
Department, 1991,1993, Taylor, 1994). Between 1981 and 1993, the ratio of journal 
copies to members, amongst the largest unions, increased from I copy/2.3 members 
to I copy/1.47 members". Additionally, a far greater percentage of journals are now 
being sent direct to members' homes. 
"In 1981, the 16 largest unions had a combined membership of 8,512,555 and a journal circulation of 
3,683,952 issues (Marsh and Gillies, 1983). In 1993, the 20 largest unions had a combined 




Clearly, whatever their reservations about the media, the indications are that unions 
have begun investing in their communications. How widespread and how effective 
new union public relations is has yet to be gauged. In fact, as already noted, there has 
been virtually no concentrated study on the use of professional public relations by 
'outsider' and 'resource-poor' groups of any description. Almost all the studies of 
sources mentioned were produced prior to the very recent expansion of non-official 
professional PR and/or chose not to focus on the issue. Thus, research has thus far 
failed fully to explore the consequences for such groups of the recent arrival of the 
non-official PRP class, or relate this development to changing media-source 
relations. 
At present, although several recent studies have noted the opportunities that exist for 
non-official sources to make an impact on media texts, the inferences are that: a) that 
impact is likely to be correlated with an organisation's overall accumulation of 
economic, cultural and institutional resources; and, therefore, b) those impacts will 
still be of a limited or temporary nature. The reasons for this caution, in regard to 
unions, have been outlined in this chapter. First, even though unions are less 
'resource-poor' than many pressure groups, they are still considerably out-resourced 
by institutions and corporations. Second, they lack institutional legitimacy and, more 
importantly, there is a distinct lack of media interest in their activities. With smaller 
union numbers, greater distance from the centres of power, and an unofficial elite 
consensus that marginalises union concerns, far less natural coverage is being 
generated. Third, unions are still suffering from negative images built up over several 
decades. This in itself greatly handicaps union campaigning and offers ammunition 
to opponents. Thus, if unions cannot persuade journalists and gain media access, how 
can they hope to break into the 'elite discourse networks' that dominate financial and 
political decision-making? 
As yet there appears little to confirm or deny this overall outlook. The next two 
sections therefore attempt to gather new empirical evidence on the subject of trade 
union PR in the late 1990s. The research offers data on the rise of professional public 
relations within the union movement and attempts to evaluate how, and to what 
degree, it is helping unions overcome their communications disadvantages. As such 
it produces material relevant to wider debates about the prospects for 'outsider' and 
tresource-poor' groups in the new professional public relations environment. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: TRADE UNION PUBLIC RELATIONS - RESISTANCE 
WITHIN NEWS PRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the state of 'new' union communications in the late 1990s and 
considers whether it has significantly raised the quantity and quality of union media 
access. As such it acts as an empirical focus for the evaluation of professional PR use 
by 'outsider' and 'resource-poor' groups. It is divided into three parts. The first of 
these describes the recent transformation of union communications and its current 
shape. It documents the widespread adoption of public relations by trade unions and 
attempts to gauge its level of professionalism. The second part asks: can trade unions 
overcome their various disadvantages and compete with corporate and government 
communications operations? What are the means by which they can gain sufficient 
access to the news production process, set news agendas, and ultimately come to 
influence decision-making processes within 'elite discourse networks'? The third 
part questions the effectiveness of new union communications. Is public relations a 
real alternative to traditional union methods or are precious resources more usefully 
employed in other ways? Has better PR really aided union-media relations and 
improved public opinion of unions or have such trends been more the result of wider 
political and social changes? 
The study was carried out using two methods. The first was a survey, with a 73% 
usable return, of all TUC affiliated unions. The second was a set of 29 interviews: 16 
with union PRPs and consultants, six with general secretaries, and seven with 
industrial relations journalists. Details of the methods, survey questionnaire and 
tables are to be found in appendices one to three. Throughout this chapter, tables 
referred to in the text can be found in appendix two. During the research a number of 
specific campaigns were brought to light through a mixture of interviews and 
previously documented cases. Several of the findings recorded here are related to 
data gathered on those cases - some successful, others not so. 
'These include: the ambulance drivers dispute (1989), the POA and Group 4/prison privatisation 
(1993), the GMB and various 'fat cats' campaigns (1993-1999), the UCW and its thwarting of Post 
Office privatisation (see chapter eight), ASLEF and the NUR's 'Save Our Railways' campaign against 
rail privatisation (1992-1999) and campaigns against London Transport (1995/96), the TUC's re- 
launch (1994), attempts by teachers' unions to stop education cuts (1994/95), BALPA and the 
TGWU's campaign against British Airways (1996 and 1997), BIFU's blocking of the Lloyd's take- 
over of Midland Bank (1992), and several smaller local campaigns led by UNISON, the GMB and 
NAPO, amongst others. 
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PART ONE: THE STATE OF UNION COMMUNICATIONS IN 
THE LATE 1990s 
As this part demonstrates current union communications bears little resemblance to 
that observed in the 1970s and 1980s (in GUMG, 1976,1980, Jones, 1986,1987, 
Verzuh, 1990, Seaton, 1991, Manning, 1998). On all scales, from attitudes and 
approaches to resources and professionalism, union PR has been transformed in the 
last decade. Regardless of their uneasy relationship with the media, unions have 
made improved PR a priority of 'new unionism'. This has involved employing more 
people for PR work and increasing communications expenditure at a time of frequent 
staff and budget cuts. It has also involved the employment of former journalists and 
PRPs, media training programmes, and contracting work out to established PR 
consultants. 
Media Contact 
Currently, the degree of union-media contact is high and union enthusiasm for public 
relations methods appears strong. Looking at figure 7.1 (table I in appendices), over 
two thirds (67.9%) of unions are in contact with the media on at least a weekly basis. 
Large unions (100%), professional/managerial unions (77.8%), and public sector 
unions (75%) all have more contact than small, private sector (53.8%) and manual 
unions (63.2%). Even small unions are likely to have contact a few times a year and 
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Figure 7.1 (Chart of Table 1): Degree of Union Contact with the Media 
Resources, Expenditure and Investment 
Union restructuring has, in the majority of cases, involved the employment of more 
people to deal with communications (see figure 7.2). At the time of the survey only 
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9.3% of unions stated that they had 'no PR function' - all but one of those were small 
unions. 37% (75% of large unions) had their own PR departments and 24.2% 
employed an agency or individual (full or part-time) to carry out the union's public 
relations work. Only 29.6% (57.2% of small unions) left it to the general secretary 
and/or an assistant to deal with PR - the norm a decade earlier. Looking at figure 7.2 
(table 3 in appendices), the norm (66.7%) is now to employ at least one person part- 
time to deal with communications. Just over a fifth (20.4%) employ more than two 
full-time people in their communications departments. If general secretaries are 
given a value of . 25 and part-timers . 5, then the total number of communications staff 











Figure 7.2 (Chart of Table 3): Numbers of People Involved 
Investment in public relations operations has also been significant in the last decade. 
Few unions were able to supply exact information on communications budgets - thus 
making any summary of expenditure unrepresentative. Of those given, annual 
budgets ranged from E 16,000, for a union with less than 3,000 members, to E3.4 
million for one of the largest unions. More information was, however, forthcoming 
about changing trends in expenditure. Union investment in public relations began 
taking place in the 1980s and became more widespread in the 1990s. 47.8% of 
unions increased their PR expenditure in the 1980s (table 4 in the appendices), while 
the rest remained static or decreased spending moderately. This rose substantially in 
the 1990s (see figure 7.3 - table 5 in appendices). Over this period 76.6% of unions 
increased their communications resources - half of those 'greatly'. It appears that 
major investments were more likely to be made by large unions in the 1980s. More 
recently it has been medium (80%) and small (88%) unions that have increased their 
communications budgets. Public sector unions (93.3%) have also increased their 
budgets more than private sector ones (69.6%). Single sector unions (90%), i. e. those 
with a clearly identifiable membership such as teachers or postal workers, have 
143 
No PR Gen Sec Pt-Timer 1-2 2.5-7 8+ 
People People People 
invested more than those with more mixed memberships (52.9%). Future investment 
(see table 6) is less widespread but still positive, with 67.4% expecting increases in 
communications resources over the next five years (80% of public sector unions, 
81% of professional/managerial and non-manual unions), and only 2.2% expecting a 
moderate decrease. Once again it was the medium and smaller unions which were 
most keen on making ftiture investments. 









Figure 7.3 (Chart of Table 5): "in the 1990s, PR/Communication Resources 
Have... " 
Professionalism 
Communications is one of many areas where the traditional practice of filling posts 
with career unionists has been altered in favour of employing professionals and 
specialists. Departments have more employees with media and/or public relations 
experience, and are more likely to offer specialist training for those without 
experience. As figure 7.4 (table 7 in appendices) shows, 63.4% of unions employ 
people with previous relevant experience. Size was an obvious factor separating 
unions here with 83.3% of large unions, but only 35.7% of small ones, employing 
people with experience. Significantly, although public sector unions tended to be 
amongst those unions most enthusiastic about PR, they had the least experienced 
staff. 66.7% of them had staff with no PR or journalistic experience, while only a 
third of private sector unions lacked experienced personnel. Additionally, 55% of 












Figure 7.4 (Chart of Table 7): Background Experience of Staff Dealing with 
Communications/PR 
Prior to the survey, the research had already identified a number of examples of 
unions using PR consultancies traditionally more associated with the corporate 
sector. These included: work by GJW Public Relations for the ambulance drivers 
during their dispute in 1989; the NUT's use of Ian Greer Associates (PR Week, 
24.5.96); Lowe Bell's work for the RMT, NUT (PR Week, 28.4.95) and UCW (IPR, 
1995a); and Burson-Marsteller's contract with the TUC (PR Week, 23.8.96). 
The use of professional consultancy services was also very much in evidence in the 
survey. A quarter (25.9%) of unions used PR consultancies. More than half (57.4%) 
employed other types of agency/consultancy for communications work. The most 
commonly used suppliers of services were: press cutting agencies (used by 31.5% of 
unions), advertising agencies (27.8%), and lobbying firms (27.8%). Other agency 
services included media training, media distribution, media evaluation, design and 
publishing, and polling/market research. Several agency names came up frequently, 
thus suggesting a growth of union-PR links and the development of a consultancy 
sector specialising in union communications. Commonly named agencies were: 
Union Communications (PR/lobbying), Westminster Communications 
(PR/lobbying), Rowlands/Lowe-Bell (Lobbying), GPC Connect (lobbying), Romeike 
and Curtice (press cuttings), MORI (market research), Landmark Publishing, 
Delaney Fletcher Bazell (advertising), and TM&D (advertising). 
Attitudes 
A positive union attitude towards the use of public relations had been experienced by 
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most interviewees and was reflected in the survey results. As John Monks, head of 
communications at UNISON (16.10.97), explained: 
'The union has carried on a commitment to put its money where its 
mouth is. It recognises that members want to be kept informed, and the 
importance of its external influence for the public image of the union. 
There have been cuts but any cuts experienced have been felt across the 
board. But the union recognises that without this sort of work, the union 
wouldn't grow, thrive or influence anybody. ' 
Whether used as an accomparument to, or replacement for, other forms of union 
action, PR is now widely regarded as an effective campaigning method. 66.7% 
fiagreed' or 'strongly agreed' (table eight in appendices) that 'Good 
communications/PR is now essential for winning strikes/pursuing industrial action; 
18.8% 'disagreed'. As figure 7.5 (table 9 in appendices) shows, 75% 'agreed' or 
6strongly agreed' that 'PR/Communications is becoming the key union method for 
achieving political and industrial goals' (including 86.6% of public sector unions and 
87% of professional/managerial and non-manual unions). Only 16.7% disagreed. 
These results thus concurred with Mitchell's earlier survey (1997, p158) in which 
most union respondents regarded public relations as the 'most effective' type of 








Figure 7.5 (Chart of Table 9): "PR/Communications is Becoming the Key 
Union Method for Achieving Political and Industrial Goals" 
Despite a positive change, however, about a third of those interviewed complained of 
continuing negative attitudes towards the media, conservative memberships, and 
entrenched union bureaucracies. As one head of communications explained 
(interview, 1997): 




When it comes to the final decisions on implementation the old trade 
unionism comes back. It's lots of little fiefdoms and castles built on 
every level and all interfering with the professional side of 
communication. It can be like tiptoeing through a minefield. ' 
Such difficulties often resulted in PR that was 'more reactive than active', 'low 
profile on purpose', and 'more on an ad hoc basis'. Some, especially those from 
professional PR backgrounds, described 'the majority of current union operations' as 
being 'full of amateurs', and 'positively Luddite'. Such things had impeded the 
development and efficiency of PR operations and suggested more of an uneasy truce 
between the media and unions - rather than a working relationship. 
Summary 
Generally, cautious union attitudes have been superseded by the view that investing 
in communications is 'vital' to improve relations with memberships, the media, and 
the public. The state of union communications has much improved since Manning's 
(1998) survey, a decade earlier, and certainly no longer resembles that recorded by 
the Glasgow Group a decade before that. As PR Week (9.8.96, p9) was thus led to 
conclude: 
'... there's been much talk of unions moving away from perceived 
"strong-arm tactics" to a new era of corporate campaigning. For years 
American unions have been employing high-profile media campaigns to 
achieve their aims and more recently their UK counterparts have 
recognised that there's more than one way to skin a (corporate fat) cat... ' 
However, as a result of diminishing resources and, in some cases, continuing 
tensions between PRPs and older bureaucracies, the adoption of 'new union' 
communications has not been consistent across the union movement. Actual 
professional public relations experience was contained in less than a third of unions 
overall. Amongst small unions, public sector unions and manual unions, the numbers 
of experienced staff were extremely low. The cumulative result is that most unions 
have indeed modernised their communications but that that progress has not been as 
wholehearted and professional as in many rival sectors - for example, amongst large 
corporations, political parties, environmental pressure groups and state institutions. 
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PART TWO: OVERCOMING COMMUNICATIONS DISADVANTAGES 
Can union PRPs overcome their own specific source disadvantages, as well as the 
more general ones encountered by 'outsider' and 'resource-poor' groups? The 
evidence accumulated in interviews with practitioners confirms that all the problems 
discussed in chapter six still exist. Unions, when compared to their corporate and 
government opponents, continue to be disadvantaged in certain communications 
respects. However, interviewees also indicated that unions are learning to overcome 
their disadvantages. This is because they have: a) particular resource advantages of 
their own which they may exploit, and b) they have discovered ways of overcoming 
their resource deficits by developing alternative PR strategies. In an increasing 
number of cases such advantages and strategies have in fact proved decisive during 
media conflicts in the 1990s. 
Union PR Disadvantages Highfighted Once Again 
As expected, the most commonly cited 'disadvantage' of union communications was 
resources. Government and corporate resources far outnumber those of most unions. 
As Lawrie Harries of the RMT explained (7.10.97) 'We will always be at a 
disadvantage in terms of resources. They will always outspend us. " These resources 
are telling in several ways. As interviewees explained, opponents with greater 
financial resources could afford to pay for advocacy advertising, expensive 
communications equipment, glossy publications with wide distributions, and make 
direct contact with all involved. Most importantly, greater finances enabled the hiring 
of expensive PR consultancies and the employment of several communications staff 
For example, ASLEF and the RMT, with three communications officers between 
them, had to compete with 47 communications staff at British Rail before its 
privatisation. The POA, NAPO and other 'law and order' unions, each with minimal 
communications support, regularly had to take on the Home Office with 43 staff. The 
NUT, with one and a half communications officers, were competing with 37 in the 
Department of Education (figs. from unions and COI Directories). More staff 
brought extensive contacts, more bodies to answer phones and respond to enquiries, 
24-hour operations for media monitoring and contact, and extensive research and 
2 See also: Craig Ryan (30.7.97), 'Another disadvantage is resources. We are a small union covering a 
wide stretch of London and elsewhere. We have to justify every penny we spend on PR'; Noel Howell 
(2.9.97), 'Resources. We don't have the same resources. We use the technology to make up for the 
fact that there are so few of us. But we can't afford to book newspaper adverts putting our case'; 
Andrew Murray (9.10.97), 'Companies have more resources. Companies are much larger. If we were 
in for a long-haul dispute it would be a determining factor. ' 
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support facilities. 
The other major communications problem, recorded in interviews, was 'media bias' - 
most especially in the tabloid press. Most unions, even if they had invested heavily in 
communications, regarded the media with suspicion. As Olive Forsythe, of the NUT, 
explained (19.5.97): 
'We're always at a massive disadvantage because we are largely dealing 
with a right-wing press which sees unions as only being concerned with 
their own interests ... An individual journalist might see, 
but it is an 
ingrained prejudice that is real. ' 
While many stated a respect for, and fair coverage from, industrial relations 
reporters, the numbers of such specialist journalists had rapidly declined during the 
1980s (see also Manning, 1999). Other journalists, especially those from the tabloids, 
tended to have little knowledge of industrial relations and were frequently just 
looking for negative stories. Union PRPs often spoke of 'despicable hacks', who 
tried to catch out general secretaries, looked for picket-line shots of unruly strikers, 
and attacked unions regularly for their politics and Labour party connections'. These 
attacks had consistently undermined traditional union campaign methods and had 
forced unions on to the defensive. 
Some of the journalists interviewed agreed that unions still had to battle to overcome 
the prejudices of media organisations. As Seamus Milne of the Guardian commented 
(13.5.99): 
'At one level unions can't [compete] because the media themselves are 
businesses. Some of the top companies fighting the employment relations 
bill were media organisations. During the late 80s and early 90s the 
media had greater levels of union derecognition than almost any other 
business sector ... When unions were more powerful - and still often now 
- it was the job of some journalists, like those on the Mail or the Sun, 
simply to go and bash the unions. If there were no strikes they looked 
elsewhere. There is a whole tradition of union bashing stories. ' 
'Other examples include: Chris Darke (3.10.97), 'Bias in the media clearly. The media are biased 
against unions and collective organisations. Things have got better, partly because unions have 
changed their attitudes and methods'; Lawrie Harries (7.10.97), 'You've got to distinguish between 
the industrial relations group of journalists who deal with front-line issues, who understand the 
industrial world and the broad fi-amework in which unions operate; and the shifty side of Fleet Street 
who come out of the woodwork and attempt to ran rubbish stories about you ... '; Chris Proctor (2.6.97), 'Part of it is the media input - because they're looking for stereotypes. For example, during 
disputes the media wanted to interview Alan Johnson on a picket line. I was adamant that it wasn't 
going to happen. ' 
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However, a more general obstacle to union communications, from the point of view 
of journalists, was the fact that unions were no longer considered to be powerful 
organisations and were, therefore, less newsworthy. As Robert Taylor of the FT 
explained (20.5.99): 
'20 years ago journalists were clamouring to talk to union leaders. Now 
union leaders are clamouring to talk to journalists ... Part of the reason 
is 
that the unions are no longer the national force they used to be. Therefore 
it's not a national rail strike but a strike on Connex. South East - not 
something that's going to attract masses of media attention. " 
In effect, the interviews with journalists tended to confirm the difficulties 
encountered in earlier studies of 'outsider' media-source relations; i. e., that such 
groups were excluded because of a lack of media capital. 
Several other more specific problems, relating to media strategy and certain types of 
unions, were also mentioned. For larger unions, which had expanded through 
mergers, the problem was having mixed memberships. Members had different 
political allegiances and came from a variety of professions, class backgrounds and 
geographical regions. This made it difficult to appeal to all membership sections and, 
at the same time, present the union coherently to the press and public. As Miles 
Weber of MSF asked (13.10.97): 'How can we campaign as a union if we cannot 
find a unifying theme? ... Are we trying to 
become another TUC or a unified, 
branded, value-based operation? " For smaller and less public unions, the problem 
tended to be a disinterested media, which brought back the problem of access 
generally. Another common problem mentioned by PRPs was the difficulty of 
turning complex disputes into 'sound bite' issues. This led either to over-simplified 
reporting or no coverage at all from journalists - both of which were counter- 
productive to campaigns'. 
4 See also: Barrie Clement (25.5.99), 'Now, because proprietors are not bothered about unions and they 
have less power, they are therefore less interested in covering them at all ... It's still an uphill battle 
for 
credibility for unions - although they are doing very much better than a few years ago'; Seamus Milne 
(13.5.99), 'There's much less reporting now. Industrial relations is hardly covered. It tends to be more 
covered as a consumer story. It's no longer political but a matter of how it affects the consumer. Most 
of the media report work as a consumer or lifestyle issue but not in other contexts. It's all got to do 
with the politics of the time; all to do with the ideology and power of the period. ' 
5See also: Karen Livingstone (21.5.97), 'The disadvantage is that we are a general union which is hard 
to identify and with a lack of clear membership focus'; Craig Ryan (30.7.97), 'The biggest 
disadvantage is the very sensitive position our members occupy - the downside of the professional 
position. If we attack the government we can't look like we are supposedly the opposition and visa 
versa. ' 
6 For example: Rosie Eagleson (1.8.97), 'Often the issues are not really soundbite issues. It becomes 
hard to have a rational debate outside political posturing. It is a very complex issue. It's easy for 
politicians to wind up people's fears about crimes. But it's more complicated than that'; Chris Proctor 
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Union Advantages and the Overcoming of Economic Resource Deficits 
Many union officials, while recognising their disadvantages, were also keen to 
emphasise their advantages and that there were other means for achieving 
communication goals. Several insisted that good communications did not just rely on 
economic resources, connections and profiles, but also involved using alternative 
resources, playing to strengths, and developing media strategies accordingly. As 
Chris Darke of BALPA explained (3.10.97): 'To those against such [public relations] 
means, and those who argue the problem of resources you have to ask yourself "with 
the material you have, the members and the resources, how can you influence and 
move things on?. "' In fact, a number of union PRPs had come to recognise their 
advantages and had tried to adapt their practices accordingly. Three particular 
assets/advantages were repeated with some consistency: memberships, organisational 
speed and expert knowledge. Each went some way towards neutralising the shortfall 
in financial and professional human resources. 
The first point to become established during the study was that unions were able to 
organise professional PR operations with very little initial outlay or ongoing 
expenditure. Unlike advertising, news coverage is free and, although the ruses used 
by PRPs to get media coverage may, at times, be expensive, the actual coverage is 
not. The main requirements for PR operations are work space, basic communications 
equipment and people. Basic public relations IT requirements include telephones and 
fax machines, postal services and access to printing facilities. It was evident that 
even the smallest unions visited had access to these. While many larger unions had 
purchased more expensive communications equipment', several PRPs believed they 
could function well enough without buying anything particularly sophisticated. In 
fact, several interviewees from smaller unions, with memberships of between 5,000 
and 30,000, appeared to have developed quite consistent media access and influence 
by just using existing union resources. These included NAPO, ASLEF, the POA, the 
FDA and BALPA. At both NAPO and ASLEF, experienced communicators had 
gained extensive national media coverage, amounting to several hundred 'hits' a 
year, with nothing more than a telephone and fax machine. 
(2.6.97), 'The dispute mostly concerned team-working. But when I met with the industrial 
correspondents, they all said the story was all too complicated. The tabloid writers all suggested that 
we concentrate on the five-day week issue because that was what Mirror readers would understand. 
This emphasis was a PR decision. ' 
7 These included: 1) new computers and Internet facilities, 2) databases with information on media 
outlets, contacts and journalists - often used with advanced fax facilities, 3) in-house radio link-ups, 4) 
media training facilities, 5) advanced desk-top-publishing software and in-house printing facilities. 
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The most expensive part of any PR operation is in fact the employment of personnel'. 
However, PR is not a licensed profession; meaning that public relations can be 
practised without gaining specific qualifications, undergoing any long-term training 
or joining a professional association'. This suggests that unions (as well as other 
outsider and resource-poor groups) can make use of their sometimes extensive 
membership resources. In theory, one or two professionals can be employed to co- 
ordinate large networks of partially trained volunteers and thus union can go some 
way to making up for lower PR staffing levels. 
As most PRP interviewees explained, unions have indeed made great efforts in the 
last decade to improve communications and relations with their members; through 
better journals, ballots and consultation exercises". 42.9% of unions, who had 
4communications priorities' (see table ten in appendices), made internal and 
membership communications their first priority, with 61.1% making it one of their 
top three priorities (table eleven). A number of unions had surveyed their members to 
gauge their concerns and had adapted journals and policies accordingly. Many had 
gone to great efforts to put out a range of new newsletters, magazines and reports. 
These were shaped and altered to fit the varying concerns of different membership 
contingents and branch activists. A number of commentators have accordingly 
signalled a recent improvement in journal output (see part three of chapter six). The 
results have also been reflected in MORI polls of union members (MORI, Sept 1975- 
1995). 
The significance of members to union PR operations also became evident. Members 
were useful in two ways. First, they were regarded as an important source of 
information for campaigns. Even smaller unions often had branch networks covering 
8 In a breakdown of the PR consultancy industry (William Shackleman Ltd, 1995), human resources 
accounted for 54% of total expenditure on PR. Most other significant costs are taken up by company 
services, space rental and financial incentives; all of which remain rather less relevant to non-profit 
organisations. 
91n fact, in the 1994 IPR membership survey (IPR, 1994) only 13% were found to have a CAM 
certificate or other relevant qualification. In the 1998 IPR survey (IPR, 1998), less than 5% had a 
degree in public relations or journalism. 
10For example: John Monks (16.10.97), '... you obviously have to carry the support of individual 
members of the union ... We are serious about keeping our members informed of what UNISON 
argues and why, and to understand why they are affected'; Karen Livingstone (21.5.97), 'We raised 
the role of publications for members and put a stronger emphasis on women members. The unofficial 
media strategy of much of our work is aimed at recruitment'; Chris Proctor (2.6.97), 'Last year we 
made the decision that the Voice was going to be more membership orientated. We decided to make 
the thing more user-friendly, to put in more local member stories and less committee reports. ' 
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broad geographical areas and containing members with specialist knowledge. Some 
unions even made requests in union journals and newsletters for possible stories on 
particular issues. Such information sources were instrumental in the POA's attempts 
to undermine Group 4 (1993) by feeding the press with escaped prisoner accounts. 
NAPO, MSF, ASLEF, the GMB, and UNISON all stated that they encouraged such 
information flows and used them to produce news stories on a regular basis. The 
second and more obvious use of members was during campaigns themselves. Media 
training for local members and branch activists had slowly become more common. 
The survey revealed that, of those unions with branches (30.2% did not have local 
branches), 47.4% gave "media training" to branch members - 90% in the case of 
large unions. Those who were not trained could still participate in local 
demonstrations and publicity stunts, letter-writing campaigns, etc.; activities which 
institutions and businesses could not organise so simply. The survey also revealed 
that 70.3% of unions used branch members in media campaigns - 90% in the case of 
large unions. Even in small unions (under 10,000 members) 30% gave training and 
40% used branch members. 
As well as providing practical campaign assistance, members were also often used to 
present the union in a positive light. The public popularity of teachers, postal workers 
and nurses appeared to be something that PRPs played on to improve the media 
images of their unions. The combination of practical networks and popular profiles in 
fact had proved invaluable to the prosecution of a number of large campaigns, 
including: the ambulance drivers dispute with the government in 1989, the teachers 
against education cuts in 1994/95 and, above all, the UCW in its battle against Post 
Office privatisation in 1994". For Seamus Milne, of the Guardian (13.5.99), all these 
factors made members an extremely useful resource for unions: 
'So unions are now rather more powerful than people think. Before, 
when they were much stronger, people thought they had more power than 
they did. Now it's the other way round and people underestimate them. 
They have extensive networks and people everywhere, and with their 
people and their resources they can be very effective campaigners. ' 
Unions can also make up for their resource disadvantages in other ways. For 
"See also: Lawrie Harries (7.10.97), 'Strong support from the members enabled us to keep going 
from June to October without any significant drop in support'; Karen Livingstone (21.5.97), 'We also 
make use of our breadth of membership. We use the information that comes to us from members and 
make use of national and regional officials'; Daniel Harris (18.6.97), 'The local members, once 
trained, were marvellous advocates. The local MP is very sensitive to the local press and therefore 
very responsive to the local campaign. ' 
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example, more than half the interviewees believed that, due to bureaucratic factors, 
they could operate their communications with much greater efficiency than their 
larger opponents. As several explained, union PR departments are far more oriented 
towards campaigning than government departments and businesses, which are set up 
for steady, long-term communications operations. Although unions have fewer 
communications resources, they are more campaign-focused and normally have 
instant access to the general secretary. This means that they can respond to 
journalists with few delays. In contrast, govemment and business departments have 
small armies of staff, several layers of bureaucracy, extensive systems of checks and 
balances, and are often badly briefed on up-to-the-minute issues. Thus unions, if well 
organised, can respond faster, outmanoeuvre opponents and set agendas. As Karen 
Livingstone of the GMB explained (21.5.97): 
'The main advantage is that we are quicker and faster than government 
and business because, ultimately, the general secretary gives us the 
authority to act. We are less bureaucratic and we have greater autonomy. 
We are closer to the top than in govenunent or business"'. 
The speed of union PRPs was noted as a significant factor in several successful union 
campaigns, including: BIFU's battle against Lloyds' take-over of Midlands (1992), 
ASLEF's disputes with London Transport over working conditions (1995), and the 
TGWU against British Airways over working conditions (1997). 
Union PRPs also believed that they usually had greater expertise than opponents and 
could exploit it accordingly. Union members are often closer to the industry than 
management and, especially in the case of professional/managerial memberships, 
have more specialist knowledge of the work sector. When companies bring in 
consultancies, they may have communications expertise but they are often lacking 
detailed knowledge of the business, relevant legislation, the dispute, etc. Once again, 
this improves the speed and consistency of union messages in relation to their 
oppositions". 
12 Others include: Craig Ryan (30.7.97), 'Secondly, your government PR machine is very 
cumbersome. It's a big operation. They have to clear everything with ministers and so on. We are very 
nimble. We can get a press release out in an hour and don't necessarily have to check with the general 
secretary. In government you deal with the minister, junior ministers, senior civil servants, and the 
party also'; Andrew Murray (9.10.97), 'We are much less hierarchical and have more direct contact 
with the general secretary. Company people often have to go through five layers of bureaucracy to 
reach the top. Businesses are not often set up for disputes - they are not swift enough. They have huge 
communication departments but they are more used to dealing with the City of London, marketing 
issues, etc., but not disputes'; Keith Bill (19.6.97), 'We always run rings around them because we are 
freer to respond. We can give instant quotes - companies and departments just don't have the same 
freedoms. ' 
13 As a number explained: Chris Darke (3.10.97), 'We are a lot smarter at understanding how to 
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Interviews with journalists tended to confirm these two union advantages. As Barrie 
Clement of the Independent explained (25.5.99): 
'The advantages of a union are that they can be leaner and meaner, 
especially in a fast-moving situation like a strike. That's because the 
media person can speak to the general secretary immediately and then go 
back to the journalist. It's different in a big corporation with a big 
bureaucracy where they have to report to the head of communications 
and check with the heads of departments and then the secretary of the 
chief executive. If you compare the ability of the press person in a union, 
who knows what the general secretary is thinking and doing, with the 
press person of a large organisation, who has no idea of what the chief 
executive is doing and thinking, you can see the differences. "' 
Union Strategies - Overcoming Institutional Disadvantages (Media/Cultural 
Capital) and a Hostile Media 
Union PRPs are also managing to overcome poor media relations and profiles by 
developing sophisticated media strategies which exploit particular union strengths. 
Not only have they established their own networks of media contacts, they have 
discovered ways of presenting their unions more favourably - both during short-term 
disputes and in long-term image-building exercises. As such, they have shown that 
there are several ways of making up for a lack of institutional authority (or 
media/cultural capital) that do not require large financial outlays. 
Many of the unions, small as well as large, successfully operated an active policy of 
acquiring and maintaining media contacts and demonstrated that they could also 
influence the media in our particular area. We know a lot because we are a niche organisation'; Joe 
Marino (14.10.97), 'Also, food hygiene is a good news story that will hit the headlines. It is a 
specialist area and we have strengths in the industry - although disadvantaged outside'; Hannah 
Jeffiries (31.7.97), 'We have better inside knowledge, especially if the company is using outside PR. ' 
14 Seamus Milne (13.5.99), 'They [unions] are that much quicker to respond. They have no 
bureaucracy and no hassle. They just have to get through to the general secretary. But businesses have 
to go through layers of bureaucracy to get approval - secretaries, department heads, the head of 
communications, all the way up to the chief executive. That's how the T&G ran circles round British 
Airways - one man and a mobile phone. Things move fast in a dispute and you have to be quick'; 
Christine Buckley (1.6.99), '1 think government and business can be quite impeded in their 
communications ... the government press officers who work for the various departments are not 
particularly good. Many of them have a reluctance to talk about issues and won't comment. They are 
generally not very communicative ... They take 
forever to go down and answer the most basic 
questions. ' 
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become established sources for journalists. As several explained, a steady supply of 
newsworthy stories to a range of correspondents, ensured that those journalists: a) 
took up a greater proportion of information supply from union sources; b) came to 
established union sources in search of stories, and; c) automatically returned to those 
sources for quotes and information to balance out that obtained from government and 
business. As one experienced communicator in a small union explained (interview, 
1997): 
,I offer a high number of stories, and can deliver something every week 
or at least every third week. That also means they come back to me for 
comment. The quid pro quo is that they will come back to me for a story 
that isn't mine. Journalists are more likely to use my stuff because of past 
rewards and favours. ' 
Interviewees at the POA, NAPO, UNISON, the CVV`U, the NUT, and ASLEF all 
outlined similar long-term operations, each designed to cultivate journalist contacts 
at all levels". 
Many unions, large and small, have also avoided the difficulties of getting national 
media coverage by focusing on local and community media. Local media are less 
politically hostile to unions, more in need of information subsidies, and interested in 
covering local issues". Unions, with their local branch networks, strengths in 
particular industry sectors, and community roles, have been well placed to take 
advantage. Some, such as the BFAWU and AMO, only concentrated on local 
industries and institutions. The TUC and CWU, although they had national networks 
and appeal, often campaigned on the local level - supplying the same arguments but 
with regional-specific information, across the country. Others, such as MSF, the 
GMB and UNISON, offered central expertise to local branches with different 
campaign interests. Sometimes the larger unions managed to achieve blanket 
"For example: John Monks (16.10.97), 'Our press officers are forever in contact with their sources, so 
we have become a source of expertise for newspapers. So when you've got a story to relate the 
contacts are established and we have a fighting chance of getting a say in the press'; John Richards 
(20.5.97), 'A sea-change happened during the miners strike of 1984/85 - the necessity of maintaining 
good contacts. The secret is not to worry them unnecessarily - wait for a good story and present it well 
and at the right time'; Daniel Harris (18.6.97), ' ... When the story 
finally broke those contacts came 
flooding back to me. I built up a long-term rapport with the media ... For three years I was putting out 
ress releases and talking to people. ' 
6 Rosie Eagleson (1.8.97), 'They [local media] are always desperate for stories, and local radio in 
particular'; Andrew Murray (9.10.97), 'Local radio are always looking for stuff. You can be very 
effective by hitting a number of small stations. You can line up several, with different local radio 
stations, all through Broadcasting House'; Joe Marino (14.10.97), 'You've got more chance when 
you're using the local media - if it's of local public interest. The local media are very interested in 
arguments about the effects on the local economy. ' 
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coverage in the local press, radio and television, which then led to the national media 
picking up the story. 
As well as improving access through the regular supply of information subsidies, 
PRPs have worked hard to develop media-friendly union images. As Andrew Murray 
of the TGVVU (9.10.97) explained: 
'Over a period one can reposition the union's image in the media. This is 
done gradually over time. We promote the union's services more 
publicly, co-operation with employers and the non-conflict side of the 
union. We are moving away from the image of a dinosaur to something 
more modem. We are not completely transformed but one has to be 
realistic - generally the negative image of unions has been dissipated. 
That's not just down to the T&G. A number of unions, including the 
TUC, have put a lot of effort into improving the image. ' 
In the survey, work on the 'union image' was a campaigning priority for a quarter 
(25.9%) of unions (table 12 in appendices). It was thus one of the two most 
commonly mentioned communications campaign priorities (along with campaigns to 
influence politics/legislation). 
The strategies involved in improving union images and media access varied 
according to the type of union involved. The most commonly applied technique, as 
revealed in interviews, was what might be referred to as the 'public service 
approach'. Instead of campaigning on wages and personal employment issues, union 
PRP strategies were designed to appeal to the public and escape the common 
accusation that 'they put their own interests above those of society at large' (Seaton 
1991, p256). Unions increasingly focused on issues such as safety, healthcare, 
educational standards, prejudice and social inequality. For example, the ambulance 
drivers dispute in 1989 ensured that its campaign put the public first and, 
consequently, drivers gained considerable popular support. As Keff and Sachdev 
observed (1992, p140, see also Philo, 1995, Manning, 1998): 'By conceiving an 
industrial and public relations strategy that built on public support and media 
attention, the ambulance unions were able to avoid the pitfalls of 1979... ' This 
strategy has also been successfully repeated by the UCW, the NUT, the NUR, 
NALGO, and the RMV. In each case the unions worked hard to demonstrate a 
17 Rosie Eagleson (1.8.97), 'The principles of fairness and equality underlie cuts and job losses. It's 
always about the public and the impact on the public - the public service angle'; Lawrie Harries 
(7.10.97), 'We won the argument over the signal workers dispute in 1994. We held the moral high 
ground from day one. We continued to argue an easily understood case'; Olive Forsythe (19.5.97), 
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united front with service users, feed the media and set the agenda for the dispute. As 
interviewees acknowledged, public sector service unions clearly benefited more from 
this approach than private sector and industrial unions. 
For unions such as the FDA and BALPA, strategies have combined the public 
service angle with a carefully cultivated image of 'professionals' doing a job with 
great skill and expertise. Their spokespersons have therefore found themselves in the 
role of 'official' and/or 'expert' source. As Craig Ryan of the FDA (30.7.97) 
explained: 
'Our strategy, basically, is to use media and PR to promote our standing 
and profile. The media are not interested in how badly paid we are ... 
Professional concerns to our members - that's what gets us coverage. It 
also impresses management because they take us seriously. We are 
speaking with authority - more than an organisation of 10,000 members 
should normally have. "' 
Two other strategies avoided the union image problem altogether and, in fact, 
question the importance of acquiring more than minimum levels of institutional 
legitimacy and/or media capital. The first of these involved attacking oppositions and 
guiding journalists to negative stories. Rather than campaigning on wages and 
conditions, some unions have gained more by attacking executives and politicians for 
their salaries, intransigence, and for financial, legal or sexual irregularities. Such 
attacks diverted the media spotlight away from unions and made their oppositions 
appear unreasonable and untrustworthy. According to Kerr and Sachdev (1992) and 
Philo (1995) this worked extremely well in the ambulance drivers dispute in 1989. 
This strategy was also successfully employed by: the POA against Group 4 in 1993, 
by the NUT against education cuts in 1994 and 1995 and, most dramatically, in the 
GMB inspired 'fat cats' campaigns". On each occasion it was a company or 
'The NUT emphasises educational improvement over and above wage rises ... We also have to have 
arents on our side and the public definitely. Without them we are lost. ' 
See also: Chris Darke (3.10.97), 'We have a single identity clearly associated with all issues of civil 
aviation. Pilots are still looked at with a bit of mystique. So to some extent we are able to say things 
with greater authority ... We have a very high input into the ways those jobs are done. But we are seen 
as professional, which, we use to influence decisions - not just to raise wages'; Miles Weber 
(13.10.97), 'We have a perceived political muscle because we represent many wealthy professional 
people, many of whom work at a high level of the production chain. So the government understands 
the implications of our real strength... ' 
19 Kerr and Sachdev (1992, p 14 1), 'Perhaps their most striking finding was the dramatic role reversals 
of normal media images: namely, the contrast between the popular, respected trade union leaders and 
the aggressive, intransigent minister'; Lawrie Harris (7.10.97), 'The message was "the railways were 
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government department that was made to look incompetent or intransigent. 
Negative information supply also appeared to play a part in several low-key, long- 
term PR campaigns. For some smaller unions, such as AMO or NAPO, such means 
were the only hope of promoting particular approaches to policy-making during the 
years of Conservative government". Issues, such as inequality in the legal system, 
the minimum wage, privatisation, health and safety conditions, cuts in health and 
education, multinational monopolies, and freedom of information, have all been 
integrated into long-term union campaigns over the last decade. All similarly found 
their way on to the legislative agenda of the new Labour government. As Barrie 
Clement of the Independent pointed out (25.5.99): 
'Press officers see it as their job to get union issues into the media, so 
that they are seen to be working behind the scenes despite the fact that 
nothing much newsworthy is happening and there are less strikes. So 
they campaign on fairness at work, sexual equality, the minimum wage, 
and so on. For example, they put a lot of pressure on about the 
introduction of the minimum wage and they have also had a hand in the 
Employment Relations Bill... ' 
The second means by which unions had bypassed the need for institutional 
legitimacy/media capital was by using third-party endorsement. As Keith Bill of 
Union Communications (19.6.97) advised: 'The way for unions to do anything is not 
to do it themselves. The trick from now on is to get other people to do it. ' For many 
unions, greater media access and more positive coverage had been achieved by 
putting their case through MPs, scientists, charities, pressure groups, poll 
organisations, and public figures - each of which had been able to speak out on the 
union's behalf The information was then presented by journalists as information 
the victims of the cuts in the same way that the passengers were ... ; Mary McGuire of NALGO (quoted 
in Verzuh, 1990, p30), "we concentrated on ... the fact that the services they [union members] 
provided to the public were being placed in jeopardy ... Employers were always made to look like the bad guys. " 
20For example: Harry Fletcher (13.10.97), 'Up to May 1997, the policy was to use the media to 
criticise government policies wherever possible ... The attitude was that the chances of getting change 
were remote and we therefore had to criticise the administration and work through the media as a 
means of getting change'; Craig Ryan (30.7.97), 'Where we run the more proactive campaigns it tends 
to be a very long-running theme. For example the 'freedom of information' campaign, which has been 
runmng for 15 years. We have a very long view of that kind of thing. We are looking for media 
opportunities to get our message across all the time'; John Monks (16.10.97), 'We have continued to 
campaign against privatisation in one or other of its various forms. Although campaigning is not on 
the streets we are campaigning as hard as ever for pay, versus cuts, and against PFIs (private finance 
initiatives). ' 
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produced by more objective sources instead of merely the opinions of self-interested 
unionists. For the teachers' unions, parents associations often become third parties; 
for the communications and rail unions it was charities and pressure groups working 
under general campaign banners; for unions such as MSF it was often scientists and 
Mps". 
Clearly, unions are adopting the professional PR methods of business and 
government - but with a difference. They are identifying and exploiting their own 
natural resource advantages and personalised PR strategies - all of which go some 
way to making up for their disadvantages. As they have made a greater impact on 
news producers and 'elite discourse networks', so the overall images of the union 
movement have improved, long-term campaign goals are being reached, and short- 
term victories achieved. That small and medium-sized unions are increasing 
investment in PR much faster than large unions (see back), indicates that PR is 
indeed one area where it is possible to overcome a lack of economic resources. As 
Chris Darke of BALPA (3.10.97) explained: 
'But strikes are not a necessary weapon of current-day deterrents. A lot 
more is going to be about how you influence the market and players in 
key positions and that is central ... It's influencing the power game of 
those that have the power - it means using professional help and the use 
of consultants - business consultants and management consultants. What 
we've got to do is look at and say the way in which certain companies 
behave is not right and we can look at these companies using 
management consultants who can say it that much better. In today's 
game you are looking to influence in all directions and there should be 
nothing that isn't open to us to influence and thus ultimately help our 
members. So you can use consultants, strategists, and you can actually 
take some action that collectively solves it ... ' 
PART THREE: EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
NEW UNION COMMUNICATIONS 
This section attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of union communications. It is 
clear that unions have made large investments in their communications operations. It 
2 'Third-party endorsement is also a strategy strongly advocated by Wilson (1984) and described by 
Cracknell (1993), Miller and Williams (1998), and others writing about pressure group activity. 
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is also clear that they have developed media contacts, reduced negative coverage and 
raised their approval ratings with members and the general public. But for many 
observers, such changes have resulted less from improved communications and more 
from such factors as reduced union militancy and a shifting political environment. To 
determine comprehensively which factors are more influential is, in fact, a near 
impossible task - as scholars and practitioners have found in numerous studies of 
communication. However, the findings of this thesis do suggest that improved union 
PR has played a significant part and that unions, whatever their misgivings, will 
continue to invest in public relations. 
Improved Relations, Access and Favourability 
The evidence accumulated from the survey and interview responses suggests that 
there have been considerable improvements in union-media relations - even for those 
unions with more militant reputations. Despite a continuing union belief in media 
bias, hostile relationships have now been replaced by uneasy truces and a 
commitment to keep talking to the media. As Laurie Harries of the NUR (7.10.97) 
commented: 
you can't call them [tabloid] journalists, quite frankly they're 
despicable ... But we are conscious of the need that the media understand 
what our case is. We are more media-conscious now than we have ever 
been - even on local disputes. The union is very much aware of the need 
to use it to the best advantage. "' 
As table 7.1 (table 13 in appendices) shows, survey respondents' impressions were 
that relations deteriorated from the 1970s to the 1980s but, in the 1990s, they 
appeared to be approaching a post-war high. In the 1970s, just over a quarter of 
respondents thought relations were 'bad' or 'very bad'. In the 1980s, 45.3% of 
respondents classified relations as 'bad' or 'very bad'. In the 1990s, a clear majority 
(56%) thought them 'good' or 'very good', with only 10% describing them as 'bad' 
or 'very bad'. Breaking down the figures in terms of size, small unions had the best 
22 For similar examples: Hannah Jeffries (31.7.97), 'It's still a bit cynical even if more open to 
persuasion ... There is an understanding between the media and trade unions. It's not based on trust but on an understanding of each other's motives. Previously we were scared because we didn't 
understand where they were coming from ... Things are different now'; John Richards (20.5.97), 'ASLEF always had a guarded attitude towards the media - the media are always out to get us ... Sometimes in the past, relations were non-existent and we refused to talk to the press if we could ... We get a better press [now] but it does depend on how we handle our media relations. We take a very 
professional view. ' 
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relations throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but large unions did so in the 1990s. In 
fact the most dramatic improvement came for large unions whose respondents 
believed that their good relations went up from 20%, in the 1980s, to 72.7% in the 
1990s. Public sector union respondents also believed they had better relations 
(81.3%) in the 1990s, while only 38.5% of private ones did. 
Union/Media 1970s 1980s 1990S 
Relations Per cent Per cent Per cent 
Good/Very Good 33.4 19.1 56.0 
Neutral 38.9 35.7 34.0 
Bad/Very Bad 27.8 45.3 10.0 
Table 7.1 (of Table 13): Individual Union Relations with 
the Media, 1970s-1990s 
M Stayed the 
Same 
17% 






Figure 7.6 (Chart of Table 14): "Compared to the 1980s, 
Has Union Access to the Media in the 1990s... " 
As figures 7.6 and 7.7 (tables 14 and 15 in appendices) indicate, good relations have 
been followed by better access and more favourable coverage. Despite the decline in 
industrial relations reporting and media interest, 65.3% of respondents thought 
access had improved since the 1980s, and 79.1 % thought media coverage was more 
favourable. This compared with only 17.3% who believed access had become worse 
and 2.1% who thought coverage was less favourable. Large and medium-sized 
unions had improved their access and favourability significantly more than smaller 
ones. In fact, 75% of the respondents of medium-sized unions believed their access 




important. Significantly, 90% of respondents in large unions reported an increase in 
favourable media reporting. Public sector union respondents (92.8%) thought they 
had more favourable coverage than respondents in private sector unions (75%), and 
pro fessional/managerial unionists believed they (68.8%) had done better than those 
in manual unions (52.9%). 




Figure 7.7 (Chart of Table 15): "Compared to the 1980s, 
Favourable Media Coverage of Unions in the 1990s Has... " 
All journalists interviewed also believed that union communications had improved 
and that union-media relations were far better in the 1990s. Indeed, some were very 
positive about the increased professionalism of union communicators. As Seamus 
Milne of the Guardian observed (13.5.99): 
'One, they are no longer so antagonistic to the media, and two, they have 
broader contact with different kinds of correspondent. So they go for 
transport or the environment or politics ... It's changed a lot since the 
NUM in 1984/85. Then it was a state of open warfare. All unions were 
covered in a very hostile way. There were lots of very political negative 
stories and this led to increased conflict between the two. Very few 
correspondents could get access. Now everyone, even the most negative 
tabloids, can get some sort of access. "' 
2'Robert Taylor (20.5.99), 'As the unions get less and less powerful they have tended to put more into 
their communications ... There's more professionalism in some of the unions - not all. 
You can see 
that just by looking at some of the journals they put out'; Barrie Clement (25.5.99), '10 or 15 years 
ago most unions were very suspicious of reporters because they regarded the press as a Conservative, 
with a big C, press. And to some extent that's true ... At some point they 
decided to use the press 
rather than avoid them and it worked. It certainly helped to get unions into the media in a more 
positive light ... People are on mobiles these 
days. It's far easier to get hold of union officials now. 
When I started it was almost impossible. There were no press officers, the union officials were 




Media coverage is not the only thing to show significant improvement. Memberships 
are more positive about their union leaderships and the general public is more 
positive about unions generally. In 1995 Gallup found that 67% of people thought 
that trade unions 'Generally speaking ... were a good thing', compared to 
51% in 
1979. Only 17% thought them 'too powerful', next to 84% in 1979. MORI polls also 
showed that some faith in union leaderships had been restored to union members. 
Between 1975 and 1984 MORI polls recorded that between 55% and 73% of trade 
union members thought "Trade unions have too much power in Britain today", and 
between 55% and 64% thought "Most trade unions are controlled by extremists and 
militants". By 1995 only 14% thought them 'too powerful' and only 23% thought 
them 'controlled by extremists and militants ý24 . 
Other Factors Involved 
There are of course many other factors which have contributed to the improvement 
of union profiles. To date, many union observers (Edwards and Bain, 1988, Marsh, 
1990, Seaton, 1991, Taylor, 1994, McIlroy, 1995) have suggested that union 
(un)popularity is more closely linked to union militancy and/or changes in the socio- 
political environment. A study by Edwards and Bain (1988) concluded that union 
popularity declines as inflation and/or levels of industrial action rise. Marsh (1990) 
and Manning (1999), amongst others, have suggested that the Thatcher government 
was a greater determining factor of media hostility towards unions in the 1980s -a 
conclusion not too dissimilar from the one supported by the Glasgow University 
Media Group. In effect, an elite consensus developed in the 1970s and 1980s - one 
that regarded unions as the greatest cause of British economic decline and social 
disruption. Such a consensus came to be reflected in the media. 
In the late 1990s, all the external conditions which made unions unpopular have now 
changed. Unions are smaller and no longer perceived as a threat to the establishment. 
The average number of stoppages and working days lost to strike action have 
declined significantly. It is also clear that the last Conservative government (1992- 
97) was deeply unpopular with both the media and public. Although Labour and the 
union movement have kept communications discreet, business and political opinion 
24 However problems do remain. According to Gallup, in 1995 only 32% of people thought union 
leaders 'representative of their members'. MORI also found that only 35% of members disagreed with 
the statement 'Trade union leaders are out of touch with their members'. 
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is generally less antagonistic towards unions, and they have once again been granted 
access to government policy-makers. Elite consensus currently agrees on two things: 
the economy is strong and, following Conservative legislation, unions can no longer 
be singled out as a hindrance to sound economic development. Thus, all the external 
conditions which made unions unpopular have now been transfonned and unions 
should, by default, have an increased level of popularity once again - regardless of 
their PR activities. 
Interviews and the survey asked respondents to reply on this matter. The results were 
rather inconclusive. Although almost all interviewees believed union 
communications had made a very real impact, a significant minority were inclined to 
give more support to the political climate argument. As Andrew Murray of the 
TGVV'U (9.10.97) explained: 
'It's all part of the political climate - also because unions are not seen as 
the threat they were in the 1970s. Instead there has been a change of 
attitude against macho or greedy management. How trade unions are seen 
does fit into a larger matrix. "' 
Survey respondents were also divided over whether improved PR or changing 
political and economic circumstances were more responsible for improved media 
coverage and increased public approval. In response to the statement 'Improved 
public opinion of unions is due more to unpopular government and a decrease in 
strike activity - NOT public relations', as many respondents 'agreed' as 'disagreed' 
(see figure 7.8 - table 16 in appendices). Doubts about the usefulness of public 
relations more generally also surfaced. Only 45.8% disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the statement 'PR/Communications tactics are limited and will never really 
replace other union strategies and campaigning forms' (see table 17 in appendices). 
35.4% agreed or strongly agreed and 18.8% did not know. There was some variation 
across types of union and further efforts were made to cross-tabulate financial 
investment data with the tables on media relations, access and favourability. 
Although greater investment did equate to better relations, etc., the increases were 
25 Seamus Milne (13.5.99), 'Generally you can't separate industrial reporting from the social and 
political context. The unions were more powerful in the 70s and 80s and that meant that they were 
over-covered ... Now they're under-covered. There are very few labour correspondents left. If you 
think that the unions still have seven million members they are some of the largest voluntary 
membership organisations. And by whatever measure they should have more coverage than they do. 
The fact that they don't has got to do with the political climate ... '; Barrie Clement (25.5.99), 'In the 
past I have worked with people whose only idea of a union story was a negative story. They were 
looking for disruptive strike action, for militants and Trotskyists taking over. But there's a lot less of 
that now and that's because there are less strikes and less militancy. ' 
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not significantly higher than the averages - being only a few percentage points better 
in most cases. 
0 Strongly 





0 Don't 0 Agree 
Know 37% 
17.4% 
Figure 7.8 (Chart of table 16): "Improved Public Opinion of Unions is Due 
More to Unpopular Government and a Decrease in Strike Activity - NOT Public 
Relations" 
Improved Communications a Substantial Part of Change 
However, other survey responses, combined with the replies of most interviewees, 
indicated that unionists believed improved communications had played a key part in 
better media relations and access. To begin with, trade union reporting has declined. 
Unions are smaller and less involved in 'newsworthy' industrial action, and media 
outlets have cut down on industrial reporting (see Manning, 1998,1999). Despite 
this, a clear majority of respondents (see figures 7.6 and 7.7) believe access and 
favourability have increased. Unions may not be the central focus of stories but they 
certainly get their arguments reported in the media. This is most likely to be 
explained by the increased proactivity of union PRPs. 
Second, a number of union victories have clearly been gained, or at least aided, by 
the use of PR. This growing list includes: The ambulance drivers in 1989 (see 
Verzuh, 1990, Kerr and Sachdev, 1992, Manning, 1998); the NUR in 1989 (Verzuh); 
the POA in 1993; the UCW in 1994 (see IPR, 1994, Cockerell, 1997, and next 
chapter); BALPA and the TGWU against British Airways in 1996 and 1997. Other 
union campaigns, although failing to achieve their objectives, were extremely 
damaging to the government and/or particular corporations. These have included: the 
TUC against pit closures in 1993, the NUT against education cuts in 1995, the 
railway unions against privatised railways, 1993 to present, and ongoing 'fat cats' 
166 
campaigns against corporate pay, 1992 to present. Each of these might also be said to 
have contributed to a shift in the political climate itself - thus aiding the election of 
New Labour in 1997 and forcing several welfare and industrial relations issues onto 
the political agenda. 
Proactive long-term communications also appear to have benefited general union- 
media relations to a degree that appears too large to put down to other circumstances. 
For example, it appears quite significant that larger unions, which invested more for 
longer periods (see back), have also had the largest improvement in media relations 
in the 1990s. In the 1980s only 20% had 'good' media relations; by the 1990s, 72.7% 
claim to have 'good' or 'very good' relations. Similarly 90% of large unions believe 
that media reporting has become more favourable to them. The same story can be 
applied to public sector, professional/managerial and non-manual unions, which also 
invested more and gained better coverage. For example, 93.3% of public sector 
unions increased communications expenditure in the 1990s; 81.3% believe they have 











Figure 7.9 (Chart of table 18): "Money Spent on Public Relations is 
Better Spent on Other Union Priorities" 
Third, the overall impression given by respondents to the use of PR is more than 
favourable. Figure 7.3 (tables four, five and six in appendices) showed that large 
majorities had invested, and expected to make finther investments in, their 
communications. Figure 7.5 (tables eight and nine) indicated that similar majorities 
believed that communications methods were essential for pursuing industrial action 
and other goals. Figure 7.9 (table 18) below demonstrates a continuation of this faith. 
70.2% 'disagreed' or 'strongly disagreed' with the statement that money was 'better 
spent on other union priorities' and only 8.5% 'agreed'. Whatever union leaderships 
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believe are the reasons for improved media relations, they obviously think 
improvements in PR are a necessity - if only because the opposition are investing 
heavily in communications. This suggests that PR has had, and will continue to have, 
a leading role in union activities. 
Last of all, the view of the majority of journalist interviewed was that union public 
relations had made a significant difference to union campaigns and had now become 
a vital campaigning tool. For Robert Taylor of the FT (20.5.99): 
'The success or failure of an industrial dispute now depends on whether 
the union concerned is able to satisfactorily put over their case to the 
journalists and to the general public. They have got more sensitive in the 
way they approach things. And they have been quite influential in 
changing opinions on other issues such as race or gender or the minimum 
wage. They have been quite effective in recent government policy- 
making. "' 
CONCLUSION 
Evidently, a majority of unions have made a clear organisational decision to use 
public relations as a means of achieving a number of political and economic 
objectives - from increasing and maintaining memberships to influencing legislation. 
Minimal public relations operations are now considered a standard requirement for 
medium and large unions, and many small unions are attempting to expand their own 
communications operations. Like other organisational sectors, unions are employing 
professional consultants, using specialist equipment and services, adopting 
professional PR strategies, and focusing their campaigns on those who count - 
corporate and political elite decision-makers. 
26 Seamus Milne (13.5.99), '1 can't think of a recent dispute in which the majority of the public were 
not behind the unions. It all came out in polls. In that respect the media are behind the times in their 
coverage - very outdated ... Unions have 
had a number of successes in the 1990s'; Barrie Clement 
(25.5.99), 'It's not necessarily likely to achieve a victory. But there have been notable examples where 
unions, which have been taking industrial action, are favourably reported even when causing 
considerable inconvenience to the public. For example the ambulance drivers dispute (1989) or the 
signal workers (1994). In each case it was about having a strong grip on press relations and having a 
positive attitude towards it'; Keith Harper, 20.5.99), 'Their [unions] PR improved as their power 
declined and they realised that they needed a forum, a conduit, with which to communicate ... since 
the 1980s ... the unions 
have learnt, from a point of low popularity 20 years ago, to improve their 
communications. And so they have improved despite the drop in power and direct coverage ... In some 
respects union PR has become very effective and sophisticated. ' 
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In the new public relations environment, unions are quite clearly disadvantaged in 
terms of the economic and cultural resources they have at their disposal. The study 
did tend to confirm a general correlation between the size of a union and its 
investment in public relations personnel and equipment. It also suggested that, on the 
whole, those unions that had invested more had gained greater media access and 
more success in their campaigning. The findings then offer some support for 
previous work that linked economic resources to PR efficacy (e. g., Gandy, 1980, 
Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Miller, 1994, Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994, and 
Deacon, 1996). All of which indicates that corporate and government elites, which 
employ the majority of PR resources and personnel, have a significantly stronger 
influence over the norms and values established in long-term media discourses. 
However, this chapter has also suggested that, contrary to the assumptions of many 
earlier source studies, public relations is not just another economic resource to be 
monopolised by those with more economic and media/cultural capital. The fact that 
public relations coverage is free and reliant on human resources, leaves much scope 
for 'outsider' and 'resource-poor' groups, such as unions, to make an impact. Clearly 
several other factors can also affect an organisation's ability to use PR effectively. 
One of these is human resources - something that outsider and resource-poor groups 
can take advantage of if they are well organised. Another is the speed with which an 
organisation can operate its communications. Yet another is the malleability of 
journalist routines and of what is considered 'newsworthy'. Knowledge of journalist 
routines, patterns of coverage and 'news values', has enabled union PRPs to become 
regular suppliers of information subsidies. It has also enabled them to devise skilful 
PR operations that can overcome a lack of institutional authority and/or negative 
union images. Indeed, in at least two examples, extremely small unions, operating 
with one part-time practitioner and household communications equipment, have 
managed to get more annual coverage and/or influence than organisations a hundred 
times larger. Some union operations have been so successful that they have had 
major impacts on long-term media discourses and short-term policy-making - often 
while unions themselves barely registered in the media at all. 
It might therefore be concluded that outsider and resource-poor groups can 
effectively use PR to influence news producers and, ultimately, to gain entry into the 
'elite discourse networks' described in earlier chapters. Dominant media discourses, 
largely chartered by governments, institutions and businesses, can thus be knocked 
off course. Clearly, pressure groups, charities and trade unions can become 'primary 
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definers' too - and without the general public necessarily being aware of their 
presence. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE UNION OF COMMUNICATION WORKERS 
VERSUS POST OFFICE PRIVATISATION IN 1994 
INTRODUCTION 
This case study illustrates the findings of chapter seven. It looks at how a very 
successful PR campaign, run by the Union of Communication Workers (UCW), 
contributed to the failure of the government to privatise the Post Office in 1994. 
Events were set in motion on the 15th July 1992, when Michael Heseltine, President 
of the Board of Trade, unexpectedly announced that Parcelforce would be privatised. 
Two weeks later the government declared it would be reviewing all postal services 
and thus signalled its intention to privatise the whole of the Post Office. After two 
years of delays, Heseltine announced (19th May 1994) the forthcoming publication 
of a green paper - 'The Future of Postal Services'. This presented three options: 
greater commercial freedom for the Post Office within the public sector, a complete 
privatisation, and the government's preferred option of a partial (51 per cent) 
privatisation. The paper, published at the end of June, gave a three-month 
consultation period, after which the government would announce future legislation. 
Prior to the May announcement several interested parties had begun campaign 
preparations and, with the publication of the green paper, the campaigns began in 
earnest. Apart from the DTI, Post Office management had a significant interest in the 
issue. Led by Bill Cockburn (chief executive) and Michael Heron (chairman), it had 
been campaigning for two years for more freedom from government. Management 
now made the strategic decision to follow the DTI and campaign for the 51 per cent 
privatisation option. 
The unions' campaign, led by the UCW', had begun preparing to defend the Post 
Office's public-sector status even before the 1992 announcement. Their campaign 
began to accelerate during the early months of 1994 and gathered momentum over 
the surnmer. Since no union campaign up until that time had succeeded in halting a 
privatisation, the prospects were not good. On 12 July, when MPs voted by 305 to 
'As well as dealing with DTI restrictions, Post Office profits had been increasingly used to reduce the 
PSBR (Public Sector Borrowing Requirement) of the Treasury. Such demands had led to a fourfold 
increase in taxes paid to the government since 1991, therefore leaving little for new capital 
investment. 
2 The principal union involved was the Union of Communication Workers (UCW), whose membership 
included the majority of Post Office staff. The National Communication Union (NCU) and 
Communication Managers Association (CMA) played supporting roles. Together, they made up 
POUC - Post Office Unions Council. All three were represented on the sub-group committee that met 
to plan the campaign. 
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government's long-running privatisation programme looked set to continue. 
However, after a Summer of media campaigning and lobbying, in which the Labour 
party and many other interest groups entered the debate, the government's plans 
suddenly began to look doubtful. Between the end of the consultation period 
(30.9.94) and the start of November, when legislation was being finalised for the 
Queens Speech, Heseltine and the DTI looked increasingly desperate. On 2 
November, with the cabinet divided, Ulster Unionists refusing to support the 
govenu-nent, and up to 20 Conservative MPs threatening rebellion, plans for the Post 
Office were shelved. The strength and ingenuity of the union's campaign was cited 
as being the main reason for the goverm-nent's retreat in a series of articles in the FT, 
Standard, Independent, Guardian and PR Week (3.11.94). Robert Taylor (FT, 
3.11.94) described the union's campaign as 'the most effective and professional 
campaign by a British union for a long time'. PR Week (3.11.94) described the UCW 
communications team as: 
'... prime examples of a new generation of union professionals using 
communications tactics more familiar to big business ... a 
devastatingly 
effective team galvanising the union's most useful weapon - its 160,000 
members - and in the process becoming the first union ever to defeat a 
govemment privatisation. ' 
The research involved the accumulation of information on the activities of sources - 
through documents and interviews with participants'. The second stage was a content 
analysis of the national press, during the-six month period in which the campaigns 
were most intensive, plus further interviews with journalists. The two sets of 
evidence were then compared to look for patterns and correlations. 
3 The principal source of documentation, records and news cuttings was the research archives of the 
UCW. Documentation included: all records of the union campaign and correspondence; press releases, 
promotional material and submissions from the unions, DTI, their respective allies and opponents. 
Eight interviews were also conducted: three (ex) union staff who had worked on the campaign, two 
PR consultants who had worked for the UCW, two DTI officials and a Post Office head of 
communications. 
4 The newspaper analysis looked at a total of 285 articles appearing in 10 national daily newspapers. 
The analysis was applied to all articles appearing in these newspapers between the l8th May (the day 
before the initial cabinet meeting) and the 2nd of November 1994 (the day the cabinet rejected all 
options) -a 25-week period when coverage was heaviest. The breakdown 
between papers was as 
follows: the FT -51, the Times -51, the Guardian - 45, the Telegraph - 40, the Independent - 
34, 
Today - 15, the Mirror - 15, the Daily Express - 11, the Daily Mail - 11, the 
Sun - 10. A further seven 
interviews took place with journalists who covered the story. 
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PART ONE: UNION COMMUNICATIONS OR FORCE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES? 
Although the pr07privatisation camp lost the campaign, commonly-used types of 
analysis, when applied to this case, suggest that union activity had little to do with 
the eventual outcome. The distributions of economic and cultural capital of the 
different parties, combined with a conventional content analysis of news coverage, 
indicate that corporate and political elites dominated as news sources. At the same 
time, the Conservative government was extremely weak and divided. It could thus 
well be argued that negative coverage of the DTI and Heseltine, and the eventual 
collapse of their proposals, resulted from a breakdown in elite-source consensus and 
subsequent elite conflict. 
Elite Source Advantages and Media Dominance 
In terms of economic and professional PR resources, the Post Office and DTI were 
greatly advantaged. The Post Office had a turnover in 1994-95 of E5.88 billion and 
190,000 employees and a network of some 460 'communications staff (Post Office 
1997a, 1997b). As several newspapers observed at the time (FT, 20.5.94, Times, 
12.8.94, Telegraph, 12.8.94), its campaign was extremely thorough 5. Roland Rudd, 
of the FT (20.5.94), called it a '... campaign that was impressive by the standards of 
any professional consultancy'. Articles in the Telegraph (28.8.94) and the Times 
(8.9.94) estimated that fl. 8 million had been spent by August 1994 - although the 
total figure was probably half that (over and above the fixed costs of the Post 
Officef 
Heseltine and the DTI had the might of the GIS (Government Information Services) 
and Conservative party press machine. The COI directory for January 1994 lists 67 
communications staff at the DTI. Ministers and government departments already 
benefited from the 'Hansard advantage', ensuring that government statements and 
select committee evidence gained coverage in the 'quality' press. In November 1994, 
'The campaign involved: private meetings with 150 MPs; at least three mailouts to all 190,000 postal 
workers, explaining events and putting the case for privatisation; monthly front-page spreads in The 
Courier, the Post Office staff magazine; regional briefing meetings and weekly updates for 12,000 
managerial staff-, a hotline number for employees and members of the public to call; a glossy 
document arguing the case for privatisation - sent to all main offices, 'opinion formers' and 'decision 
makers'; a promotional video distributed to post offices and sub-post offices; a high-profile media 
campaign; and advertising in the national press (interview with James Lindsey, 24.6.97). 
6 This figure was actually estimated by the UCW (according to UCW sub-group minutes, 25.8.94, and 
interviews with union staff) and probably an exaggeration. The Post Office itself, claimed that it had 
only spent E38 thousand -a figure that would not have covered the printing and postage of one 
letter 
being sent to all employees. The exact figure remains unknown. 
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in answer to a commons question (Hansard, 12.2.97, p223-4), the DTI declared that 
EI. 6 million had been spent on consultancy for the project alone. Heseltine and other 
ministers (notably Edward Leigh, Patrick McLoughlin and Tim Eggar) attempted to 
promote the privatised options vigorously. The full costs of the DTI campaign are, 
however, not determinable. In contrast, the UCW had a total staff of 120 and an 
annual turnover of E12.5 million. The unions had a handful of 'communications 
staff in total. They claim to have spent E500,000 on their campaign - most of which 
went on printing and distributing campaign material (including over seven million 
assorted cards and leaflets) over a six-month period in 1994. This amount was far 
beyond the means of most unions, but still considerably less than that spent by the 
combined pro-privatisation lobby of the DTI and Post Office management 
The content analysis also suggests that government and business sources did 
generally dominate. While the unions and Labour party were widely cited in articles, 
their overall contributions to news content were rather smaller than those of Post 
Office management and Heseltine/the DTI. Unions and other anti-privatisers did 
appear to do well in terms of being cited in articles (see table 8.1). The Labour party 
(16.5 per cent) and the unions (14 per cent) figured rather more than members of the 
DTI (10.4 per cent) and other government figures (5.2 per cent). The most cited 
groups were in fact Post Office management (18.7 per cent) and Conservative party 
rebels (18.7 per cent). However, the focus on source quotations is somewhat 
misleading. The contributions of the Labour party and the unions were, more often 
than not, reduced to a single quotation in the middle or end of the article. In other 
words, they were simply used to offer 'journalistic balance' within articles framed by 
the contributions of other organisations. 
Table 8.1: Actors Cited in Press Coverage 
Pro Privatisation Anti Privatisation Others 
DTI/Heseltine 10.4% 
Government 5.2% 
PO Management 18.7% 
Unions 14% 
Labour 16.5% 
Other Organisations 12.1% 
Conservative Rebels 18.7% 
Public/Postal Workers 4.4% 
ITOTAL 29.1% 49.2% 21.7% 
Sample: 364 citations in 283 Articles 
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Table 8.2: Sources Contributing to Press Coverage 
Pro Privatisation Anti Privatisation Others 
DTI/Heseltine 20.7% 
Government 19% 
PO Management 15.6% 
Unions 12.6% 
Labour 11% 
Other Organisations 11.3% 
Conservative Rebels 8.5% 
Public/Postal Workers 1.2% 
TOTAIL 36.3% 32.1% 31.6% 
Sample: 564 contributions in 283 Articles 
Indeed, if the same articles are looked at in terms of article content and actors' 
contributions (see table 2), the results are strongly skewed in favour of the DTI (20.7 
per cent), other government sources (19 per cent), and Post Office managers (15.6 
per cent). Labour (I I per cent) and the unions (12.6 per cent) are some way down, 
with Conservative 'rebels' (8.5) contributing least. This picture becomes more 
skewed still when looking at the number of times groups are not mentioned at all. 
The views of Heseltine and the DTI are discussed in, or contribute to, 89 per cent of 
articles. Post Office management are included in 56 per cent of stories. The Unions 
are only mentioned in 37 per cent. The public and postal workers have negligible 
input, with 4.4 per cent of citations and 1.2 per cent of contributions. 
From the point of view of the journalists covering the story it was also the 
institutions and their spokespersons - the Post Office and DTI - who were responsible 
for placing the issue on the political and news agendas. According to Roland Gribben 
of the Telegraph (21.5.99): 
'It was a combined effort. The government effectively brought it in. The 
Treasury and the DTI had had it sitting on the back bumer for some time. 
But it really came to the fore when Hezza decided to bring it in. At the 
same time Post Office management had been pushing it behind the 
scenes - they wanted their freedom from government. " 
Thus, as demonstrated in virtually all earlier studies of media content (e. g. Sigal, 
7 Roland Rudd, then at the FT (23.11.98), 'I'm not taking anything away from the union but the Post 
Office itself did a remarkable job of getting it on the political agenda ... That it became possible was 
down to Heseltine, who was in favour when he came in and he had large Tory back-bench support for 
it. But it got on the agenda because of the efforts of Bill Cockburn and the Post Office'; Keith Harper 
(20.5.99), 'The government brought it on to the agenda because they wanted to privatise the Post 
Office. It was one of the big things that Heseltine wanted to do. Post Office management were very 
much in favour of it, because firstly it would commercially free up the Post Office, and secondly, 
because they personally stood to gain quite a lot of money in the long run'. 
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1973, Hall et al., 1978, Gans, 1979, Herman and Chomsky, 1988, Tiffen, 1989, 
Hallin, 1994), the substance of cover-age proved to be very much guided by 
institutional sources. 
Figure 8.1: Cumulative Favourability of Coverage for Organisations in 
Broadsheet Press 18th May to 3rd November 1994 
> 00z 





Sample: 283 articles 
At the same time, an examination of the media profiles of the principal organisations 
involved (see figure 8.1) demonstrates that the content of coverage was significantly 
more unfavourable to Heseltine and the DTL For most of the period the unions were 
presented quite neutrally, scoring a small positive average for all papers except the 
Daily Express. The overall rating for Post Office management was slightly negative, 
with only the Daily Express and Sun newspapers offering positive overall coverage; 
its least favourable exponents were the Mirror and the FT. The DTI and Heseltine 
had the most negative coverage with an overall weekly average below -0.5. Their 
main detractors were the Mirror and Today; their least critical were the Times and 
the FT. This picture was not uniform throughout the period. For the first ten weeks of 
the campaign, until late July, the DTI/Heseltine appeared to be struggling but in 
contention. After that they rarely managed to obtain neutral coverage and came out 
extremely badly in the last seven weeks. Post Office management had fairly neutral 
coverage during the first 14 weeks, faced a negative barrage at the start of 
September, and never recovered thereafter. Ile unions maintained neutral coverage 






and gained some positive coverage after week 15. 
What becomes clear from these findings is that less access to the media does not 
necessarily mean poorer presentation of an organisation's case or profile. One might 
even conclude that 'news values' tend towards negative coverage and that more 
coverage of a powerful but poorly communicating source harms an organisation's 
cause. In this respect it might be argued that the coverage and outcome of the 
campaign was less related to union communication activity and had rather more to do 
with the general divisions and tactical errors of their high-profile oppositions - an 
explanation suggested in several other studies of institutional sources (Hallin, 1994, 
Miller, 1994, Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). 
Institutional Divisions 
The pro-privatisation sources were indeed divided and, consequently, their 
communication campaigns were erratic. By 1994, the Conservative government was 
already deeply unpopular and holding the smallest majority since it came to power. 
On the issue of Post Office privatisation, the cabinet was profoundly split between 
'consolidators' and 'radicals'. While Heseltine and Clarke had managed to resolve 
their differences in favour of privatisation, Major was unsure, and several cabinet 
members - notably Hurd, Newton and Hunt - were opposed to it. Major's own 
position was so weak that speculation was rife about his immediate survival as Prime 
Minister. Press coverage at the tirne highlighted the level of public opposition and 
pointed out that it was a privatisation that not even Margaret Thatcher had dared to 
attempt. As a memo to the UCW, from Connect in April 1994, commented (Connect 
correspondence, 21.4.94): 'The consolidators in the Cabinet believe that after an 
impossibly difficult legislative year, it would be best not to proceed with what could 
well be highly controversial legislation which would leave ministers vulnerable to 
pressure from potential rebels. ' 
The ambivalence and fears of the party were reflected in a confused and intermittent 
campaign. Divisions and anxieties resulted in a green paper being delivered rather 
than the government pressing ahead with a white paper. As the whole issue was then 
technically 'under review', neither the government nor DTI could actively campaign 
for their preferred option. Guy Black (interview, 18.6.97), commenting on the 
government campaign, said: 
'I don't think it existed in any great way. To some extent, my instinct 
was, that the DTI lamentably failed ministers in this matter. Over the 
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summer there was a lot of opposition and by the time it got to the party 
conference, the game was almost up. During these three months (July, 
August, September) the government was making absolutely no effort to 
sell their proposals to anyone - the back-benchers, the public, or 
whoever. ' 
Whether it was ministers or civil servants, the case was not put across'. It was also 
apparent that Post Office management, ministers in the DTI and Treasury, and their 
allies in the loD and CBI, were not in accord. Post Office management wanted 
freedom but as a whole organisation. For Heseltine freedom meant privatisation, but 
he knew that full privatisation would be politically impossible. To complicate 
matters, the Treasury was only going to be happy if it could either continue to tax the 
Post Office each year or gain the revenue from a sale of 50 per cent or more of it. 
Heseltine's final compromise of a 51 per cent sell-off left none of the supposed allies 
for privatisation happy and no more likely to co-operate than before. When the IoD 
and CB1 began calling for a 100 per cent privatisation, this only served to heighten 
opposition and upset a shaky compromise. 
Thus, one could convincingly argue that the divisions amongst the pro-privatisation 
lobby caused their campaign to implode at an early stage. If any credit is to be given 
to the unions' communications campaign several questions need to be answered. 
How did they: 1) overcome their economic and communications resource deficits; 2) 
manage to put across convincing and authoritative arguments with little institutional 
authority or legitimacy; and 3) manage to set news agendas and exploit elite-source 
conflicts with little obvious media access? 
PART TWO: OVERCOMING THE ECONOMIC AND MEDIA DEFICITS 
PR Expertise, Media Contacts and Insider Information 
While the unions, led by the UCW, did not have the PR and economic resources of 
their rivals, they found several ways to overcome their shortfall. This began with an 
accumulation of in-house and consultancy expertise. Since 1990 the UCW had begun 
8These views were echoed in the press and in interviews with DTI civil servants. A 'Ministerial 
source' was quoted in the Guardian (3.10.94) as saying 'It is not a question of opposing the sell-off 
but of having a clear strategy for winning public support ... 
The feeling is that not enough attention 
has been given to promoting the idea. ' As a DTI official recalled (interview, 16.6.97), 'The way it 
came out in the end - there was not a clear government proposal for privatisation. Although there was 
clearly a preferred option, the government had to appear to remain judiciously open - it couldn't 
simply come out and lobby for the one they preferred. In the end, the government as a whole was just 
that much more ambivalent... One might even reach the conclusion that not enough was done against 
the campaign to stop privatisation'. 
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to build up its communications capacity with the employment of its first full-time 
Media and Campaigns Officer (Daniel Harris). With arrival of the new general 
secretary, Alan Johnson, the emphasis on media relations grew as the 
communications budget increased (Chris Proctor interview, 2.6.97). In 1993, Julia 
Simpson was thus recruited as head of communications. By 1994 there was an 
established core team of four, plus other union representatives, meeting on a regular 
basis. As preparations developed, the unions made up for their lack of professional 
communications staff by hiring a number of consultants. Connect Public Affairs was 
taken on in August 1992 - to lobby, advise on strategy and keep the unions updated 
on parliamentary and government activity. Keith Bill of Union Communications was 
employed to run PPS (Protect our Postal Services) in March 1993. 
As the campaigns got under way in the summer of 1994, in addition to pulling in 
more union support staff, further consultants were recruited. David Lane, an ex- 
director of Royal Mail International, was hired. The most widely publicised alliance 
was with Lowe-Bell Political, headed by a principal advisor to Margaret Thatcher 
and the Conservative party - Tim Bell. Lowe-Bell supplied a team of four to work 
part-time on the campaign for a six-month period starting in July 1994. Both sets of 
consultants brought contacts and access to the business community and Conservative 
party. The overall costs of all these consultants ate heavily into union funds but were 
substantially less than many press estimates claimed. Consultancy fees accounted for 
approximately a fifth of the E500,000 campaign bill. 9 
Although the unions did not have the media profile of their opponents, the core team 
had spent a lot of time building up media contacts. As Daniel Harris explained 
(interview, 18.6.97): 
'I built up a long-term rapport with the media ... This 
filtered through to 
the national press. For three years I was putting out press releases and 
talking to people ... Throughout the period, 
from a very drip drip drip 
approach we were getting good stories about local postmen in ... It was a 
long slow build-up of quotes and stories, always giving the union the 
moral high ground. ' 
Lowe Bell's arrival also brought in its contacts with the right-wing press". Thus, by 
9Bills for Connect varied from a few hundred pounds up to two thousand pounds per month. The 
London Economics report was billed at E20,047.62 (London Economics correspondence). Desperate 
to win the contract, Lowe-Bell offered its services at very reduced rates (recorded in UCW 
correspondence, 29.6.94). Two interviewees put the costs at less than E40,000 in total. Total costs in 
consultancy fees are thus estimated to have been in the region of E90,000. 
1OGuy Black (interview, 18.6.97), 'Rather then just getting articles into the Guardian, the Mirror and 
the Independent, we thought of ways of getting stories into the Sun, the Times and the Telegraph. The 
UCW was doing a brilliant job in the local and national press - we could only refine this and help in 
179 
the Summer of 1994, the UCW had built up, or purchased through hiring PR 
consultants, regular media contacts across the national media. In effect, it had 
accumulated large amounts of media capital as sources - enough to begin competing 
with the Post Office and DTI. Keith Harper, then industrial correspondent for the 
Guardian, confirmed the level of union information subsidies being supplied at the 
time (20.5.99): 
'They [the UCW] were a big source for journalists. They provided 
surveys and polls and documents and provided stories through their 
members ... the UCW played it so well, there's absolutely no doubt. By a 
succession of polls and surveys and political activity, from meetings to 
demonstrations in local town centres, the unions led a very successful 
campaign... ' 
The consultants also delivered vital inside intelligence on their opponents' actions. 
This allowed the unions to time their activities, outmanoeuvre their opponents, and 
make best use of their resources. As Mario Dunn of the UCW (interview, 23.6.97) 
explained: 'We were aware when pressure was needed most - timing was the key 
element. You can write to an opinion-former or policy-maker, but if you do it two 
weeks too early it's useless. ' Connect Public Affairs, the CNIA union and David 
Lane all provided detailed information on Post Office and DTI plans for 
privatisation. Connect Public Affairs was the eyes and ears of the unions in 
Parliament. As its initial correspondence with the UCW stated (Connect 
correspondence, 21.8.92): 
'Connect is in a very good position to provide the union with political 
intelligence. We have excellent contacts with the Department of Trade 
and Industry, including with ministerial private offices. We can provide 
the union with an early warning system on developments on Post Office 
privatisation ... ' 
Advance warnings enabled the unions to begin initial preparations as early as 
January 1992 - six months before Heseltine's first announcement of a parliamentary 
review. This continuing flow of information also kept the unions up to date with 
every important committee or cabinet meeting, thus allowing media exposure and 
public campaigns to be timed appropriately. 
The Use of Union Membership 
While the UCW could not match its opponents' economic, professional PR and 
placing them in non-pro-union newspapers. ' 
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media resources, it did have a very significant resource in its 160,000 members. The 
UCW had over 100 branches spread across the UK - possibly the best network of any 
union in the UK and far superior to many businesses and government departments. In 
addition to the UCW's membership, the CMA had 14,000 members in Post Office 
management positions. The unions identified this potential campaigning resource 
early on and the membership became a vital part of the campaign. Media training 
was given, and campaign packs circulated, to all local branch representatives. 
Branches worked hard to promote the union message in the regions - through the 
local media, town councils, local events and in letter-writing to local MPs. Every 
single union postman and woman was given information cards and encouraged to 
discuss the issues with customers on their doorsteps. In fact, in Keith Bill's 
estimation (interview, 19.6.97), one widely supported by other sources": 'The real 
credit should go to the members - they were the ones that won it - not Lowe-Bell. 
They sent 10 times as much mail to MPs as the railways campaigners. ' 
At the same time, this network was carefully co-ordinated and kept uniform by 
campaign headquarters. Communication was maintained with branches through 
regular 'Special Branch Circulars'. As a UCW campaign brief explained: 
'Using the media will be an important factor in these campaigns. Political 
Officers and Regional Secretaries are already receiving news releases and 
election information. Headquarters can also send out prepared news 
releases to blanket over 850 titles nation-wide. This has the effect of 
ensuring the same message reaches everyone at the same time ... In 
conclusion, we need tight co-ordination from the top and a lot of activity 
on the ground. ' 
This closely co-ordinated media and letter-writing campaign worked consistently 
over the summer and was used to maximum effect at particular pressure points". 
Clearly the unions made up for their lack of professional and economic resources in a 
number of ways. The unions had tighter and more direct lines of communication - all 
focused through a small and rapidly-reacting committee. They bought in consultants 
to provide specialist knowledge and wider media and political 'insider' access. This 
was combined with a large and extensive network of voluntary labour that remained 
tightly co-ordinated from the top. What also becomes apparent when comparing the 
"Interviews with Daniel Harris (18.6.97), Guy Black (18.6.97), Roland Rudd (23.11.98) and Keith 
Harper (20.5.99), and in articles in FT, PR Week (3.11.94) 
12 For example, a UCW sub-group letter commented (1.7.94) 'In one part of London alone, 70 postmen 
and women are preparing to deliver leaflets at weekends in their own time. ' Another reports (25.8.94) 
'Activity by branches is frenetic. Millions of leaflets have been distributed. Rallies are being 
organised every weekend and countless initiatives are being pursued in relation to local petitions. ' 
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three sides was that the UCW's communications structure was also better suited to 
fighting the campaign. The DTI and Post Office, while having much larger networks 
of communications officers, were more likely to be slowed down by their extensive 
bureaucracies. While each maintained consistent channels of communication with 
the media, those channels were structured to produce an even, steady and long-term 
form of output. They were thus not set up for the speed and adaptability of a fast- 
moving campaign. 
PART THREE: OVERCOMING THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
AUTHORITY WITH THIRD-PARTY ENDORSEMENT 
One of the most significant factors in the media campaign was the unions' use of 
third-party endorsement. As Lowe Bell strategists explained (Lowe-Bell 
presentation, 1994): 
'Winning is all that matters - not how much the UCW is in the news ... 
the campaign must encourage submissions independently of the unions' 
case but which support its central arguments. It is vital that this process 
does not look like a union inspired lobby. ' 
The unions developed their strategy accordingly. Through a mixture of lobbying, 
public campaigning and polling, they galvanised a range of opposition sources and 
helped feed third-party opinions to the media. In effect, they bypassed the need for 
institutional legitimacy and direct access. Instead they gained a voice by using the 
legitimacy and access possessed by other sources: the public, 'economic experts', 
politicians and assorted 'neutral' user groups. 
Public Opinion and Economic Experts 
The 'voice of public opinion' was aired frequently by the commissioning and 
publishing of opinion polls -a common PR ruse for getting coverage in the national 
press. A series of polls, conducted by Gallup, Access Opinions and MORI, were 
conducted - usually on behalf of the UCW. The polls, of the general public, 
Conservative voters, constituency chairpersons, sub-postmasters, Post Office 
managers and MPs, found their way into the national press with some regularity - 
often providing the basis for a headline story. In the content analysis, 16 articles 
featured a MORI poll in the story, and poll results were mentioned with great 
frequency by all anti-privatisation campaigners. 'Sub-Postmasters Oppose Sell-Off 
(15.8.94), 'Post Office Managers Reject Sale' (8.9.94), 'Tory MPs "Oppose Sell-Off 
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of Royal Mail"' (24.10.94), were some of the MORI-inspired headlines in The 
Independent. 
The unions also set up Protect our Postal Services (PPS), in March 1993, to organise 
and promote localised public responses that were 'not under the UCW banner'. The 
group was made up of a number of charities and pressure groups with an interest in 
postal services". Although the unions had minimal representation on the PPS board, 
the two were closely connected. Keith Bill simultaneously acted as secretary of PPS 
and sat on the UCW sub-group campaign committee. PPS press releases refer 
enquirers to Guy Black or Bill Hamilton - both of whom were working for Lowe- 
Bell on the UCW campaign. The demands of the organisation were never particularly 
different from those of the Post Office Unions Council (POUC). As a UCW sub- 
group letter (1.7.94) explained: 'Once they [PPS] have seen the Green Paper they 
will adopt a position and campaign vigorously on what is likely to be a platform 
remarkably similar to our own (aimed at keeping the Post Office together). ' 
One of the most skilful PR moves by the UCW was to get free-market economists to 
argue its case for it. In advance of June 1994, the unions had already put forward 
alternative proposals in the shape of an EAG-commissioned report and a submission 
to the Trade and Industry Select Committee. Advice after June, from all the 
consultants concerned, was for the union to present a credible 'alternative White 
Paper' at the end of the consultation period. According to Lowe-Bell (presentation, 
1994), this would come from 'a reputable Business School, preferably using a 
consultant that is a known Tory sympathiser... ' and would be an '... independent and 
authoritative study on the case for greater commercial freedom within the public 
sector. ' Eventually London Economics was conunissioned to produce a report at 
short notice. Although Bill Robinson, the principal author, had been an advisor to 
Norman Lamont, and the consultancy was generally recognised to be a Thatcherite 
think tank, the report argued the unions' case. The conclusions of the report (London 
Economics, p79) stated: 
'... evidence suggests that there is no reason to believe that, simply by 
transferring the Post Office to the private sector, the company and the 
public will benefit from significant gains than would be the case if the 
Post Office remained publicly owned ... We propose an alternative model 
of a publicly-owned, commercially free Post Office. ' 
Predictably, the report was taken up and given wide coverage. 
13 These included the National Federation of Women's Institutes, ACRE, RADAR, Help the Aged, the 
National League for the Blind and Disabled. The inaugural meeting took place in March 1993. The 
official launch, with cross-party support, took place at the House of Commons in June 1993. 
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Supplying Information Subsidies to Politicians 
Just as sources supply an information subsidy to various media outlets, so they do the 
same for supportive MPs. In this case, the unions and their hired consultants 
provided: detailed briefs, ready-drafted speeches and motions, and a communications 
network for Labour, the Ulster Unionists and rebel Conservative MPs. Although 
running its own campaign, the Labour party was in close contact with the unions 
throughout. Both set up national petitions and paraded over-sized letters, surveyed 
sub-postmasters, referred to the same MORI polls, and argued for increased 
'commercial freedom within the public sector'. The arguments on VAT, closure of 
rural post offices, loss of the second delivery, and international comparisons, all 
argued in Labour campaign materials and in parliamentary debates, each appear 
remarkably similar to campaign materials, strategy and research documents produced 
by the UCW. Peter Hain MP, the most vocal Labour critic after Robin Cook, had 
previously worked for the UCW. He remained in regular contact with the union and 
asked parliamentary questions in accordance with union strategy. 
The battle for the support of dissident Conservative MPs and Ulster Unionists 
employed much of the time of local branch members and Lowe-Bell. A combination 
of lobbying, local media campaigns and letter-writing pushed wavering 
Conservatives towards very public rebellion. The unions were in frequent contact 
with Nicholas Winterton and other Conservative rebels. Right up until Heseltine's 
final meeting with rebels on the I st of November, the unions were briefing them and 
organising their resistance (David Lane, 30.10.94). Jim Lester, a prominent rebel and 
proposer of a well-publicised Early Day Motion, was sponsored by the CMA union. 
The motion, immediately signed by seven Conservative rebels (with up to 12 more to 
follow), was itself penned by the UCW (Mario Dunn interview, 23.6.97) and simply 
supported the unions' position (Hansard, 19.10.94): 
'This motion ... welcomes the publication of a report by London 
Economics ... and therefore supports the parts of the Green Paper which 
retain the Post Office as an integrated organisation in the public sector, 
endowed with greater commercial freedorn. ' 
The Ulster Unionists were also lobbied regularly and directly. A meeting at the 
Commons was arranged for the MPs in July and a special briefing document, 
spelling out the problems of privatisation for Northern Ireland, prepared for them by 
the UCW (UCW, July 1994). 
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Altiances with Assorted User Groups 
A third conglomeration of third-party endorsement was built up from user groups 
and other interested parties. The main targets were the Mail Users Association 
(MUA), the Post Office Users National Council (POUNC) and the National 
Federation of Sub-Postmasters (NFSP). All three were lobbied and had informal 
talks with the unions. As a UCW sub-group circular (25.8.94) explained: 'As already 
reported, the Mail Users Association are on course to produce a helpful response to 
the Green Paper ... We are also working 
hard to influence the POUNC response ... ' 
After a closely fought lobbying battle for the support of the National Federation of 
Sub-Postmasters, which included a UCW survey of sub-postmasters,. Colin Baker of 
the NFSP agreed to meet with the union. It was subsequently reported (union sub- 
group letter, 14.9.94) that: 'following our discussion we are now guaranteed a 
positive message from the NFSP nationally All three, plus the Periodical 
Publishers Association (PPA) and Readers Digest, eventually adopted positions that, 
if not entirely in accord with the unions, were critical of the govenunent's attempts to 
break up the Post Office. 
The degree of accord between the UCW and its allies becomes apparent in the press 
releases and submissions to the DTI that followed. The union (POUC) response to 
the green paper (September 1994, p3) reads: 
'Ownership is itself not the most important issuejacing the Post Office ... 
(p29) If the government is genuinely committed to ensuring that the 
whole of the Post Office remains a British success story, it will keep it 
together and give it genuine commercialfreedom in the public sector'. 
These can be compared to a number of allied organisational. press releases at the 
time. David Rogers of the MUA (press release 17.6.94) - 'Privatisation is but a 
political option and not necessarily the best option available'; POUNC (press 
release, 30.9.94) - 'The postal users watchdog has told government that it is unable to 
endorse any of its proposals and it has urged that consideration be given to keeping 
all three post office businesses together'; The National Consumer Council declared 
(press release 19.10.94) - that it was '... critical o the Green Paper for failing to )f 
consider the option of keeping the three parts of the Post Office together, either 
privatised or in continued public ownership'; Colin Baker of the NFSP (press release, 
30.9.94) - 'It [the Federation] does not see ownership as a critical issue. However 
should separation and privatisation take place, the Federation has many concerns 
14 Similar lobbying efforts were also reported in correspondence with David Lane (12.7.94) and in a 
UCW sub-group memo (25.8.94). 
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... 9; PPS (Freedom to Deliver) - '... the natural synergy of common ownership. Protect 
our Postal Services believes now is the time to examine in detail the mechanisms 
required to give the Post Office the financial fteedom it needs as an integrated 
network within the public sector"'. These submissions and releases all found their 
way, in some form, into the national press. 'Customers Unsure of Need for Change' 
(1.7.94), 'Post Office Watchdog Raps Sell-Off Plans' (30.9.94), 'Sub-Postmasters 
Seek Sale Pledge' (1.10.94), 'Double Blow for Postal Sell-off (3.10.94) were some 
of the headlines to emerge in the FT. 
Reviewing the figures for organisational contributions (table 8.3), it transpires that 
many of the 'other organisations' (see tables 8.1 and 8.2), frequently presented as 
neutrals, are actually 'union allies'. These allies contributed substantially to press 
articles during the period. 'Rebels' were cited 68 times. Other cited 'allies', not 
already mentioned, included David Lane, the Liberal Democrats, the National 
Consumer Council, Lowe-Bell, and Age Concern. The contributions of these others 
amounted to 40 quotations and 59 organisational contributions. If the totals for 
organisational contribution are re-evaluated, table 8.2 is reshaped as table 8.3 below. 
What transpires is that the media contributions of the unions and the Labour party 
could not alone match those arguing for privatisation. If union allies including rebels 
are added, media output is more constructed of anti-privatisers. 
Table 8.3: Organisations Contributing to Press Coverage 
Pro Privatisation Anti Privatisation Others 
DTI/Heseltine 20.7% 
Government 19% 
PO Management 15.6% 
Unions 12.6% 
Labour 11% 
Other Union Allies 10.5% 
DTI Allies (CBI, IoD) 0.9% 
Rebels 8.5% 
Public/Postal Workers 1.2% 
ITOTAL 37.2% 42.6% 20.2% 
Sample: 564 contributions in 283 Articles 
Significantly, most of anti-privatisation contributions in fact came in the last five and 
a half weeks of the campaign - when media interest was consistently high and 
government legislation being finalised. During this period there thus occurred an 
15 Others included: The Ulster Unionists (submission, September 1994), The Periodical Publishers 
Association (submission, 30.9.94), and Readers Digest (submission, 19.9.94). 
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unrelenting media barrage from supposedly neutral parties. This began with 
widespread coverage of the report by London Economics on 26th September and 
ended in early November with stories focusing on the dissent of Conservative party 
16 
rebels . In total, assorted union allies made 31 contributions to articles 
in this period 
- just over half their input for the 25 weeks analysed. Labour (22) and Conservative 
party rebels (28) added 49 contributions. The unions themselves only contributed to 
21 articles. The total for anti-privatisation contributions then amounted to 112 in the 
last five and a half weeks - just under half (47 per cent) the total for the 25-week 
period. The effect was seemingly to isolate the government during its most important 
decision-making period - something that had been planned by the unions far in 
advance 17 . Ultimately the government's supply of 
institutional authority was 
effectively cancelled out, without the unions ever needing to gain a significant level 
of institutional legitimacy themselves. 
PART FOUR: SETTING NEWS AGENDAS, DIVIDING OPPOSITIONS AND 
THE CREATION OF NEGATIVE NEWS 
In spite of having less direct input into the news production process, union tactics did 
much to set agendas and interpretive frameworks. In addition to orchestrating a range 
of opposition voices, they continually pursued media-friendly lines of argument, 
encouraged divisions among the pro-privatisation lobbies and made each opposition 
16 This was followed by: David Lane, a former director for the Post Office, 'now a business 
consultant', attacking privatisation (29.9.94); an announcement that Lowe-Bell, 'the Conservative 
Party PR guru', was joining the unions to work against privatisation (29.9.94); POUNC, the industry's 
watchdog, arguing against splitting up and selling off parts of the Post Office (30.9.94); the PPS group 
of charities petitioning against privatisation (30.9.94); the NFSP criticising the government's Green 
Paper options (1.10.94); the publication of a MORI poll of Conservative Party chairmen in which 57 
per cent supported the public sector option and only 39 per cent supported any form of privatisation 
(2.10.94); another MORI poll of Conservative voters in the constituencies of John Major and Michael 
Heseltine, which showed that 66 per cent were against the government's preferred option; John 
Taylor, Ulster Unionist MP, announced that he had had more recent letters on this subject than on any 
other in the previous ten years (3.10.94); the official submission on the Green Paper from the Ulster 
Unionists opposing the privatisation options (9.10.94); all polls were republished in full-page adverts 
on the day Heseltine addressed the Conservative Party conference (12.10.94); the National Consumer 
Council declared its opposition (18.10.94); an Early Day Motion, opposed to privatisation and 
supporting the London Economics alternative, signed by eight dissident Conservative MPs with more 
to follow (22.10.94); a leaked Post Office management report, which stated that the Treaty of Rome 
would force legislation on the government, threatening the future viability of the separate privatised 
Post Office companies (22.10.94); a MORI poll of Conservative MPs, which revealed that 77 per cent 
of mail on the issue was opposed to privatisation (24.10.94); between the 27th of October and the 2nd 
of November, the press was dominated by stories of increases in rebel ranks and the London 
Economics alternative. 
17 In early 1993, Connect had already predicted that the government would be attempting to announce 
legislation in the Queens Speech in November 1994 (Connect correspondence, 16.4.93). All the 
consultants to the union campaign advised striking hard during the run-up to the November speech. 
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proposition appear unworkable. Thus, in stark contrast to earlier decades, the unions 
managed simultaneously to avoid media scrutiny and to make their institutional 
opponents appear confused, untrustworthy and even illegal in their activities. 
Presenting a Positive Union Image 
From the start, the unions worked hard to avoid the media pitfalls of earlier union 
campaigns by avoiding industrial action and minimising the issue of potential job 
losses. At the union annual conferences, each union passed motions condemning any 
moves towards privatisation but voted against strike action. As in several recent 
successful union campaigns (see chapter seven), the emphasis at all times was to 
protect public services and to protect the Post Office. The Post Office itself was 
promoted as a part of 'Britain's heritage' and an economically successful public 
service. The popularity of postmen and women were also played up, as was the 
importance of the local post office in rural communities. As Chris Proctor (interview 
2.6.97) explained: 
'We didn't concentrate on traditional trade union interests. We lost 
100,000 jobs in the BT privatisation and the job issue certainly worried 
our members. But we took the view that we lost that because demos and 
strikes were inherently bad news from a PR point of view. So the whole 
thing wasn't save our jobs but save your post office and protect your 
services ... We justified the fact that people liked the Royal Mail. Ideas 
really struck a chord. Just the issue of the Queen's head and the 
possibility that it wouldn't be on stamps anymore. It seemed almost 
unpatriotic to privatise the post office. Julia came up with the idea that 
people liked their local postman. We realised that we had 160,000 
members; that we had 160,000 ambassadors that we could use. ' 
To avoid accusations of intransigence, the unions campaigned, not against change, 
but for the positive alternative of greater commercial freedom within the public 
sector. Thus, the Economists Advisory Group (1993) and London Economics (1994) 
reports were compiled. Throughout, privatisation per se was not directly attacked. 
Rather the government's particular proposals for privatisation were. Returning to the 
media content analysis, it is similarly clear that the unions were rarely portrayed as 
defenders of union employment. Out of 285 articles, the jobs question is mentioned 
in the headline in only six pieces (less than two per cent). The jobs issue is only 
discussed in 14 articles altogether - only 13 per cent of all stories in which the unions 
are mentioned and in less than five per cent in total. 
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Undermining Post Office Management 
It also becomes apparent that many of the difficulties of the DTI and Post Office 
management were compounded by, or arose directly out of, union activities. Around 
the start of September, the unions hit Post Office management hard. A UCW sub- 
group circular (25.8.94) reports: 
'As you will be aware the Post Office has launched a huge internal and 
external communications campaign. We aim to produce reliable figures 
to demonstrate how much this will cost them - it will be a good news 
story. Certainly it is unprecedented for public servants to act in this way 
during a privatisation debate. ' 
An article about Post Office management expenditure duly appeared in the 
Telegraph (28.8.94), to be repeated in the Times (8.9.94) and other papers. The Post 
Office campaign was subsequently criticised by many papers, on grounds of expense 
and legality. As Ross Tiernan of the Times asked (3.9.94) 'And why have they 
broken the unwritten rule that says leading executives of state corporations never, 
repeat never, speak out on ownership issues? ' 
A MORI poll of post office managers, conducted for the CMA in August, was also 
released to the press in September. This showed that 76 per cent of managers were 
actually in favour of the public sector option and that the higher levels of Post Office 
management were isolated: '... the results show' said Terry Degan of the CMA, 'that 
the Chairman and Chief Executive are not speaking for managers in their support for 
privatisation and break up of the Post Office'. At the same time, Post Office 
management were given the 'fat cat' tag and accused simply of seeking personal gain 
from any potential share sale. 
The favourability profile of Post Office management consequently suffered a large 
dip in September. Management was now unsure of where the government stood and 
whether it should, or was legally able, to continue campaigning for the privatisation 
option. As a result of the union attacks they halted their media efforts and 
concentrated more on their lobbying campaign. After September, Post Office 
contributions to articles declined rapidly. 
Dividing and Conquering the Conservative Party 
From an early stage, advice to the union was to put pressure on the government and 
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exploit existing divisions". Much of the union campaign was thus aimed at 
exploiting Conservative splits and complicating each new privatisation proposal. As 
Guy Black, at the time with Lowe-Bell, explained (interview, 18.6.97): 
'There were three campaigns really ... The third, to throw spanners in the 
wheels of the decision-making process - EU law, the commercialisation 
option was cheaper, etc. These were aimed at civil servants who advised 
ministers. A lot of articles appeared about the Post Office in which 
privatisation was not the issue - commercial freedom was. ' 
First it was demonstrated that complete privatisation was unworkable because cross- 
subsidisation was essential for maintaining the rural network of offices and the other 
loss-making parts of the Post Office. When a 51 per cent privatisation was proposed, 
in order to safeguard these parts, the unions and their allies argued that it made more 
economic sense for the Post Office to be kept together, whether private or public. 
Eventually, when Heseltine made a last attempt to compromise with a 40 per cent 
privatisation, it was pointed out that this would bring in less revenue than three years 
worth of the External Financing Limit currently imposed on the Post Office (David 
Lane, 30.10.94) - thus making the option unpalatable for the Treasury. Ministers 
from the DTI were consequently forever forced on to the defensive. There were 
frequent 'assurances' and retreats by the DTI, all designed to allay public and 
Conservative back-bench fears. But at each step, the unions changed their lines of 
attack again. 
The unions didn't only exploit confusions over policy, they targeted particular 
Conservatives with great accuracy. Lowe-Bell's ability to 'get behind enemy lines' 
and Connect's 'insider' access were used to good effect. These two sources gave the 
unions knowledge of the timing of government decision-making and of the personal 
divisions that existed in the Cabinet and across the party. Thus, on May 6th 1994 
(Connect correspondence), Connect informed the UCW of the impending cabinet 
meeting on the issue that was to be held towards the end of the month. The UCW, 
following a Channel 4 news exclusive on the 17th May, was then ready to move into 
action. In addition to a number of dire warnings about the future of the Post Office, 
its press releases included a survey of Conservative back-benchers showing that 30 
per cent wanted privatisation either slowed or stopped. Most of the press that day, 
most notably the Telegraph, included Alan Johnson's warnings about 'political and 
18As early as August 1992, Connect (correspondence, 21.8.92) was advising 'The object of the 
campaign is to make it politically difficult for the government to proceed nith Post Office 
privatisation'; Lowe-Bell advised (presentation, 1994) 'THE CAMPAIGN MUST Focus the 
enormous support for the Post Office in a way that maximises the political opposition to privatisation 
on the government back benches ... 
There are also government divisions to be exploited - The 
Conservative right could be mobilised to use the issue to undermine Heseltine's leadership ambitions. ' 
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electoral suicide' and/or the survey results. The splurge of negative coverage, along 
with recently published opinion polls, might well have been enough to push an 
already wavering cabinet into announcing the delivery of a Green Paper - rather than 
the expected White one. 
The UCW also diligently sought out the addresses of all local Conservative party 
associations, Conservative councillors and MPs. This information was supplied to 
local branches so that extensive local mail campaigns could be organised". Those 
especially targeted included Jeremy Hanley, David Hunt, Richard Ryder, John 
Major, Tony Newton, Douglas Hurd; all of whom were widely reported in the press 
as being either opposed to, or dubious about the prospects of, Post Office 
privatisation. Local Conservative MP doubts, often resulting from local campaigns, 
also found their way into the public domain. As Roland Rudd, then of the FT, 
recounted (23.11.98): 'The local campaigns were relentless and they frequently 
embarrassed local MPs into declaring themselves and potentially having to face the 
loss of their seats. ' There were indeed several statements released to the press which 
spoke of Conservatives opposing privatisation on account of the mail they had 
received (e. g., Julian Critchley in the Times, 24.8.94, Peter Emery in the Telegraph, 
8.9.94, and John Taylor in the FT, 3.10.94). As one anonymous Conservative MP 
said (Independent, 28.10.94) '1 don't oppose privatisation but I have had a big 
mailbag of letters objecting. I think the government should pause. ' 
Polling was focused as much on Conservative voters, MPs, constituency 
chair(wo)men, and councillors, as it was on the general public. Many of these same 
people were polled after several months of being confronted with hostile 
correspondence and local press campaigns. Polls, press releases and opposition 
statements were then released and published on important decision-making days for 
the government and Conservative party. A special branch circular (26.10.94) 
revealed how the press had once again been deluged on the weekend before a 
Monday cabinet committee meeting on privatisation: 
'The Cabinet Industry Sub Committee met on Monday, 24th October. 
This again was a crunch meeting. Colleagues would have seen the press 
reports over the preceding weekend ... The next 
deadline will be Monday, 
31 st October when the Industry Committee meets again. ' 
19As a special branch circular (14.10.94) explained: 'The next two weeks will be crucial. We have 
identified a group of Cabinet Ministers and Government Whips upon whom we want to bring 
maximum pressure. The best way this can be done is for them to receive a large postbag from their 
own constituents. To this end we have produced a special leaflet for delivery in their constituency. IT 
IS VITAL THIS LEAFLET IS DELIVERED EARLY IN THE WEEK COMMENCING 17TH 
OCTOBER 1994. ' 
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Once again, the Sun, Times, FT and Independent all carried stories about the likely 
collapse of the privatisation project that morning. 
By the time of the Conservative party conference in early October, Conservative 
party divisions were being exploited to maximum effect. On the day Heseltine was to 
address the conference full-page adverts appeared in the Times and Telegraph 
(12.10.94) with the results of all the MORI polls, each demonstrating Heseltine's 
isolation from the public, Conservative grass roots activists, and Conservative voters. 
As Daniel Harris recounts, the unions and their supporters were out in force 
(interview, 18.6.97): 'During the Tory party conference we got the nicest, rosiest- 
faced postman to dish out blue stickers to save the Post Office. When Heseltine got 
up to talk he was met by this great sea of blue stickers'. In the weeks that remained 
before the final cabinet meeting, divisions continued, Heseltine remained isolated, 
and it thus became impossible to unite all parts of the party behind any single option. 
POSTSCRIPT TO UCW CASE 
Since this case study was completed there have been several political discussions on 
the future of the Post Office. Although Post Office chief executives and chainnen 
have come and gone, New Labour has come to power, and Alan Johnson has become 
a Labour MP (in 1997), the same arguments have been played though several times. 
For much of 1998 the Labour government, pressed by Post Office management, 
came close to drawing up legislation for a 51 per cent privatisation. This time the 
powerful Labour cabinet found itself split and divided under pressure. The arguments 
resulted in successive DTI ministers - Margaret Beckett and then Peter Mandelson - 
clashing with Gordon Brown and the Treasury, and contributed to the loss of their 
cabinet seats. The final result, pushed through by Mandelson shortly before his exit, 
was greater commercial freedom for the Post Office within the public sector - the 
option always promoted by the unions. According to several of the journalists 
interviewed (Roland Rudd, 23.11.98, Seamus Milne, 13.5.99, and Christine Buckley, 
1.6.99) once again, the CVV'U (formerly the UCW) was largely responsible for halting 
the privatisation option at the discussion stage. As Christine Buckley recounted 
(1.6.99): 
'At the Labour conference Derek Hodgson virtually eclipsed Peter 
Mandelson and the decision not to sell off half the Post Office went 
completely against the government's wishes. The government were 
privately scared of the power of the CVVIJ and the threat of strike action. 
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They were also scared of the threat to middle England - the threats to 
local post offices and the network in rural areas. Before Derek Hodgson 
took over the general secretary post he was seen as a bit of a radical 
firebrand. But he immediately became new union and followed the same 
lines of action taken by Alan Johnson. ' 
CONCLUSION 
While, the inadequacies of the DTI and Post Office figure strongly in the collapse of 
their campaigns, much of the evidence indicates that it was the UCW's campaign 
which tipped the scales. Opinion polls (NOP, 1987) showed that the privatisation of 
British Rail and the electricity and water utilities were as, if not more, unpopular 
with the public than Post Office privatisation". Yet all were sold off by the same 
weakened Major government - something pointed out by several of the 
interviewees". All but one of the seven journalists interviewed believed the union 
campaign was largely responsible for causing the Conservatives to back down. In 
Keith Harper's estimation (20.5.99): 
'No other trade union campaign was as successful during the 80s and 
90s. Compared to the miners - if they had kept intact rather than be 
divided by Scargill's actions, had tactics been different, they might have 
won. Also look at rail privatisation. The public were strongly against that 
as well but they lost. So yes, the UCW's campaign was unique and had 
much to do with the eventual outcome ... Although the Conservatives 
were divided it was down to the campaign. Divisions didn't stop rail 
privatisation from proceeding. ' 
That the Labour government, with an unchallengeable Commons majority and high 
levels of popular support, was also blocked by the unions, suggests that the collapse 
of government proposals in 1994 were not simply down to elite conflicts and 
weaknesses. 
The success of the UCW campaign is notable in that it challenges both the pessimism 
of earlier radical work and the optimism of liberal arguments for journalistic 
autonomy. First, it clearly demonstrates the ability of 'resource-poor' and 'outsider' 
201n fact, polls of the general public, produced on the Post Office between 1987 and 1994, hint that the 
campaign strengthened public opinion in the unions' favour. In February 1987, NOP polls showed that 
66 per cent preferred the Post Office to be kept public and 25 per cent preferred privatisation. In 
November 1992,64 per cent opposed privatisation and 19 per cent supported it. By June 1994,71 per 
cent opposed and 10 per cent supported it. 
2 'Including: Keith Bill, 19.6.97, Guy Black, 18.6.97, Roland Rudd, 23.11.98, Keith Harper, 20.5.99 
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groups to gain productive access to the news production process and to those 'elite 
discourse networks' that tend otherwise to exclude them. The UCW combined its 
large membership resources with a few in-house experts and external consultants. 
Their bureaucracies were better co-ordinated and better suited to fighting a rapidly- 
changing campaign. They also consistently managed to sidestep traditional media 
potholes and promote their campaign in media-friendly ways. In all of this, the UCW 
demonstrated that all the ploys of government and business PR are just as adaptable 
to union causes and can be used skilfully to overcome other deficiencies. 
At the same time, as other parts of this thesis also argue, the liberal notions of 
independent journalism have also been severely undermined. The UCW 
demonstrated that professional PR methods can make a significant impact on the 
content of news articles. Goverrunent, Post Office and union statements, press 
conferences and news releases all found their way into the national press - often 
quoted word for word. Most of the time, third parties were presented as neutral 
representatives, with journalists often being unaware of the relationships that existed 
between the sources they were citing. Reports, polls and other statistics were often 
referred to without acknowledgement of their origins. Negative campaign material 
frequently set news agendas. In all of this it becomes clear that 'news values', 
journalist needs and routines, and news production in general, are not self-contained 
and independent processes. They are, in fact, observable and malleable procedures 
which sources can identify and use to gain advantage over other sources. 
What also becomes clear is the methodological limitations of earlier content analysis 
and audience research. That organisations appear more often in the news and/or are 
cited more often does not necessarily mean they are setting agendas, being positively 
portrayed, or winning arguments. As chapter six reveals, in the 1970s the unions had 
the greatest media access but were poorly represented next to government and 
management. In the 1994 dispute these positions were reversed, with goverm-nent 
and management gaining most coverage but the poorest representation. That 
journalists and audience receptionists argue for a high level of autonomy in the 
reception process does not account for the fact that audiences and journalists are 
frequently unaware of where information comes from and its creation by partial 
sources. As Miller (1997) and Deacon et al (1999) have both recently argued, there is 
an additional need for researchers to identify both the processes by which 
information comes to journalists, and what the final outcomes of campaigns are. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
THE RISE OF PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS 
The first and most obvious conclusion is that the growth and spread of professional 
public relations in Britain has been fairly substantial. What was once seen as a minor 
employment area - outside of central government - has become increasingly 
professional and well resoureed. The corporate sector generally, and the City in 
particular, took the lead in promoting professionalisation and expansion in the 
industry in the 1980s. PR was quickly adopted by the major political parties - first by 
the Conservatives and then by Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Two decades later, 
it is now the norm for all medium sized-organisations, be they businesses, 
institutions or voluntary groups, to have some form of public relations operation. It is 
very rare for large organisations to have no PR and even the smallest businesses and 
associations are more likely to be instituting a communications policy if not hiring 
PR staff and/or consultants. 
A steady expansion of the profession in all these and other areas suggests that 
organisational heads believe that the practice of PR has a significant use value for 
their organisations. Chapters three to eight gave a clear indication of just how 
important the practice has become for the corporate and trade union sectors. For 
businesses, public relations is, like marketing, advertising or information technology, 
another means for gaining a market edge. The uses generally include: the 
enhancement of company images, brand management, the recruitment and retention 
of staff, the winning of contracts, the maintenance of relations with other businesses, 
and the influence of regulatory or economic policy. For companies operating in the 
City, substantial PR investment has become necessary to sustain share prices (worth 
hundreds of millions or even billions of pounds), reduce susceptibility to take-over, 
retain contracts, and influence financial regulators. For unions, public relations is 
proving to be equally valuable. In this sector it can be used to: change union images, 
recruit and retain staff and members, place economic and social issues onto the 
political agenda, and influence elite decision-makers in business and government. 
In effect, professional public relations has come to operate as another form of 
modem conflict between organisations, interest groups and individuals, and is 
employed to achieve long-term and short-term objectives. Under the terms of 
engagement, audiences, both narrow and wide, are targeted, and attempts are made to 
control the communication channels between transmitting organisations and those 
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audiences. Anything that may influence those communication channels is considered 
to be fair game - from high-profile individuals and journalists to institutions and 
experts. In such a way, the public relations strategies and information subsidies of 
one organisation (or, sometimes, individual) are pitted against another through the 
media and associated communication channels. 
THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS ON FOURTH 
ESTATE JOURNALISM 
Of considerable significance to media sociology is the degree to which public 
relations has worked to erode the autonomy of journalists at the micro-level. The 
influence of public relations practitioners (or sources using PR techniques) was 
always much greater than scholars recorded, journalists admitted, or consumers were 
aware of Many of the standard PR methods for gaining coverage, from 
manufactured 'diary events' to press conferences and press releases, became fully 
integrated into the news-gathering process decades ago. However, this working 
relationship, between PRPs and journalists, although never part of the media fourth 
estate ideal, was a less serious matter - as long as journalists retained a certain level 
of day-to-day autonomy, and public relations remained an under-developed and 
under-resourced profession. As chapter two points out, the conditions in both 
industries in Britain changed significantly during the 1980s and 1990s. It is these 
changing conditions that have meant that the independence of journalists, and the 
wider fourth estate media, must be questioned once again; and this time for more 
micro-level reasons. 
In terms of the media industry, the most important change has been an overall 
decline in the level of news-gathering resources available to individual reporters. 
National journalists have continually been put under pressure to raise productivity by 
increasing news output without an equivalent rise in staff numbers or time. Market 
forces have been brought to bear so directly on journalists that their ability to 
produce independent, investigative and well researched pieces has been significantly 
eroded. Thus, national newspapers are going the way of regional papers and trade 
journals, in that they have developed an over-dependence on external subsidies. 
Subsidies, in the form of newspaper price rises above inflation, cross-subsidisation of 
newspaper titles by multinational media empires, wire services, the Internet, and the 
PR industry in all its guises, are what have artificially sustained the national print 
media over the last decade. 
196 
In contrast, changes in the PR industry have been much more enabling for its 
practitioners. In this sector there has been a rise in both the levels of resources and 
professional expertise that are available to users of public relations. PRPs are 
therefore increasingly better resourced than their journalist counterparts. They also 
have become more effective by simply accumulating more detailed knowledge on 
how journalism works and on how particular journalists and publications operate. PR 
output is thus being skilftilly adapted to integrate smoothly with the news production 
process. 
Chapters two, five and eight all demonstrated that PR has become extremely 
successful in passing itself off as 'real news'. At the heart of effective public 
relations techniques lies a thorough understanding of news values and journalistic 
routines. If, for example, journalists seek out 'experts', institutions and statistics, in 
an effort to be objective, then professional PRPs attempt to use, or even create, such 
experts, institutions and statistics. If journalists tend to report negative news and 
scandals, then professional PRPs attempt to dig up negative stories that focus on their 
oppositions. If particular journalists favour certain types of story and format, and are 
likely to need to fill some space on a Monday, then PRPs will attempt to supply those 
types of story, in those formats, on a Sunday. Thus, a process that began with the 
press release and news conference has become much more sophisticated. 
In effect, the liberal description of the fourth estate media, based on an image of 
independent autonomous journalists seeking out news, has been severely 
undermined. While chapter two offered data that merely suggested that journalists 
are becoming overly reliant on PR output, chapters five and eight demonstrated that 
reliance quite significantly - and to a degree that many journalists would be unaware 
of. These trends look set to continue. Competition and proliferation in the media 
industries will result in further efficiency drives and a weakened media sphere. The 
obvious consequences will be a rise in the power of sources, owners and advertisers, 
and a greater reliance on public relations by the national media. At the same time, PR 
expansion will continue as journalist consumption rises and source needs increase. 
The dividing lines between news, PR, advertising and entertainment, will thus 
become farther blurred. 
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PUBLIC RELATIONS AND SOURCE ACCESS IN BRITAIN 
While the dependence of journalists on PRPs appears to be increasing, is this 
dependence leading to significant changes in patterns of source access? Are certain 
sources gaining more access than others in the new public relations environment and, 
therefore, further undermining pluralist ideals of a media that gives voice to the 
broadest range of pubic concerns? The evidence of this thesis suggests two 
somewhat contradictory trends taking place in Britain. Certain powerful sources are 
using PR to secure their long-term access advantages in sections of the national 
media. At the same time, however, 'resource-poor' and 'outsider' sources have also 
used public relations to gain more frequent and favourable coverage. How is this so 
and what are the factors involved in changing levels of source access? 
This thesis has identified several factors that influence a source's capacity to gain 
access to news producers and obtain beneficial coverage. The first and second of 
these, already noted in several studies of sources, are the possession of economic 
capital and media (or cultural) cgpital. In this case media capital, in the form of 
legitimate authority and expertise, is accumulated in the extemal responses of 
journalists and consumers and is also related to wider social influences. A third 
factor, one that has drawn less attention, is human resources. As this thesis has 
stressed, human resources are the main expense for any public relations work and 
their costs can vary considerably across different PR sectors. Good amateur PRPs 
and/or large groups of well organised volunteers can potentially be just as effective 
as expensive professional communications operations. 
A highly significant fourth factor, one repeatedly underlined in this thesis, is a 
source's natural affinities with news producers. Media-source affinity is affected by 
both bureaucratic considerations and by what journalists perceive to be newsworth . 
Bureaucratic compatibility - referring to the ease with which journalists may 
practically report sources - is affected by such things as organisational structures, 
timetables, and the physical proximity of journalists to source organisations. 
'Newsworthiness', a catch-all phrase for journalists and liberal media sociologists, 
simply equates to the belief of journalists that they should report sources because 
their audiences are interested. Thus 'home news' journalists will report what 
consumer and environmental interest groups say, just as they will report decisions by 
powerful and authoritative sources - because of perceived 'public interest'. On the 
other side of the equation they will be reluctant to cover sources with large amounts 
of economic or cultural capital if they are not considered 'newsworthy' or are 
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practically difficult to cover. 
The fifth factor is PR expertise, which also brings appropriate media contacts and 
strategies. Chapters five, seven and eight offered examples of common PR strategies 
used by both corporations and unions. Essentially, PRIs bring a set of contacts and a 
level of knowledge about how journalists operate. Their main objectives are to a) 
locate and exploit the PR resources available to an organisation, and b) match up the 
requirements of that organisation with those of relevant news producers. In other 
words, PRIs develop strategies that uncover the potential affinities that exist 
between sources and journalists, and utilise the resources at their disposal to match 
up these affinities accordingly. 
These factors are all related but are not inextricably linked. Media (or cultural) 
capital and human resources are more likely to be boosted by economic resources but 
they are not completely dependent on them. Public relations strategies are 
advantaged by cultural and economic capital but can operate with minimal amounts 
of either. Public relations strategies themselves can help to accumulate or lose all 
other types of resource and to develop new media-source affinities. This suggests 
that variously resourced groups can employ PR strategies that rely on alternative 
combinations of factors - each of which, if conditions are right, can result in a 
successful supply of information subsidies. 
Government and Corporate Elite Sources 
Looking at this typology, the long-term dominance of British government elites 
becomes clearer. Two particular factors appear to advantage those in government. 
The first of these is economic resource advantages. Chapter two demonstrates how 
PR resources and personnel are unequally distributed in favour of government and 
corporate interests. Thus, in addition to other forms of influence over media 
institutions (legal, ownership, advertising), government sources employ PR 
operations that are literally a hundred times larger than alternative sources acting in 
civil society. For simple economic reasons, therefore, elite institutional sources are 
likely to dominate as information subsidy suppliers over a long period. Second, the 
media also gravitate towards the reporting of government and institutional elites 
because of their higher levels of media capital. Because journalists, like their 
consumers, want to a) get the opinion of experts and authorities, and b) obtain the 
views of those considered powerful and influential, a natural affinity forms between 
journalists and government elites. Added to this is the fact that such sources provide 
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regular 'beat' conditions for journalists - thus making institutional reporting a regular 
and simple means of producing journalist copy. 
However, what is also important to note is that government elites benefit from each 
of the five factors outlined above, and they can therefore use their considerable 
advantages on all levels. They are thus becoming increasingly effective at managing 
routine access to the media. At times of national crisis (e. g., wars or large-scale 
industrial action), the concerted exploitation of all types of factor advantage results in 
a virtual monopoly of official source supply. The same is true when political elite 
consensus is reached on social and economic issues, and policies and messages are 
powerfully reinforced by concerted PR output from a nuanber of elite sources (see 
Williams, 1977 and Hallin, 1994, for related discussions). 
The play of these factors has been rather different for corporate sources. They have 
superior economic resources, human resources and PR expertise. However, such 
advantages are often negated by the fact that, for mainstream news at least, they have 
little media/cultural capital and weak affinities with news producers. As other studies 
in media sociology have already noted, they thus spend large sums on maintaining 
lower profiles and/or blocking joumalist access. In numerous cases corporate elite 
debate and conflict does not even reach reporters. The real negotiation takes place in 
private face-to-face meetings and telephone calls. 
But, more significantly, corporate sources have shifted their PR efforts towards areas 
of news production where such factors operate in harmony rather than conflict. The 
sector highlighted in this thesis is business and financial news in the national press. 
Here, business sources are also the main advertisers in, and consumers of, business 
news. Media-source affinities are good and the cultural capital of sources is high. In 
this case, journalists naturally gravitate towards City and business elites as the 
'experts' and 'power brokers' in the field. In fact, the advantages of large corporate 
elites in business news, in terms of the five factors described, appear far greater than 
for political elites in mainstream news. As a result, journalists are left in the position 
of reporting outcomes or recording those conflicts that financial elites choose to play 
out in the media. With more public relations the media becomes increasingly focused 
on corporate elite concerns as elite sourcing of the media has become standardised. 
In the case of certain publications and national news sections the media has become 
almost entirely 'captured' by what I refer to as 'elite discourse networks'. 
These networks, comparable to the 'policy communities' (Jordan and Richardson, 
200 
1982) identified in studies of political policy-making, are discursive spaces where 
elites, often in conflict, debate and attempt to influence key decisions. These 
conflicts and debates are severely skewed because they a) only discuss issues 
relevant to corporate elites, and b) discuss them according to the norms and values 
shared by those elites. As chapters four and five argue, in the case of the City, those 
concerns, norms and values have many areas of consensus that are not typical of the 
general population or even other elites. Thus, although elites may be in conflict, and 
journalists consciously assert their autonomy, such discourse networks are severely 
biased. Therefore, in the area of economic and business news, the British print media 
serves to repeat the 'mobilisation of bias' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) identified in 
policy-making itself; i. e., the policy concerns of non-corporate elite constituencies 
are likely to be overlooked. As a result, the financial and business media become 
another means of voicing consensual financial elite requirements, in the guise of 
economic norms, to government elites. Political policy-makers, who are dependent 
on maintaining a healthy economy to retain both elite and mass support (see 
Lindblom, 1977, and Offe, 1984), are likely to be influenced in their deliberations 
accordingly. 
Unions, Outsider and Resource-Poor Groups 
In spite of such trends, the number and range of interest groups gaining access to the 
media in the UK has appeared to increase and broaden. The opportunities for trade 
unions and pressure groups to gain favourable media coverage appear to have 
improved significantly with the dissemination of professional PR. How does the 
above typology of factors account for this? 
Several explanations have been documented in this thesis. The first, is that superior 
elite PR resources are not simply deployed for the benefit of cohesive elite 
communities. Research in politics (e. g., Grant, 1993, Richardson, 1993, Kavanagh, 
1995) and media studies (e. g., Hallin, 1994, Miller, 1994, Deacon and Golding, 
1994) has pointed out that corporate and government sources do not always act 
together and, indeed, are in frequent conflict with each other. As a result, economic 
and cultural resource advantages can often be cancelled out. Elite conflict can also 
result in negative publicity and/or journalists questioning the legitimacy of certain 
powerful sources. A related point is that elites sources may often actually be 
representing the views of non-elite constituencies. This may be because they are 
consciously acting as third-party endorsers, or because they are the victims of 'spin' 
themselves. The obvious conclusion to be made is that elite source advantages cannot 
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be recorded on a simple balance sheet. 
A second explanation, rarely noted in source literature, is that, although public 
relations efficacy can be loosely correlated with financial expenditure, PR is far from 
dependent on economic resources. As explained, the main costs of PR are human 
ones and, as chapters seven and eight demonstrate, voluntary labour combined with 
some PR expertise can do much to make up for a lack of economic resources and 
professional PRPs. As these chapters also observe, large unwieldy communications 
operations, operating within large corporate and government bureaucracies, can often 
be at a disadvantage in a fast-moving media campaign. Being smaller and more 
campaign-focused, pressure group PRPs often have more specific knowledge and are 
quicker to respond to journalist needs than PRPs in govenu-nent and corporate 
organisations. In effect, well organised pressure group sources can have a greater 
media affinity with journalists on the bureaucratic level. 
Third, the affinity between unions/pressure groups and media producers can also be 
quite strong in terms of what is considered 'newsworthy'. News organisations clearly 
operate in a contradictory environment in which they tend to report elite interests and 
move in elite circles, but also have a raison d'&re that includes maintaining a check 
on power and representing the general public. While they need to attract advertising 
and are owned by pro-capitalist patrons, they also need to attract wider audiences 
that are not necessarily happy with the effects of capitalism and are cynical about 
business leaders. Media outlets, needing mass readerships, therefore need to appeal 
to large non-elite constituencies on a regular basis and often must be seen to be 
fulfilling some sort of fourth estate role. As chapter seven observes, union PR 
strategies have often attempted to exploit this potential affinity. Many have thus 
linked their campaigns with the needs of 'the public' and/or attacked 'greedy' and 
'incompetent' corporate and government elites. Unions are less likely to argue about 
jobs and money. Instead the communications focus is on public safety, education 
levels, attacks on racial and sexual discrimination, social welfare and recruitment 
problems. 
Fourth, what source literature has also been slow to recognise is that forms of media 
(cultural) capital are far from dependent on, and are a lot more volatile than, 
accumulations of economic capital. This volatility is where public relations strategies 
and operations become vital - something that has become more apparent as 
alternative sources adopt professional PR. As chapter six argues, unions in the 1970s 
and 1980s had lots of media capital but non-existent PR strategies. As chapter seven 
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suggests, and chapter eight demonstrates, union PRP strategies have proved to be 
fairly successful at accumulating all the forms of media capital outlined above. They 
have formed and maintained their own journalist contacts by improving media 
relations and supplying regular research and stories to them. They have worked hard 
to cultivate reputations associated with expertise, calm authority, forward thinking 
and public awareness. When lacking in cultural capital they have exploited that of 
others around them such as MPs, scientists and celebrities - using these figures to 
gain media access. Union PR strategies have thus been used to accumulate various 
forms of media capital as well as nullify that which is possessed by others. 
Thus the ability to influence norms and values in the new public relations democracy 
is as uneven as the material distribution of political power and resources themselves. 
Many organisations do not have the minimum resources necessary to mount even 
basic PR operations, while others inundate the media with their messages on a 
regular basis. The rise of professional public relations therefore means that 
institutions and corporations can further extend and institutionalise their media 
influence in the long term. It also means a greater media concentration on elite 
debates and/or the exclusion of non-elites from media access. However, outsider and 
resource-poor groups can continue their efforts in spite of resource inequalities. 
Instead they can make use of their human resources and apply strategies that 
integrate well with media requirements, sometimes using both to accumulate their 
own media capital. On occasion they are therefore able to make a significant impact - 
especially when governments and businesses are unprepared or in conflict. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: METHODS INVOLVED IN SURVEY OF TUC AFFILIATED 
UNIONS AND SELECTION OF INTERVIEW CANDIDATES 
This study was carried out using two methods. The first was a survey of all trade unions 
affiliated to the TUC (accounting for 80% of union membership in the UK). The second 
was a set of interviews across a range of 19 affiliated unions - accounting for one in four 
unions. The survey questionnaire was sent out by post to all 74 affiliates (as listed in the 
1997 TUC Directory) in July 1997 with repeat requests being sent out again in 
September. At the start of November, a total of 54 usable questionnaires (73%) had 
been received. Of the 54 respondents, 20 were Directors/Heads of Communication, 17 
were General Secretaries, and 17 had other titles ('researcher', 'communications 
assistant', etc. ). The questionnaires were coded and the information fed into SPSS for 
statistical analysis of the data. Of the 54 replies, 5 stated that they had no PR function at 
all and were not able to answer most of the questions. Others questions, e. g. on 
campaign priorities and branch participation, were also not answered by many smaller 
unions. The majority of tables had little 'missing data'. All tables are calculated on the 
basis of completed data. All participants were also coded, where possible, according to 
five criteria: Size, Public/Private, Single/Mixed Sector, Density, Profession. Many of 
the tables were cross-tabulated with these variables. Where results showed significant 
differences across sectors, these are highlighted in chapter seven. The five criteria are 
explained as follows: 
Q Size - Large unions over 100,000 members; Medium = unions between 10,000 and 
100,000; Small unions less than 10,000 members. 
ii) Pubfic/Private - Divides unions into those whose memberships are mostly employed 
in the public or private sectors. 
iii) Single/Mixed Sector - Divides unions into those whose members work in a single 
industry and those who work in two or more. 
iv) Density - High =a density of over 66%; Medium = density between 40% and 65%; 
Low = density of less than 40%. 
v) Profession - Divides unions into Professional/Managerial, Manual (skilled and 
unskilled) and Non-Manual (skilled and unskilled). 
In addition to the survey, a series of interviews was conducted across a range of unions. 
These unions were: UNISON, T&G, GMB, AEEU, MSF, CVVU, NUT, BIFU, RMT, 
MU, BFAVvrU, POA, ASLEF, NUJ, FDA, NAPO, BALPA, AMO, and HCSA. Unions 
were coded, according to the criteria above and the selection of unions attempted to get 
representatives of all sizes and sectors. Not all unions agreed to be interviewed and the 
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sample was not quite an even representation of unions in the 1990s. Smaller unions, 
especially manual and low density ones, tended to have little to do with communications 
or the media. Interviews with those unions, were thus often refused or cancelled. The 
interviews were with a mixture of General Secretaries and Heads of Communication. 
Most took place during the period of the survey and consisted of the same ten questions 
being put to participants. A few took place prior to the survey and were more 
exploratory in nature. Additionally, interviews were also conducted with two PR 
consultants working with unions and seven journalists with an involvement in 
industrial/labour affairs reporting. 
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APPENDIX 11 - TABLE PRINTOUTS FOR TRADE UNION SURVEY 
Table 1: Degree of Union Contact with the Media 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Daily 24 45.3 45.3 
Weekly 12 22.6 67.9 
Monthly 3 5.7 73.6 
Several Times/Year 13 24.5 98.1 
Never 1 1.9 100.0 
I Missing 
--------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 2: How PR/Communications Dealt with in Unions 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
General Sec Only 10 18.5 18.5 
PR Individual 1 1.9 20.4 
PR Department 20 37.0 57.4 
Part-Timer 9 16.7 74.1 
General Sec with Other 6 11.1 85.2 
No PR Function 5 9.3 94.4 
Consultancy Only 3 5.6 100.0 
--------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 3: Numbers of People Involved 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
No PR 5 9.3 9.3 
General Secretary 13 24.1 33.3 
Part-Timer 15 27.8 61.1 
1-2 People 10 18.5 79.6 
2.5-8 People 10 18.5 98.1 
More than 81 1.9 100.0 
--------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 100.0 
Mean 2.125 (people/union) Median .5 
00 (Part-time person) Mode . 
500 (Part-time person) 
Sum 114.75 (Total people employed in union communications for sample) 
Table 4: "During the 1980s, PR/Communications resources... " 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Increased Greatly 6 13.0 13.0 
Increased Moderately 16 34.8 47.8 
Stayed the Same 15 32.6 80.4 
Decreased Moderately 5 10.9 91.3 
Decreased Greatly 0 0.0 91.3 
Don't Know 4 8.7 100.0 
8 14.8 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 
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Table 5: "In the 1990s, PR/Communication Resources Have... " 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Increased Greatly 18 38.3 38.3 
Increased Moderately 18 38.3 76.6 
Stayed the Same 8 17.0 93.6 
Decreased Moderately 3 6.4 100.0 
Decreased Greatly 0 0.0 100.0 
7 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 6: "Over the Next Five Years do you Expect Your 
PR/Communications Resources to be... " 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Increase Greatly 13 28.3 28.3 
Increase Moderately 18 39.1 67.4 
Stay the Same 14 30.4 97.8 
Decrease Moderately 1 2.2 100.0 
Decrease Greatly 0 0.0 100.0 
8 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 7: Background Experie nce of Staff Dealing with Communications/PR 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
PR Only 3 6.5 6.5 
Journalism Only 11 23.9 30.4 
PR and Journalism 15 32.6 63.0 
Neither 17 37.0 100.0 
8 Missing 
------- ------- ------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 8: "Good Communications/PR is Now Essential for Winning 
Strikes/Pursuing Industrial Action" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Strongly Agree 14 29.2 29.2 
Agree 18 37.5 66.7 
Don't Know 7 14.6 81.3 
Disagree 9 18.8 100.0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 100.0 
6 Missing 
--------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 
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Table 9: "PR/Communications is Becoming the Key Union Method 
for Achieving Political and Industrial Goals" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Strongly Agree 11 22.9 22.9 
Agree 25 52.1 75.0 
Don't Know 4 8.3 83.3 
Disagree 8 16.7 100.0 
Strongly Disagree 0 0.0 100.0 
6 Missing 
--------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 10: The First Commun ications Priority of Un ions 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Membership Recruitment 11 26.2 26.2 
Campaigns/Lobbying 3 7.1 33.3 
Union Profile 2 4.8 38.1 
General Media Relations 1 2.4 40.5 
Journal. /Other Publications 7 16.7 57.1 
Internal/Member Communic 18 42.9 100.0 
12 Missing 
--------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 11: Top Communications Priorities of Unions Overall 
(Sum of Top Three Communications Selec tions) 
Percent of Unions 
Value Label Frequency Percent Prioritising 
Membership Recruitment 18 15.3% 33.3% 
Campaigns/Lobbying 20 16.9% 37.0% 
Union Profile 11 9.3% 20.4% 
General Media Relations 22 19.5% 42.6% 
Journal/Other Publications 13 11.0% 24.1% 
Intemal/Member Communic 33 28.0% 61.1% 
--------------------- 
Total 118 100.0 
Table 12: Top Communications Priorities for Campaigns Overall 
(Sum of Top Three Campaigns Selections) 
Percent of Unions 
Value Label Frequency Percent Prioritising 
Industrial Action 10 12.7% 18.5% 
National Employment Issues 8 10.1% 14.8% 
Union Image 14 17.7% 25.9% 
National Indust Campaigns 12 15.1% 22.2% 
Local Empt/Ind Campaigns 7 8.9% 13.0% 
Influence Members/Recruit 12 15.2% 22.2% 
Influence Politics/Legislation 14 17.7% 25.9% 
Other 2 2.5% 3.7% 
Total 79 100.0 
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Table 13: Individual Union Relations with the Media, 1970s-1990s 
Value Label 1970s 1970s 1980S 1980s 1990SI990S 
Freq Percent Freq Percent Freq Percent 
Very Good 2 5.6 1 2.4 4 8.0 
Good 10 27.8 7 16.7 24 48.0 
Neutral 14 38.9 15 35.7 17 34.0 
Bad 9 25.0 13 31.0 4 8.0 
Very Bad 1 2.8 6 14.3 1 2.0 




Total 54 100.0 54 100.0 54 100.0 
Table 14: "Compared to the 1980s, Has Union Access to the 
Media in the 1990s... " 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Increased Greatly 9 19.6 19.6 
Increased Moderately 21 45.7 65.2 
Stayed the Sarne 8 17.4 82.6 
Decreased Moderately 6 13.0 95.7 
Decreased Greatly 2 4.3 100.0 
Don't Know/Missing 8 
--------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 15: "Compared to the 1980s, has Favourable Media Coverage 
of Unions in the 1990s ... 1, Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Increased Greatly 4 8.3 8.3 
Increased Moderately 34 70.8 79.2 
Stayed the Same 9 18.8 97.9 
Decreased Moderately 0 0.0 97.9 
Decreased Greatly 1 2.1 100.0 
Don't Know/Missing 6 
--------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 16: "Improved Public Opinion of Unions is Due More to Unpopular Government and a 
Decrease in Strike Activity - NOT Public Relations" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Strongly Agree 2 4.3 4.3 
Agree 17 37.0 41.3 
Don't Know 8 17.4 58.7 
Disagree 18 39.1 97.8 
Strongly Disagree 1 2.2 100.0 
8 
--- -- - ---- 
Missing 
- - --------- 
Total 54 100.0 
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Table 17: "PR/Communications Tactics are Limited and Will Never Really 
Replace Other Union Strategies and Campaigning Forms" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Strongly Agree 1 2.1 2.1 
Agree 16 33.3 35.4 
Don't Know 9 18.8 54.2 
Disagree 18 37.5 91.7 
Strongly Disagree 4 8.3 100.0 
6 Missing 
--------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 
Table 18: "Money Spent on P ublic Relations is Better Spent 
on Other Union Priorities" 
Valid Cum 
Value Label Frequency Percent Percent 
Strongly Agree 0 0.0 0.0 
Agree 4 8.5 8.5 
Don't Know 10 21.3 29.8 
Disagree 24 51.1 80.9 
Strongly Disagree 9 19.1 100.0 
7 Missing 
-------------------- 
Total 54 100.0 
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APPENDIX III: OUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEY OF TRADE UNION 
COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA RELATIONS 1997 
Name of Union: ..................................................................................................................................... 
Year Formed: ......................................................................................................................................... 
If your union has merged within the last 12 years, please state when this took place and the titles of 
the previous unions: 
................................................................................................................................................................ 
Name of individual answering questionnaire: ....................................................................................... 
Official title: ......................................................................... Date: ...................................................... 
If you would like your union to remain anonymous in the reporting of any survey results 
please tick here [] 
SECTION A: DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES OF 
COMMUNICATIONS/PUBLIC RELATIONS MR) IN YOUR UNION 
1. Who is mainly responsible for PR/Communications within your union? (please tick one or more) 
a) the General Secretary [] 
b) another member of staff with other responsibilities 
c) a member of staff only employed to work on communications issues FT or PT 
d) a communications/PR department [] How many stafP 
e) the union has no communications/PR function [] 
f) other (please specijyj) ......................................................................................................................... 
Ifyour answer to this question is 'e'please move onto Section C (pg 4) 
2. a) Is the communications officer/department in your union responsible for any of the following 
(please tick where appropriate)? 
Internal Communications [] General Publications for Members [] Media Relations [] 
Journal Publications for Members [] Conferences/Exhibitions [I Lobbying[ 
Advertising [I Promotions/Sponsorship [] Membership Recruitment [I 
Media Monitoring/Evaluation [] Other (please specify) ................................................................ 
b) In order of importance, what are the three main communications priorities of your union: 
i) ............................................... ii) ............................................... iii) ................................................ 
3. Staff Experience/Training: 
a) Do any staff members, responsible for communications, have any previous work experience in 
i) public relations? Y[] or N 
ii) journalism? Y[] or N[] 
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b) Do those members with no media/public relations experience, responsible for communications, 
receive any media training? Y[] or N[] 
4. Do you have an annual communications budget? Y[I or N[] 
If yes, how much is it? f ........................................................................................................................ 
5. Please answer the following questions about the growth/decline of communications within your 
union. IncreasexIDecreases should be estimated as a proportion of union resources overall - E. g., 
if your union has shrunk in the 1990s, but its communication resources have remained stable, your 
resources have increased. (Tick only one box per question. ) 
Key: Increased Greatly (IG), Increased Moderately (IM), Stay(ed) the Same (SS), Decreased 
Moderately (DM), Decreased Greatly (DG), Don't Know (DK) 
IG IM SS DM DG DK 
a) During the 1980s, PR/Communications resources... [][][][][](] 
b) In the 1990s, PR/Communication resources have [][][][][][] 
c) Over the next five years do you expect your PR/ 
Communications resources to be ... 
6. Other Resources: 
a) Does your union use PR consultancies? Y[]N[] 
Please list which ones: ........................................................................................................................... 
b) Does your union use any of the following? (please tick appropriate boxes) 
Press Cutting Services[ ] Advertising Agencies [] Media Evaluation Services [] 
Media Distribution Services [] Media Training Services [] Lobbying Finns [] 
Other Services (please specify) ............................................................................................................. 
Please list any companies that have supplied these services to your union in the last five years: 
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SECTION B: CAMPAIGNS AND COMMUNICATIONS/M 
1. a) For what types of campaigning are PR and media relations used? (tick all appropriate boxes) 
strikes/industrial action [] long-term image of union [] national employee-rights campaigns [] 
national industrial campaigns [I changes in legislation [] local employee/indust. campaigns [] 
other (please specify) ............................................................................................................................. 
b) Communications resources are prioritised most for which types of campaign? Please state in 
order of priority. 
i) ............................................... ii) ............................................... iii) ................................................ 
2. Does your union have more than one branch? N[] or Y[] (if W'move onto question 3) 
a) Do local/branch members receive media/communications training? Y[] or N[] 
b) Do local/branch members participate in national media campaigns? Y[] or N[] 
3. Please list any campaigns, conducted since 1993, in which public relations has played a major 
role. Please write one line of explanation for each. 
4. Please answer the following questions on the use of public relations/communications and 
campaigning. (All questions should only have one tick. ) 
Key: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Don't Know (DK), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD) 
SA A DK D SD 
a) Good communications/PR is now essential for winning 
strikes/pursuing industrial action. 
b) PR/communications is becoming the key union method 
for achieving political and industrial goals. 
c) PR/communications tactics are limited and will never 
really replace other union strategies and campaigning forms 
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SA A DK D SD 
d) Money spent on public relations is better spent on other 
union priorities 
e) Improved public opinion of unions is due more to 
unpopular government and a decrease in strike activity 
- NOT public relations 
SECTION C: MEDIA RELATIONS 
1. How often does your union deal with the media? (please tick one) 
a) On a daily basis [] or b) On a weekly basis or c) On a monthly basis 
d) Several times a year [] or e) Never [] 
Ifyour answer to this question is Wyou have completed this questionnaire 
2. Please answer the following questions about your union's relations with the media. (Please tick 
one box per question) 
Key: Very Good (VG), Good (G), Neutral (N), Bad (B), Very Bad (VB), Don't Know (DK) 
VG GNB VB DK 
a) How would you describe union-media relations in 
the 1970s? 
b) How would you describe union-media relations in 
the 1980s? 
c) How would you describe union-media relations in 
the 1990s? 
3. Please answer the following questions about access and favourable reporting. (All questions 
should only have one tick. ) 
Key: Increased Greatly (IG), Increased Moderately (IM), Stayed the Same (SS), Decreased 
Moderately (DM), Decreased Greatly (DG), Don't Know (DK) 
IG IM SS DM DG DK 
a) Compared to the 1980s, has union access 
to the media in the 1990s ... 
b) Compared to the 1980s, has favourable media 
coverage of unions in the 1990s ... 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE IS NOW COMPLETE. PLEASE RETURN IT IN THE 
S. A. E. PROVIDED. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE. 
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APPENDIX IV: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ABBC - Association of British Chambers of Commerce 
ACAS - Arbitration and Conciliation Advisory Services 
AEEU - Association of Electrical Engineers Union 
AEU - Association of Electricians Union 
AGM - Annual General Meeting 
AMO - Association of Magistrates Officers 
ASLEF - Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
AUEW - Associated Union of Electrical Workers 
BAA - British Airports Authority 
BALPA - British Airline Pilots Association 
BBC - British Broadcasting Company 
BIFU - Banking, Insurance and Finance Union 
BFAVV'U - Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union 
BFI - British Film Institute 
BMA - British Medical Association 
BT - British Telecom 
CBI - Confederation of British Industry 
CEO - Chief Executive Officer 
CMA - Communication Managers Association 
COI - Central Office of Information 
CRE - Commission for Racial Equality 
CWU - Communication Workers Union 
DHSS - Department of Health and Social Security 
DTI - Department of Trade and Industry 
EAG - Economic Advisory Group 
EFL - External Financing Limit 
ERM - Exchange Rate Mechanism 
FCO, - Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
FDA - First Division Association of Civil Servants 
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FTSE - Financial Times Stock Exchange 
GATT - General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
GIS - Govemment Information Services 
GMB - General and Municipal Boilennakers Union 
GMWU - General Municipal Workers Union 
GUMG - Glasgow University Media Group 
HCSA - Hospital Consultants and Specialists Association 
loD - Institute of Directors 
IPR - Institute of Public Relations 
IRS - Investor Relations Society 
ITC - Independent Television Conunission 
HN - Independent Television News 
LWT - London Weekend Television 
MAFF - Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 
MAM - Mercury Asset Management 
MEAL - Media Expenditure Analysis Limited 
MMC - Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
MSF - Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union 
MU - Musicians Union 
MUA - Mail Users Association 
NACRO - Nation Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders 
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement 
NALGO - National Association of Local Government Officers 
NAPO - National Association of Probation Officers 
NCB - National Coal Board 
NCC - National Consumer Council 
NEDC - National Economic Development Council 
NGA - National Graphical Association 
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NFSP - National Federation of Sub-Postmasters 
NCU - National Communications Union 
NUJ - National Union of Journalists 
NUM - National Union of Miners 
NUR - National Union of Railwaymen 
NUT - National Union of Teachers 
OFT - Office of Fair Trading 
PKFA - Pannell Kerr Forster Associates 
POA - Prison Officers Association 
POUC - Post Office Unions Council 
POUNC - Post Office Users National Council 
PPA - Periodical Publishers Association 
PPS - Protect our Postal Services 
PRCA - Public Relations Consultants Association 
PRP - Public Relations Practitioner 
RMT - Royal Maritime and Transport Workers Union 
TGVVU (T&G) - Transport and General Workers Union 
TUC - Trades Union Congress 
UCW - Union of Communication Workers - old CWU 
UNISON - Public Services Union 
USM - Unlisted Securities Market 
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